Mapping European security after Kosovo by Ham, Peter van & Medvedev, Sergei
www.ssoar.info
Mapping European security after Kosovo
Ham, Peter van (Ed.); Medvedev, Sergei (Ed.)
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Sammelwerk / collection
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
OAPEN (Open Access Publishing in European Networks)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Ham, P. v., & Medvedev, S. (Eds.). (2002). Mapping European security after Kosovo. Manchester: Manchester Univ.
Press. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-271264
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
M
apping European security after Kosovo
van
Ham
,M
edvedev– eds
Mapping 
European security
after Kosovo
edited by
Peter van Ham
and Sergei Medvedev
VANHAMME.D-J  18/11/04  3:16 pm  Page 1
Mapping European security
after Kosovo
Allie
Mapping European security
after Kosovo
edited by
Peter van Ham and Sergei Medvedev
Manchester University Press
Manchester and New York
distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave
Copyright © Manchester University Press 2002
While copyright in the volume as a whole is vested in Manchester University Press, copyright
in individual chapters belongs to their respective authors, and no chapter may be reproduced
wholly or in part without the express permission in writing of both author and publisher.
Published by Manchester University Press
Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9NR, UK
and Room 400, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010, USA
www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk
Distributed exclusively in the USA by
Palgrave, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York,
NY 10010, USA
Distributed exclusively in Canada by
UBC Press, University of British Columbia, 2029 West Mall,
Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z2
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data applied for
ISBN 0 7190 6240 3 hardback
First published 2002
10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Typeset in Times
by Graphicraft Limited, Hong Kong
Printed in Great Britain
by Biddles Ltd, Guildford and King’s Lynn
Contents
List of figures page viii
Notes on contributors ix
Preface: Kosovo and the outlines of Europe’s new order
Sergei Medvedev and Peter van Ham 1
1 Kosovo: a European fin de siècle
Sergei Medvedev 15
Kosovo between Idealpolitik and Realpolitik 15
Kosovo between ethnic cleansing and allied bombing 17
Kosovo between (East)-modernity and postmodernity 19
Russia between derzhavnost’ and the dollar 23
Behold, the new world order cometh 27
2 Simulating European security: Kosovo and the Balkanisation–
integration nexus
Peter van Ham 32
Introduction: writing security 32
‘Security’ as a political struggle 33
European security as a tabula rasa 36
Kosovo and the margins of modernity 38
Writing security on the Balkan screen 40
Kosovo: the pre-context of European security 43
3 Kosovo and the end of war
Pertti Joenniemi 48
Introduction: deviant voices 48
War: a floating signifier? 50
War as usual 54
Towards a higher order? 55
Dealing with a residual case 57
Averting the mirror image 59
Conclusion: war as a stranger 61
4 Kosovo and the end of the legitimate warring state
Iver B. Neumann 66
Introduction 66
The Copenhagen School and violisation 67
War as legitimate violisation of politics 69
The ontologification of war 73
The other side 75
Legitimising weapons, targets and victims 76
Conclusion 79
5 Kosovo and the end of the United Nations?
Heikki Patomäki 82
Introduction 82
Principles of US foreign policy in the 1990s 83
The UN after Boutros-Ghali: implementing the will of the
US in Kosovo and elsewhere 93
Conclusion: the dangers of hard will and narrow power 96
6 Kosov@ and the politics of representation
Maja Zehfuss 107
Naming: reality and representation 108
Derrida: reality as representation 110
The reality of Kosovo 112
The supplement: identity, credibility, cohesion 116
Conclusion 117
7 ‘vvv.nato.int.’: virtuousness, virtuality and virtuosity in
NATO’s representation of the Kosovo campaign
Andreas Behnke 126
Introduction: reading preferences . . . 126
Loading plug-ins: liberal truth against systemic anarchy 128
Looking up host: www.nato.int 131
Host found; waiting for reply . . . 131
Reading file . . . 132
Cache clean-up . . . 137
‘All video sequences are available in MPEG’ 140
Conclusion: vvv.nato.int: host not found . . . 141
vi Contents
8 Of models and monsters: language games in the Kosovo war
Mika Aaltola 145
Introduction: Kosovo as a sign 145
Repetition, variation and incantation 147
The phantasmal background of political ‘magic’ 149
Western phantasmata and Yugoslavian counter-‘magic’ 150
Extending political order during the Kosovo war 153
Concluding remarks: security in search of agency 156
9 ‘War is never civilised’: civilisation, civil society and the
Kosovo war
Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen 162
Introduction 162
Civilisation and civil society 163
‘Who are you?’ 165
The civilisation of civil society 167
The cosmopolitan soul of Europe 170
Concluding remarks 173
10 Chechnya and Kosovo: reflections in a distorting mirror
Christoph Zürcher 179
Prologue 179
Chechnya and Kosovo: the similarities 183
Chechnya and Kosovo: the responses 187
Epilogue: reflections in a distorting mirror 193
Contents vii
List of figures
1 NATO banner page 131
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/all-frce.htm
2 F15/SAMs 132
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/all-frce.htm
3 Tank attack 140
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/video.htm
4 Tank attack 140
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/video.htm
5 Polysemantics of war images 192
Notes on contributors
Mika Aaltola Senior researcher on the project ‘Openness in Finnish Foreign
Policy’, funded by the Academy of Finland, and assistant professor of
international relations at the University of Tampere (Finland). His recent
publications include The Rhythm, Exception, and Rule in International
Relations (Studia Politica Tamperensis, 1999), and several articles on reality
making, order creation and persuasion in international politics.
Andreas Behnke University adjunct at Stockholm University (Sweden),
where he teaches international relations. His research interests include IR
theory, critical security studies and NATO. His recent publications include
articles on NATO’s post-Cold War security discourse and on the securitisa-
tion of political issues.
Peter van Ham Senior research fellow at the Netherlands Institute of
International Relations ‘Clingendael’, the Hague, and adjunct professor
at the College of Europe, Bruges. His recent books include European
Integration and the Postmodern Condition (Routledge, 2001); and (as
co-author) A Critical Approach to European Security (Pinter, 1999).
Pertti Joenniemi Senior research fellow and programme director for
Nordic–Baltic Studies at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute
(COPRI, Denmark). His publications are on region-building in the Baltic
Sea and Barents areas, northwestern Russia, as well as the unfolding of
political space in the northernmost part of Europe. He is co-editor of the
NEBI (North European and Baltic Integration) Yearbook.
Sergei Medvedev Professor at the George C. Marshall European Center
for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen (Germany). He has
held research positions in Moscow, Rome, Ebenhausen (Germany) and
Helsinki. His research interests vary from semiotics and cultural anthro-
pology to post-Soviet studies and European security. Recent publica-
tions include Russia’s Futures: Implications for the EU, the North and the
Baltic Region (UPI/IEP, 2000) and Russia and the West at the Millennium
(forthcoming).
Iver Neumann Senior researcher at the Norwegian Institute of International
Affairs (Oslo). His recent books (in English) include Uses of the Other:
‘The East’ in European Identity Formation (University of Minnesota Press,
1999); (as co-editor) The Future of International Relations: Masters in the
Making? (Routledge, 1997); and Russia and the Idea of Europe (Routledge,
1996).
Heikki Patomäki Reader in international relations at the Nottingham Trent
University. He is also the research director of the Network Institute for
Global Democratisation. His most recent books (in English) include (as
co-editor) The Politics of Economic and Monetary Union (Kluwer, 1997);
Democratizing Globalization (Zed, 2001); and After International Relations
(Routledge, forthcoming).
Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen Post-doctoral fellow at the University of Copen-
hagen (Denmark). He holds degrees from the University of Copenhagen
and the London School of Economics. He currently works on a project
on ‘reflexive security’ practices following the Cold War.
Maja Zehfuss Lecturer in international relations at the University of
Warwick (England). She works on German participation in international
military operations, constructivism and poststructuralism, and has
published in Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen.
Christoph Zürcher Researcher and Lecturer in international relations at
the Institute of East European Studies of the Free University of Berlin
(Germany). He is the co-editor of Potentials of (Dis)Order: Explaining
Conflict and Stability in the Caucasus and in the Former Yugoslavia
(Manchester University Press, forthcoming).
x Notes on contributors
Preface 1
Sergei Medvedev and Peter van Ham
Preface: Kosovo and the outlines
of Europe’s new order
Introduction: ‘Brother, can you spare a paradigm?’
Twelve years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, talk about the end of the Cold
War continues to haunt the professional discourse on European security.
The seemingly innocent reference to the post-Cold War era has turned into
an almost standard opening line of most writings in the field. A remarkable
uniformity of approach among different authors testifies not so much to the
intellectual impotence of the trade as to a lack of reference-points in recon-
ceptualising European security, compelling us to look back and attach our
narratives to the Cold War as the last-known paradigm and a foolproof
marker of Western identity.
Old mental maps are still very much in use for charting the new waters:
bipolarity, systemic thinking and the mindset of inclusion–exclusion continue
to cast their shadows beyond the Berlin Wall. The vacuum of Europe’s name-
less 1990s has attracted many new visions, and offers to fill the conceptual void
left by the end of communism. Rosy scenarios along the lines of Fukuyama’s
‘end of history’ were soon followed by the suggestion of the ‘new pessimists’
that we are instead entering a period of a ‘coming anarchy’ (Robert Kaplan),
asking ‘Must it be the West against the rest?’ (Matthew Connelly and Paul
Kennedy), or predicting a ‘clash of civilisations’ (Samuel Huntington).1 When
the United States proposed, in the early 1990s, to establish a new world order,
it became clear that this new vision of the West’s undisputed global leadership
was too ambitious; this new world order was interpreted by many as just the
new world’s newest scheme by which to give orders. Understanding that its
dream of a world society based on liberal values, democracy and a free-
market spirit would be unattainable, the West soon succumbed to a defeatist
notion of a new world disorder, ‘accepting’ that the ‘other’ does not think like
‘us’ – has not reached levels of civilisation and civil society similar to ‘ours’.
In this story of post-Cold War conceptual confusion, the war in and over
Kosovo stands out as a particularly interesting episode. ‘Kosovo’ obviously
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is more than a conflict, fight, clash or war over territory: it has been a battle
over ideas, identities and interests. ‘Kosovo’ has been marketed as a turning-
point in the development towards a new kind of Western mentality, as well
as the culmination of a liberal sense of humanitarian solidarity confined
to Europe’s political space. Clearly, these events can also be read in a less
positive manner, as testifying to Western arrogance, an over-reliance on the
efficacy of high-technology and a lack of long-term visions and policies of
peaceful engagement. But, however one wants to interpret ‘Kosovo’, it is
certainly clear that political spin-doctors have been highly successful in sell-
ing this war/conflict, and that Western public opinion has been happy to
buy the product/story.
What ‘Kosovo’ also offers is a template for academics, by which to test
and taste a smorgasbord of new, often critical, ideas about European pol-
itics and security. Whereas some would label ‘Kosovo’ as politics-cum-war
as usual, the vast majority (and certainly not a silent one, this time) seems to
share the view that this event stands for ‘something different’. NATO’s war
over Kosovo has called in question the orthodox understanding of what
European security is all about. Perhaps appropriately, coming as it does at
the beginning of a new millennium, ‘Kosovo’ testifies not only to the open-
ing of a post-Westphalian era where aged notions such as sovereignty and
territoriality have become uncertain, but to a potential post-Clausewitzian
era in which ‘hard’ military power as the straightforward ‘continuation of
politics by other means’ has proven to be ineffective, if not ultimately coun-
terproductive. ‘Kosovo’ can therefore be called ‘the first European war of
the twenty-first century’ (with the twentieth century ending in 1989), and
seen as an example of how the West has been fumbling towards a new
model of liberal order in Europe. ‘Kosovo’ symbolises and exemplifies the
relevance of many ‘end’-debates and ‘post’-debates within the academic
literature (i.e. the end of sovereignty, territoriality, geopolitics, modernity).
The time perhaps is now right to provide an initial outline of the fuzzy borders
of Europe’s new political order which ‘Kosovo’ has helped to shape.
This book emerged from a desire to contribute to the debate on how
‘Kosovo’ (as well as the discourse on ‘Kosovo’ itself) has affected our under-
standing of a number of key concepts in European and global politics. It
is not our intention to provide the reader with an ‘unbiased’ and detailed, let
alone definitive, account of what preceded the Kosovo war, how it has been
conducted and why, and how the aftermath should be evaluated (with all
the comfortable benefits that accompany hindsight). There are quite a number
of published works that try to do just that. The Kosovo saga is an ongoing
story with its own ups and downs, ranging from ethnic cleansing and alleged
genocide in the spring of 1999, to a quasi-successful popular revolution in
October 2000, and the election of a democratic government in Belgrade in
December of that year. These events form, of course, the background of the
papers collected here. But rather than to rehearse or take sides on the debate
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on ‘what really happened’, the essays in this volume take a different route
through the theoretical minefield of ‘Kosovo’, carefully watching out for the
scholarly detonators and the metaphysical boobytraps. They are all inter-
ested in questions that go beyond practical, policy-oriented, concerns which
may help decision-makers in avoiding (or preparing for) the next security
crisis in Europe.
Mapping European security starts by asking how experiences in Kosovo
have changed the discourse of European security. All chapters are based on
the assumption that the conventional political paradigm needs to be chal-
lenged through a series of critical variants, although they do not follow a
single agreed-upon theoretical approach to which they could all subscribe.
But instead of mainstream notions like anarchy, balance of power and statal
interpretations of European politics, this book calls for a reconceptualisation
of security and the inside–outside dyad through the introduction of new sets
of puzzles that concentrate on issues of identity, culture, language and the
normative notions of global politics. There are now numerous critical ap-
proaches to (European) politics and the study of international relations in
which this book is conceptually embedded. Constructivism, critical theory,
postmodernism and many a feminist approach have unveiled the hegemony
of mainstream social sciences and offered different readings of current events,
recent history and their theoretical implications.2
This book makes an attempt to provide new and stimulating perspectives
on how ‘Kosovo’ has shaped European post-post-Cold War reality (and a
possible new European order-of-sorts). It will, of course, be impossible to
press all these critical voices within the covers of one volume, and we there-
fore have no intention of offering a complete overview. It is our aim to
contribute to the insecurity of the field of security studies by sidelining the
theoretical worldview that underlies mainstream strategic thinking on the
Kosovo events. Most of the book’s contributions challenge the epistemo-
logical definition of the Kosovo game, arguing that we should be concerned
both with the ‘Kosovo out there’ (i.e. far away in the exotic Balkans) and
with the debate about what counts as security and how our definitions of
security are shaped by various power/knowledge interests.3 Our concern
with ‘Kosovo’ is not rooted in a desire to offer ‘problem-solving theory’.
Rather, we are (as Ken Booth argued a decade earlier) interested in moving
‘thinking about security in world affairs . . . out of the almost exclusively
realist framework into the critical philosophical camp’.4 Most contributors
to this book have adopted such a critical approach by re-essentialising and
deconstructing orthodox assumptions about the nature of European (and
global) security without, however, necessarily offering their own redefinitions.
The political and intellectual insecurity brought about by ‘Kosovo’ has
much to do with a rising culture of virtuality to which most authors in this
volume pay tribute. The Gulf war, which, according to Baudrillard’s pro-
vocative statement, ‘never took place’, may still have been too far away in
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space and relevance.5 But, in Kosovo, Europe found itself for the first time
in the midst of a virtual war, based on aggressive strategies of simulation
which were more typical of the new world than of the old continent. The
war, originating in the United States-led revolution in military affairs and
automated warfare, has made unprecedented use of airpower, thus largely
disregarding and bypassing territorial (read: ‘European’) space.6 On the ‘home
front’, manipulation techniques of the media have alienated the audience
from the ‘felt presence’ of war to the extent of turning ‘Kosovo’ into a
media spectacle and a PR event. This has resulted in (what Walter Benjamin
has called) the ‘aestheticisation of war’.7
In ‘Kosovo’, Europe has for the first time faced the increased independent
agency – some would say the dominant role – of technology and the media in
security matters, turning the war into a form of symbolic exchange and ‘Euro-
pean security’ into a simulacrum. A remarkable disregard by policy-makers
and military planners of the ‘situation on the ground’ has made the entire
territory of Kosovo and Serbia redundant for war fought out on computer
monitors and TV screens, in the realm of high-technology and high politics.
The missing referents of war have highlighted a more general problem, namely
the missing referents of European security and the constructed, simulated
nature of the new project of producing a more robust European identity.
Although it is frequently claimed that ‘Kosovo’ heralds a new era of
humanitarian and ethical politics within Europe, most of the contributors to
this volume are far from assured that a system is emerging that can serve as
a new grounding for Europe’s political order. It is this quest for order and
the mechanisms that are used by the West’s political and military elites that
attract most attention here. The cult(ure) of security rests on accepted claims
about the nature and limits of the established political order, and the role of
politics in shaping and changing this order. ‘Kosovo’ has again illustrated
these power mechanisms, although the swirl of European integration,
globalisation and fragmentation has altered the character of some more
familiar procedures.
Indeed, ‘Kosovo’ has illustrated how security has been used to secure
European sovereignty and its institutions. After the single European currency,
‘security’ has become Europe’s next big ‘new idea’, although few have any
clear understanding of how this new enterprise can/should be interpreted
and realised. Perhaps by default, ‘security’ has become one of the keys tools
for constructing Europe, a tool for claiming Europe’s essential foundations
through fixing the boundaries between inside and outside and the claim to
organise, occupy and administer Europe’s space. Mapping European security
aims to investigate how ‘Kosovo’ has developed into this principal paradig-
matic sign in the complex text of European security and asks how its very
marginality has emphasised the unravelling fringes and limits of the sovereign
presence of what ‘Europe’ thinks it stands for, and how it affects the discourse
on European security.
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Previews
The first two chapters of this volume offer a conceptual overview of the
Kosovo debate, placing these events in the context of globalisation, European
integration and the discourse of modernity and its aftermath. As its title
suggests, the opening essay, by Sergei Medvedev, examines the latter aspect
of ‘Kosovo’, interpreting it as a typical instance of late-modern decadence, a
game of narcissism and simulation, resembling cultural paradigms of fin de
siècle and the Untergang des Abendlandes. ‘Kosovo’ is an elusive phenom-
enon, evading the categorising discourses of modernity and postmodernity,
sovereignty and integration, nationalism and transnationalism, realpolitik
and idealpolitik, and other dichotomies. ‘Kosovo’ might have been adver-
tised as heralding everything ‘new’, from ‘humanitarian intervention’ to the
revolution in military affairs. Medvedev’s deconstruction aims to ruin the
binary opposition of ‘old’ and ‘new’ in relation to Kosovo, and to interpret
it as an omen of uncertainty and indecision, a symptom of decay and of the
protracted crisis of modernity.
Medvedev displays the failure of the old–new paradigm to analyse the
actors of the Kosovo story and their respective discourses. On the one hand,
‘Kosovo’ has introduced the new element of agency into European security,
whereby the main actors and driving forces of the West’s war were not
states, elites, bureaucracies or politicians, but means of communication –
weapons and the media. He argues that Kosovo has ultimately blurred the
distinction between weapons and the mass media. As ‘smart’ weapons started
carrying on-board cameras, their purpose is transformed from destruction
to entertainment. It was the media, in its military and journalistic guises,
that produced and simulated the Kosovo war, which amounted to nothing
more than a video-sequence, a computer game, a PR campaign, or at
the very least a military parade, to be consumed by a (mainly) Western
audience.
On the other hand, the ‘new’ discourse of European security that reveals
itself through numerous media representations is in fact a traditional dis-
course of power akin to the Christian white man’s discourse that has guided
Western colonisation for the last 500 years under the banner of morality.
The popular rendering of ‘Kosovo’ as the ‘new’ NATO versus the ‘tradi-
tional nationalist’ Milosevic is therefore a simulated binarity, luring the
Western audiences into a false choice, and into accepting NATO bombings
as a ‘necessary evil’.
Peter van Ham has a different point of departure, arguing that the notion
of ‘European security’ no longer follows the logic of representation (by
which ‘security’ posits the state within legitimate boundaries), but now abides
by a logic of simulation. Building upon the work of Cynthia Weber and Ole
Wæver, he suggests that to tell stories about European security is to imply
the very existence of ‘Europe’ as an object of reference. This is the alibi
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function of all discourses of European security, since to assume that
‘something’ is (possibly) threatened is to insist upon its very existence.
‘Kosovo’ and the European security discourse have discursively framed the
diverse meanings of ‘Europe’, fixing its geopolitical boundaries by locating
its practices and by speaking as if a stable European polity already exists.
The ‘enemy’ of Europe’s volatile identity has been defined as the ‘unknown’,
the ‘unpredictable’ and the ‘unstable’. The challenge for the EU has been to
prevent a slow drift from a postmodern politics of diversity to a succumbing
to the modern fear of fluidity and ambiguity.
‘Kosovo’ has been the ultimate marker of the strange-and-alien threaten-
ing contemporary European security by its ethnic and sectarian essential-
ism, its barbarian methods of ‘ethnic cleansing’, and its altogether premodern
values, attitudes and practices. Van Ham suggests that by not accepting the
rationales of European integration and European security, Milosevic’s
Serbia posed itself as the main challenge to the emerging new European
order (NEO), and, by ignoring the logic of NEO realism, raised the key
question which European policy makers and theorists have tried to ignore:
on what stable foundations can European security be constructed? He claims
that the Kosovo experience illustrates that the discourse on ‘European secur-
ity’ has changed, once and for all, and that the ‘signified’ of statal security
no longer dominates. Van Ham therefore concludes that ‘Kosovo’ has been
both the pretext and the ultimate context in which the contemporary reading
of ‘European security’ is taking place.
These introductory chapters are followed by three chapters that examine
Kosovo’s impact on the idea of war. War is not merely armed conflict; nor
is it merely politics by other means. War is one of the key events that shape
and legitimise states in their quest for sovereignty and power (both inside
and outside their boundaries). Pertti Joenniemi asks whether NATO’s
involvement in Kosovo was merely an ‘air operation’, a military interven-
tion, or perhaps even an all-out war? He suggests that ‘Kosovo’ has played
an instrumental role in changing the discourse on conflict within Europe,
and that it signals a profound ontological clash by turning ‘war’ into an
openly contested concept.
Joenniemi claims that ‘Kosovo’ has undermined one of modernity’s cen-
tral referents and that war now has to be envisaged without its traditional
conceptual baggage (e.g. sovereignty and statehood). His essay suggests that
the events in Kosovo have offered us war in a new guise: it does not stand
out as a normal state of affairs, but occurs as an exception and a stranger.
War represents a form of discontinuity of politics-as-usual and is something
unexpected and unique within a broader political setting characterised by
the general absence of securitisation. Cooperation within an imagined ‘inter-
national community’ has now become the norm, whereas local conflicts
are depicted as exceptions, conducted by ‘outlaws’, which are automatically
subject to Western-mediated remedies and ‘normalisation’. Joenniemi claims
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that ‘Kosovo’ has been instrumental to the construction of a new doctrine
of humanitarian intervention that is no longer ‘modern’ in the sense that
it is not predicated on notions of sovereignty and a clear divide between
inside/outside and friend/foe. Rather, he argues, it is premissed on ambival-
ence and ambiguity, caused by the blurring and transcendence of numerous
political and conceptual boundaries, including the ones that are essential for
the modern understanding of war.
Iver Neumann further investigates the claim of the West to have become
the norm – and the only legitimate representative of ‘humanity’, thereby
casting Serbia as the enemy not just of human rights but of ‘humanity’ as
such. In exploring this claim, he goes to the origins of the notion of
‘securitisation’, citing the work of Carl Schmitt and several authors of the
Copenhagen School (Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver). To their criteria of pol-
iticisation and securitisation, Neumann adds a category of ‘violisation’. In
Kosovo, certain national identities were violised, but at the same time for
the West, war became a legitimate violisation of politics.
The central point of Neumann’s chapter is the question of legitimacy:
who can legitimately wage war, over which issues, and by what means? The
answer to the first question in Kosovo was given in a legitimising speech act
whereby the alliance of states appointed themselves as the representatives of
humanity. As regards issues legitimising war, Neumann observes the late
modern trend of replacing the left–right axis and the conflict of the classes
by a national–post-national axis and the struggle between the local and the
global. Liberal globalisation is left as the only political programme with a
global appeal, and that is why ‘NATO could so easily . . . pose as the rep-
resentative of humanity as such. There simply was no force around to issue
a counter-claim.’
The identity-driven violisation of politics has added an ontological dimen-
sion to war, eliminating the Hegelian understanding of war (‘right against
right’), and re-introducing the Catholic tradition of a ‘just war’. Neumann’s
conclusions are unflattering for Western politicians, as he questions the
morality of a no-own-losses war, which yields to the temptation of letting
other people die instead. ‘Humanity’ was invoked in Kosovo as a political
notion, a legal concept and, ultimately, as a speech act legitimising war and
thereby replacing the legitimate warring state – but it has spectacularly
failed, morally as well as politically, to legitimise the violence and death
which followed its invocation. Neumann’s quest for a ‘political entity which
may legitimately speak in the name of humanity’ has so far proved futile.
In fact, many, including Russia, China and most Third World countries,
would see such a political entity to be embodied in the United Nations –
and the UN Charter as the only source of legitimacy for the possible use of
inter-state violence. For them, ‘Kosovo’ may have seemed an unfortunate
occurrence in which the UN was sidelined by NATO. However, as Heikki
Patomäki argues in his chapter, ‘Kosovo’ was not an exception but rather
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the rule, an episode in the longer-term process of the domestication and
marginalisation of the UN by the United States, underpinned by Manichean
myths of good and evil and rituals of enemy construction. His analysis
contributes to the discussion of the implications of US hegemony, originat-
ing in the debates of the late 1970s and the 1980s on hegemonic stability.
Patomäki starts by reconstructing the US–UN conflict in the 1990s, analys-
ing the deep structures of US foreign policy discourse, and formulating its
four guiding principles: unchallenged global leadership; the moralising
production of myths and construction of enemies; maximising the support
of public opinion; and supporting the global expansion of corporate capital-
ism. His analysis is particularly incisive in describing the crude ethics com-
municated by the globalising media, which follows the logic of selective
sensations and a hierarchical valuation of human lives. The Americans and
the Europeans are the most valuable, and get the most coverage; however,
‘even poor and less valuable people can be covered if they die in large
numbers in one spot at one time’. A particularly low value is attributed to
‘evil-doers’ in remote and unfamiliar places, whether presumed terrorists,
fundamentalists or ethnic cleansers, who can be legitimately killed – indeed,
they have to be killed in Western performative rituals of ‘realism’.
Patomäki arrives at rather pessimistic conclusions, with respect both to
the United States and to the role of the UN. For characterising the US, he
uses Karl Deutsch’s definition of ‘hard will’, which implies the ability to act
‘in character’, talking instead of listening. An ever-harder will on the part of
the US and its increasingly ‘narrow power’ bring to mind the ‘torpedo run
by a pre-destined and a potentially destructive programme’. The UN after
Kosovo holds out equally little promise to the world, as the moral basis of
its pluralism and its basic legal procedures have been undermined. There are
few signs indicating that the US would allow for a rejuvenation, empower-
ing, or democratising of the UN system. Patomäki’s radical proposal is to
begin building a parallel and more efficient and more democratic global
system than the UN, ‘at first perhaps in spite of the will of the US and its
closest ally, the UK’.
Whereas the chapters by Joenniemi, Neumann and Patomäki explore
‘Kosovo’ as a product of the decay of modern institutions and discourses
like sovereignty, statehood, the warring state or the UN system, the sub-
sequent three contributions explore the symbolic economy of ‘Kosovo’, treat-
ing it as a mere representation, a sign in the contrived text of ‘Europe’.
Informed by poststructuralist discourses, the contributions by Maja Zehfuss,
Andreas Behnke and Mika Aaltola analyse the political implications of the
crisis of representation, the virtualisation and visualisation of politics, and
language games involved in enemy creation and identity construction.
First in this semiotic/linguistic cluster comes the chapter by Maja Zehfuss,
looking into the political linguistics of Kosovo in a framework shaped by the
texts of Ferdinand de Saussure and Jacques Derrida. She starts by observing
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a characteristic struggle over the name of Kosovo in the Western discourse:
it could be the Serbian spelling of Kosovo, the Albanian spelling of Kosova,
or the orthographic oddity ‘Kosov@’, a spelling suggested by the German
Green Party in an attempt to avoid political partisanship inherent in the act
of naming. This story attests to the fact that naming is a productive prac-
tice, an act of objectification, and eventually an act of assigning power
positions: naming is empowering, and is therefore a political practice.
Moving on to poststructuralist ground, Zehfuss deconstructs the produced
‘reality’ of Kosovo, using Derrida’s critique of Western logocentrism. For
Derrida, any ‘reality’ is signified, and signs which were supposed to merely
supplement ‘reality’ came to replace it. Attributing any positive value to
‘facts of real life’, and placing them at the heart of our normative discourses,
are therefore political moves. Following this logic, Zehfuss shows how the
‘reality of Kosovo’ was constructed in the Western discourses. The ‘real
facts’ like the ‘genocide’, the ‘ethnic cleansing’ and the ‘humanitarian cata-
strophe’ which served as a reason for Operation Allied Force, were supple-
mented by goals like upholding the credibility of NATO, ensuring the
cohesion of the Alliance, and, more generally, the construction of a Western
(‘European’) identity. However, in accordance with Derrida’s logic, ‘supple-
ments’ came to replace what were pictured as the ‘real reasons’ for the
operation. This was exemplified by the practice of high-altitude bombing,
which aimed to preserve NATO’s cohesion, but ultimately exacerbated the
plight of the refugees whom these bombs were supposed to protect in the
first place.
In this sense, the claims of Western politicians – including former peace
champions like the German Greens – that bombing was ‘demanded by
reality’ were problematic since they posited ‘reality’ as something external to
language. Zehfuss, instead, argues that ‘Kosovo’ was produced by the
Western power discourse in the very act of naming, and in its numerous
representations. In portraying Kosovo as an ‘inescapable reality’ and a no-
other-choice situation, the West has in fact relieved itself of all responsibility
for fellow humans.
Following Zehfuss’s critique of the politics of the sign, Andreas Behnke
proceeds to deconstruct the politics of the image. ‘Kosovo’ has been NATO’s
first virtual war using high-tech military equipment and computers to
visualise the bombing raids (in the familiar ‘before-and-after’ pictures used
during NATO’s daily press briefing). Behnke asks how this ‘virtual Kosovo’
has affected NATO’s policies as well as the public reaction to the war in
general. He concerns himself with the ‘virtualised’ nature of the conflict and
its representation in a virtual system of signifiers. Operation Allied Force
has been part of a wider campaign in which the crucial battleground is the
delocalised world of information networks, TV-screens, newspaper-articles
and internet sites. It is on these grounds that the battles over legitimacy,
effectiveness and consequences have been fought.
10 Sergei Medvedev and Peter van Ham
Behnke maintains that NATO’s claim to represent a superior ‘commun-
ity of values’ has been used to authorise the Alliance’s exercise of military
force against other, ‘lesser’, states. NATO has presented itself as an agent
with a humanitarian purpose and almost untouchable moral values, untainted
by politics, power and persuasion, attributes which have now been replaced
by concepts such as morality, authority and force. In this sense, Behnke
claims, NATO has conducted an epistemic war to secure its privileged moral
status, fighting against the systemic anarchy of the international system
and the inherent ambivalence and undecidability that necessitates (and even
demands) the political designation of identity. By analysing the presentation
of the Kosovo war on NATO’s website, using images, narratives and videos,
Behnke opens a new theoretical perspective on the visual/virtual side of the
conflict.
In the last of three contributions on semiology, Mika Aaltola sees the
events of ‘Kosovo’ as part of a long history of language games in relation to
war, belonging and identity. He argues that the West has looked at the
atrocities which have taken place in Kosovo as something fascinating and
horrifying, events that by their exceptionality were testing and defying the
moral order to be found ‘at home’. Aaltola claims that it is at the periphery
of the known world that the realm of marvels and wonders seems to begin.
It is this world of ‘magic’ – the radically strange and bizarre – that is of
interest to him in understanding what ‘Kosovo’ is all about. He argues that
the periphery of (international) reality always has an inherently ‘magical
flavour’ to it, mainly because it offers a template for understanding that
element of global politics which deals with the art of producing and main-
taining marvellous, striking and at times also surprising phenomena by
ritualistic/performative methods.
For Aaltola, ‘magic’ implies a strong sense of forcefulness behind explicit
words. In the case of ‘Kosovo’, the violence that was used was therefore not
only the exercise of military force, but the (mainly rhetorical) sources of
power themselves. During the Kosovo war, the spectrum of these ‘divine’
words (used by both sides) included ‘freedom’, ‘liberty’, ‘hope’, ‘peace’ and
‘unity’. He argues that by their incessant repetition (with only marginal
variation), these concepts have been sublimated and have acquired a power-
ful character reminiscent to the ‘spirits’ of medieval times. By drawing upon
classical texts by Plato, Aristotle and Giordano Bruno, as well as by
Wittgenstein, Aaltola makes it clear that ‘Kosovo’ has invoked a language
game that has been essential to the creation of a legitimate political order in
Europe.
This is the theme which Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen takes as the starting-
point of his chapter, namely how the Kosovo war has informed us on the
relevance of modish concepts such as identity and civilisation, and how the
use of force can be instrumental in the construction of government in terms
of civil society. Rasmussen links the public discourse on NATO’s actions in
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Kosovo with philosophical traditions such as the Scottish Enlightenment
(and the writings of Adam Ferguson in particular), the work of Kant (and
his conception of the pacific federation of liberal governments as the cosmo-
politan purpose of history) and the recent debate on the role of civilisation
introduced by Huntington. European politicians have frequently argued that
NATO was using force against Belgrade to secure Western civilisation. But,
using Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’, Rasmussen suggests that we
can better understand the notion of civilisation as the manifestation, rather
than the explanation, of the West’s construction of appropriate government
in post-Cold War Europe. Therefore, NATO’s war over Kosovo has illus-
trated the dominant belief in the West that the bombing campaign was de
facto enforcing Kant’s idea of a ‘cosmopolitan system of general political
security’.
As several other contributors to this book have argued, Rasmussen sug-
gests that ‘Kosovo’ has helped to construct the nascent ‘European identity’,
mainly in reference to the notion of cosmopolitan integration. Quoting the
British Prime Minister Tony Blair, he suggests that the emerging definition
of Western governmentality is captured under the heading of globalisation.
This is illustrated by the fact that, during the war, the West could no longer
define itself as a community of nation states, but that the very governmentality
of the Western states had acquired a cosmopolitan nature. ‘Kosovo’ can
therefore be considered in terms of the globalisation of domestic politics, an
ongoing process that replaces the old rules of power politics with the novel
convention of cosmopolitan community. To the West, both ‘Kosovo’ and
the deepening of globalisation may be considered as proof that history is
coming to an end and that a cosmopolitan system is emerging.
Globalisation is also a leitmotif for the final chapter in the volume, by
Christoph Zürcher. He likens ‘Kosovo’ to Russia’s war in Chechnya as two
archetypal conflicts in a globalising world, involving three types of inter-
dependent actors: nation states; identity groups; and international regimes. He
explores the claims, rights and capacities of each of these actors. The simil-
arities between the two conflicts range from their background – the institu-
tional legacy of the socialist ethno-federations – to the new type of violence
that likens Kosovo and Chechnya to many of the conflicts in Africa and Latin
America in the 1990s. Zürcher quotes Mary Kaldor in calling this phenom-
enon ‘new war’, a type of organised violence that blurs the distinction between
war, organised crime and large-scale violation of human rights. According
to Zürcher, such conflicts share at least four common features: they involve
identity groups and the state; the states involved are weak or virtually absent;
the conflicts lead to the emergence of ‘markets of violence’ on which a few
‘entrepreneurs of violence’ engage in an economy of war, blurring the border
between legal economy, organised crime and warfare; finally, these conflicts,
and the actors, are embedded in transnational networks of images, resources
and politics, linking the local wars with the globalising world.
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Analysing the interventions by NATO in Kosovo and by Russia in
Chechnya, Zürcher observes a remarkable lack of traditional Realist interests.
Neither NATO nor the Russian federation went to war because its survival
was actually threatened, or because of the relative gains to be made. Rather,
both wars were supposed to cater to the expectations of domestic audiences,
propping up the respective identity projects of ‘European security’ and ‘Rus-
sian revival’ under Putin, while at the same time ‘sending the right message’
to the opponent and to the world at large. As Zürcher succinctly puts it,
‘winning these wars not only meant to outgun the enemy – it meant above
all “selling” the conflict to the consumer, i.e. having the monopoly of inter-
pretation’. This has been made all the easier by the blurred chain of com-
mand, and by what Zürcher describes as a lack of democratic control
mechanisms in Russia as well as in NATO.
Into the unknown
Probably the most unfortunate similarity between Kosovo and Chechnya is
that, although the high-intensity military phase is over, both conflicts are a
long way from a lasting solution. In Kosovo, the tremendous war effort – at
almost $1 billion a day, not to mention the $40 billion worth of damage to
the Yugoslav economy – stands in stark contrast to the paltry results on the
ground. Serb security forces have evacuated the province but remain essen-
tially undefeated. Pictures on TV showed an orderly retreat of armed men,
displaying Serb flags and V-signs. This army still has a potential use in
oppressing dissent within Serbia or in waging an assault against Montenegro.
Inside the province, the ending of the conflict has left Kosovo with what
promises to be an indefinite and significant garrison of NATO-led troops,
the KFOR; while the UN civil administration (UNMIK) is under-resourced.
Though diplomats do not like to openly admit it, the ‘international commun-
ity’ has established a strange kind of power-sharing arrangement in Kosovo
between the UN and NATO, on the one hand, and the heirs of the KLA,
including illegal guerrilla groups, on the other.8
Against the background of an expeditious return of over 800,000 Kosovar
refugees – which should be rightly considered a major success of KFOR and
UNMIK – the province has been cleansed of 230,000 Kosovo Serbs, Roma
and other minorities (a UN estimate). Hundreds of Serbs are reported to
have been killed or to be missing, while revenge attacks, ethnically motivated
murders, bombings and arson have driven the vast majority of the remain-
ing Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanians in Kosovo into enclaves guarded
by KFOR.
Of course, things have dramatically changed in Yugoslavia in the last
months of the year 2000. Milosevic was defeated in the Yugoslav federal
presidential elections in September; his refusal to accept the result led to the
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popular uprising on 5 October that brought to power the election winner
Vojislav Kostunica. This was again followed by a landslide victory for
Kostunica’s Democratic Opposition of Serbia in the parliamentary elections
on 24 December 2000, and the appointment of veteran opposition leader
Zoran Djindjic as new prime minister. Milosevic has now left the political
scene, and thus one of the NATO’s main objectives (‘We stay until Milosevic
goes’), has been met. However, the irony of the situation is that finding
a solution for Kosovo has become an even more complicated task, much
more so than at the times of the straightforward ‘the world v. Milosevic’
stand-off. With a new and more legitimate government in Belgrade, Kosovo’s
hope for independence is weaker than in 1999–2000. No one seems to have
a clear idea about Kosovo’s future, and, like Bosnia, it is bound to remain
a Western protectorate for many years to come. As Tim Judah has warned,
in the long run, frustration over this contradiction could lead Kosovo
Albanians into conflict with UNMIK and KFOR, if they come to be seen as
occupiers.9
The insecurity in Kosovo is merely an episode in the wider security crisis
faced by the West, the crisis of security referents, institutions and discourses.
As happened so often in the 1990s, the invocation of the spirits of security,
along with traditional mechanisms of power and Realist thinking, has proved
ineffective. ‘Kosovo’ resists a solution purely in terms of security by a
Foucauldian ‘discipline and punish’. The question remains whether Europe
will be able to learn from this failure and start to doubt the relevance of
traditional thinking about security for the European project. ‘Kosovo’ has
introduced new overtones into the European Weltanschauung and the ways
in which ‘Europe’ asserts itself as an independent power discourse in a
globalising world: increasingly diffident, looking for firm foundations in the
conceptual void of the turn of the century.
Europe’s security is back by popular demand, although it may just be an
attempt to conceal the growing security gap and the increasing uncertainty
of Europe in a world of late modernity. It is precisely the insecurity brought
about by ‘Kosovo’ that makes military planners long for the strategic clarity
of East–West confrontation; makes politicians yearn for the simplicity of
Cold War zero-sum games; and makes academics repeat ‘magic incantations’
of security, relapsing into talk about the end of the Cold War twelve years
after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Peter van Ham and Sergei Medvedev
Garmisch-Partenkirchen, the Hague
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Kosovo: a European fin de siècle
On a hot day in early June 1999, I was participating in a conference on
European security in Berlin. The talk of the day was obviously the war in
Kosovo. At the same time, at Unter den Linden, a few blocks away from
the conference venue, a messy and joyful event was taking place – the
Christopher Street Gay Parade, a prelude to the Berlin Love Parade held a
couple of weeks later. As I left the conference hall and joined the crowds at
Unter den Linden, it occurred to me that Kosovo and the Love Parade
have a great deal in common. They are both carnivals of simulation and
narcissism, glowing with flamboyant decadence. A techno-music parade and
a military techno parade, a unified Berlin and a disintegrating Yugoslavia,
rights of the gay minorities and rights of the Kosovo Albanians, are all
signifying Europe at the end of modernity, a trademark European fin de
siècle.
Kosovo between Idealpolitik and Realpolitik
Kosovo is the first war in history said to be fought in pursuit of principle,
not interest. What is at stake is a radical revision of the moral (and, perhaps
subsequently, the legal and institutional) basis of the international system.
The Westphalian principle of sovereignty – originally created by monarchs
to ensure their position against popular movements, and systematically
(mis)used by rulers against their own subjects – is being eroded. In fact, the
Weberian principle of the state as possessing a legitimate monopoly on
violence seems to be failing. Sovereigns no longer hold this monopoly: it
now belongs to the international community. The West has defined basic
human rights as universal principles that transcend sovereignty.
In the new normative paradigm of Idealpolitik, sovereignty is no longer
an ontological given, no longer inviolate. In some cases, it may be restricted
(for example, Milosevic’s token sovereignty over Kosovo or Saddam Hussein’s
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over Iraqi skies); in other instances, it is simply revoked. As a result,
sovereignty and governance arguably can be made more responsible and
accountable, encouraging greater public participation and observance of
human rights. (However, the question remains, responsible and account-
able to whom? Is it to indigenous constituencies or to the moral authority of
the West, which in some cases is external to domestic discourses?)
This seems well and good in theory, but the reality test has turned out to
be much more confusing. To put it simply, interests of power have contamin-
ated what looked like an attempt to execute normative Idealpolitik. In The
Twenty Years’ Crisis, E.H. Carr criticised the hypocrisy of the application of
morality to the anarchy of international relations, and argued that it led to
disaster by ignoring the real relations of power.1 NATO’s operation in Kosovo
proved to be no different. Idealpolitik has been mixed (one could say com-
promised) with all sorts of traditional interests, strategies and mischief.
Interests at play in the conflict in Kosovo have been numerous and con-
spicuous. They have ranged from NATO’s search for a post-Cold War role
to play and for a clear enemy – to President Clinton’s determination in his
post-Lewinsky phase to show, urbi et orbi, that he was, after all, a morally
responsible statesman. They have included the United States’ wish to reassert
its position in transatlantic relations in the wake of the Amsterdam Treaty
and the arrival of the EMU; the desire of EU member states to prevent the
influx of 1 million Kosovar refugees; the interests of the military industry
and the interests of technology.
In the world of postmodern technology, hardware – computers, commun-
ication networks and state-of-the-art weapons – acquires a certain agency
and generates interests of its own. Anton Chekhov said that if there is a
shotgun hanging on the wall in the first act of a play, it is certain to fire
in the third act. Likewise, B2 bombers, our civilisation’s top guns, need to
fly actual missions – and fly they did, taking off from a base in Missouri,
refuelling over the Atlantic, bombing targets in Serbia, and returning to
Missouri the same evening. As an American pilot declared in an interview,
‘The great thing about flying a B2 is that you start in the morning,
accomplish a mission, and you’re back home in the evening, with your wife,
your kids, and a cold beer.’ ‘Hi Dad!’ – welcome to the world of postmodern
warfare and computer morality. Never mind the cost-effectiveness of these
B2 missions: they were all about media effectiveness and a display of tech-
nological supremacy. ‘The medium is the message.’ The B2 bomber as such
is a message. It does not even have to do the dirty job of dropping bombs: all
it has to do is fly, engaging in a communicative action rather than physical
contact with the enemy. A fresh twist to the theme of technology as a
relevant actor was added by defence analysts who suggested that some NATO
members were using as many guided bombs and missiles containing chips
with potential Y2K bugs as possible, rather than have them undergo a
costly testing program.
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The overwhelming interest in waging a war against Serbia, however, has
belonged not to a specific agency, or a group, but to a certain power discourse
– the post-Cold War dominant moral discourse of the ‘West’. Claiming to
have norms at its core (for example, NATO as a ‘community of values’),
this discourse is about expansion and power, much like the Christian white
man’s discourse that guided Western colonisation for the last 500 years
under the banner of morality. After all, any ethical discourse is a discourse
of power working by way of exclusion and retribution, by surveiller et punir
(as per Michel Foucault), and the West’s current moral assertiveness is little
more than a new guise for a centuries-old tradition.
In seeking to establish itself as a norm for global conduct, the moral dis-
course of power is rather indiscriminate in respect of specific conflicts,
instrumentalising them to its own advantage. In some cases, this discourse
supports sovereignty (Kuwait); sometimes it supports human rights (Kosovo);
and sometimes it supports neither (Turkish Kurds). The ethnic cleansing in
Kosovo, real and terrible as it was, seems not to have been the overwhelm-
ing reason for Western intervention, but rather a convenient pretext. There
was no contradiction between Idealpolitik and Realpolitik in Kosovo, as they
were both manifestations of the same historical force, the same discourse of
power. In Kosovo, it was principle exercised as power, and power disguised
as principle.
Kosovo between ethnic cleansing and allied bombing
One of the great paradoxes of the war in Kosovo was that it was not just one
campaign but two: there was the ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo and the
allied bombing campaign against targets in Kosovo and all over Serbia. At
times it seemed that these campaigns were taking place in separate dimensions.
This was made particularly evident in daily television news reports. First,
there would be a report on the arrival of thousands of new refugees at the
Kosovo–Albania (or Macedonia or Montenegro) border. A correspondent in
all-weather gear would be positioned before a backdrop reminiscent of scenes
from Schindler’s List: unending columns of refugees slowly walking along
railway tracks. This would be followed by a smartly dressed correspondent
at NATO headquarters in Brussels, going live to NATO’s daily briefing, where
an ingratiating and smiling Jamie Shea would provide the numbers of sorties
flown and targets hit, and would assure us of the ever-increasing success of
the bombing campaign. Sometimes, pictures from Serbian television would be
included, showing destroyed bridges, factories and residential quarters, as
well as people wandering amid the debris. (In Russia, the images were served
in reverse order: first, the destruction in Serbia and then Kosovar refugees.)
It seemed that each campaign was following its own course. Serb troops
were completing the ethnic cleansing of towns and villages in Kosovo, and
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NATO aircraft were completing the orderly and meticulous destruction of
Serbia’s infrastructure. NATO was running short of targets and, at times,
hitting the same site two or three times; meanwhile, it did almost nothing on
the ground to stop the ethnic cleansing. At best, one can say that the two
campaigns were carried out relatively independently of each other. At worst,
one can argue, as did The Economist, that
this was a war to stop ethnic cleansing, but the main effect was to intensify it.
The bombing campaign accelerated the killing – no more than 2,000–3,000
people had died in the province before the bombing began, quite a few at the
hands of Kosovar guerrillas – and it accelerated the emptying of the population
at large. In humanitarian terms, the Kosovo campaign turned into a disaster.2
Indeed, it turned out to be a vicious circle and a self-propelled enterprise:
NATO bombs accelerated ethnic cleansing, and the stronger outflow of
refugees (escaping not only from Serb atrocities but from NATO bombs)
prompted still more bombing. The entire population of Kosovo and civilians
in cities all over Serbia became NATO’s hostages and bargaining chips in a
geopolitical game. Rather than helping the refugees, NATO seemed to be
exploiting them in its narcissistic display of military power. In the seventy-
nine days of the air campaign, the Alliance failed to pursue larger goals such
as toppling Milosevic’s regime, installing a new and more just order in the
Balkans, or sending a strong message to the rest of the world. Later, as
forensic evidence of the genocide in Kosovo was recovered, the news was
met with horror in Western capitals, but also with a kind of relief, signalling
the provision of retrospective moral justification for the bombing.
The first war in history said to be fought on moral grounds has been
tainted by hypocrisy. It is hard to reconcile self-appointed ‘normative politics’
with the embracing of an ally like the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), an
organisation with a well-documented history of terrorism, drug trafficking
and ethnic cleansing. It is difficult to reconcile it with the use of cluster
bombs that proved to be ‘surgical’ in the most direct sense of the word, that
is, resulting in amputations. Likewise, it is hard to reconcile calls to abolish
the death penalty (as the Council of Europe has urged of its member states)
with the killing and punishing of innocent civilians for crimes committed by
their leaders, which in effect was Europe’s stance during the course of
NATO’s attacks. Even if one admits that the war in Kosovo had moral
foundations, it was the morality of an action movie and a computer game,
the morality of Western messianism and of ‘chasing monsters’ (Milosevic as
the Fidel Castro of Europe), the Manichean morality of good–evil, inside–
outside, us–them.
It is the binary mapping of the conflict in Kosovo (in which, for instance,
an ambiguous force like the KLA fell into the ‘us’ category as Western
journalists glorified these guerrillas on their mountain trails, while Russia,
identified as a ‘Serb ally’, was relegated to the ‘them’ camp) that leads one
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to suggest that Europe was not simply looking to establish morality and
justice, but rather to institute its own identity represented as morality. It
was not that some pre-established European norms have compelled Europe
to intervene in Kosovo, but the converse: the intervention in Kosovo was a
means by which Europe could re-invent itself and imagine itself as a moral
fortress. Europe needed Kosovo for the construction of its own identity and
for the consolidation of the European project on a higher moral ground.
Kosovo between (East)-modernity3 and postmodernity
To be fair, there was hesitation and confusion in Europe in reaction to the
bombing. There was a certain degree of objectivity and balance in media
reporting, and some astonishment at ‘what we are doing’. But there was no
audible protest. As cluster bombs were being dropped on the residential
quarters of Serbian cities and ‘collateral damage’ was tolerated, Europe
asserted its new identity. This was accompanied by a stunning ‘silence of the
lambs’, the peace movements, the anti-war generation of the 1960s and
1970s, and of former NATO critics like the German Greens4 who hastily
developed their version of the concept of a ‘just war’. It looked as if Europe
had re-discovered atavisms of modernity, with essentialist narratives of
identity, security, heroic politics and outright militarism. Wasn’t it all about
modernity, the war in Kosovo?
At first glance, it seems that ‘Kosovo’ was an outburst of modernity.
Modern history was returning with a vengeance, in particular the Balkan
history, with its post-Ottoman, post-Habsburg and post-Tito potential for
conflict. The shadow of Kosovo Pole5 suddenly loomed large over Europe,
along with a number of other unresolved territorial disputes, unsettled borders
and ethnic rivalries in East-Central and South-Eastern Europe. The conflict
over Kosovo demonstrated that the east had not yet completed the tasks of
modernity, that is, forming nation states, and defining borders. In the age
of globalisation and European integration, it has turned out that pockets of
violent modern nationhood still exist.
Indeed, the Balkans are often interpreted as the reserve of the archaic,
reminding one of Jean Baudrillard’s piece about a Stone Age tribe dis-
covered in Papua New Guinea. As the story goes, the international commun-
ity decides to completely isolate the tribe in order to ‘preserve’ its unique
biosphere and to simulate the undiscovered. Likewise, the West could theor-
etically preserve the ‘unique multi-cultural environment of the Balkans’ as
a UNESCO Heritage Site, a Jurassic Park of ethnic strife and territorial
disputes.
On the other hand, the West, too, seems to have relapsed into modernity,
making use of war and power politics, and waving national flags. British
defence analysts on Sky News would jealously count the number of attack
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sorties flown by the Royal Air Force during the air campaign. As Maja
Zehfuss mentions in chapter 6, the German press would proudly report that
the German Tornadoes ‘were flying in pole position’.
It would be too simplistic, however, to read the war in Kosovo as a
sudden recurrence of modernity, nationalism and military security in late
twentieth-century Europe. To begin with, Serbian, Albanian and other
nationalisms are staged in a postmodern setting; that is, this is nationalism
as a response to globalisation, integration and the emergence of transnational
diasporas. Each of the nationalist movements in the region is surprisingly
global, positioning itself in relation to the ‘West’, that is, the EU, NATO
and the United States, but also in respect of Russia (as occasionally does
Serbia). Ethnic leaders are vying for the West’s attention, and their strategies
are addressed to the ‘international community’ as well as to their direct
opponents and domestic constituencies. That is to say, someone like Milosevic
is hardly an archaic nationalist, obsessed with ethnicity, and intent on defying
the West. On the contrary, he has proved to be a rather pragmatic politician,
playing the strategy of a regulated conflict with the West, indeed using the
West for the purpose of consolidating his own power. Provoking NATO’s
attack may have been Milosevic’s strategic miscalculation, yet there is no
denying that he had been playing with the global community as much as with
Serbs’ archaic instincts. Likewise, appeals to the world and international PR
have become a major activity for the KLA and the Kosovar leaders.
Second, the war in Kosovo has marked a major infringement on the
modern principle of sovereignty as the ultimate legitimate monopoly on
violence. Milosevic was a classic sovereign: until the November 2000 revolu-
tion in Belgrade he was legitimate (elected), and he used various forms of
violence against his Serbian and Albanian subjects. It was precisely this
monopoly that was being challenged by the ‘international community’. In
addition, the West was repeatedly questioning the sovereign political choice
of the Serbian nation, refusing aid to Serbia while Milosevic was in office. In
a sense, one can call this limitation of sovereignty a ‘humanitarian Monroe
doctrine’ (or a ‘Brezhnev doctrine’).
It is interesting, however, that the war in Kosovo has also infringed on
the sovereignty of Western nations. It subjected their alleged ‘national
interests’ to supranational purposes (NATO’s search for action and leader-
ship, preserving the transatlantic relationship and also attempting to shape
Europe’s security and defence identity and common foreign and security
policy, etc.) and to transnational technologies. The leading actors in the war
were not states (with the possible exception of the US, the last surviving
nation state), but institutions. The story of the war in Kosovo has taken
place not in the realpolitisches field of traditional state interests, but in the
highly virtual institutional field of ‘European security’.
Third, this simulated field features a new concept of agency that roughly
corresponds to what the poststructuralist literary critics, following Roland
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Barthes, call ‘the death of the author’. The story of Kosovo had no author:
it was written by impersonal forces like ‘Europe’, or the ‘West’, or the
‘community of values’, or the ‘new world order’. Discourses have no face or
personality, and war in Kosovo has been written by a collective body of the
West, emerging in an electrified field of symbolic exchange and simulation.
A remarkable thing about the war in Kosovo was that it materialised ‘out of
the thin air’ of late modernity. It has had no author or mastermind behind
it (even though interests have been involved), and NATO was no more than
an instrument, an executor, a performer. In this way, the war in Kosovo has
resembled Russia’s war in Chechnya, especially its first episode in 1994–96.
It was not known who made the decision and gave orders to start it, while
the roles of President Yeltsin, the Security Council and the Ministry of
Defence still remain unclear.6
The missing agency concept represented in the conflict in Kosovo goes
some way in explaining NATO’s spectacular planning failures and the general
ad hoc and ad libitum mode of operation. When, early in the air campaign,
it became clear that NATO had failed to deflect Milosevic from his course
of ethnic cleansing, it seemed that the Allies had no plan whatsoever except
to continue bombing with reckless abandon, as though driven by Napoleon’s
motto On s’engage et puis on voit. Given the improvisational nature of
the bombing, and alarmed at the evident inefficacy of air strikes, NATO
began to look for alternative mechanisms of conflict management and/or
retrospective justification of its own action. It looked to the players it should
have involved from the outset: the OSCE, the United Nations, the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (the Hague Tribunal),
and finally the EU and Russia.
Indeed, the Chernomyrdin–Ahtisaari mission virtually saved NATO, which
by late May 1999 seemed hopelessly stuck in the Kosovo quagmire, unable
to stop bombing, on the one hand, and unwilling to employ ground forces,
on the other. Had a political solution not been mediated in early June 1999,
it is hard to imagine the further course of events, especially given that the
Allies, according to some reports, could have run short of munitions within
the next month. The West’s impersonal war machine had to turn for help to
personal-style politics from the European peripheries (Finland and Russia);
a marginal discourse was needed to save the grand narrative of the new
world order.
Fourth, on the subject of de-personalised actors, one cannot fail to notice
the immense role played by the mass media in the war in Kosovo. Just as in
the Gulf War, this conflict was produced, fought and consummated in the
field of televised images; that is, it was virtualised and simulated to a high
degree. (Compare this with Jean Baudrillard’s provocative statement that
‘the Gulf War did not take place’;7 see also Andreas Behnke’s and Iver
Neumann’s chapters in this volume). In a darkly ironic coincidence, shortly
before the start of the air campaign, the movie Wag the Dog was released,
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featuring some imaginary – simulated – ‘Albanians’. The media is the tail
wagging the dog of world politics, or rather the media has become the dog,
waiting, in Pavlovian spasms, for more food, like Kuwait or Kosovo or
Chechnya, that it can digest and communicate in a politically relevant and
melodramatic manner.
The mass media in question are total and global. Reports may be biased
and distorted, but media as such do not belong to either side in the conflict.
(For example, in 1994–96, the Russian media sided almost entirely with the
Chechens, angering the Russian generals.) In arguing that Serb TV should
be exempt from bombing, CNN was much more likely driven by hunger for
information than by humanitarian concerns or professional solidarity.
Indeed, the media dominated the war in Kosovo. B-52 bombers joined
the dissident Belgrade radio B92 as mass media devices. State-of-the-art
military technology has become a department of the mass media. An analogy
can be made with today’s top racing cars that carry on-board cameras, and
rather than mere racing their function becomes showing the race. (In this sense,
it is preferable that a car sometimes crashes, providing a unique view from
the cockpit, to be replayed in slow motion). By the same token, today’s
bombs and missiles with inbuilt cameras are designed to destroy but also to
show, allowing the viewers to savour the entertaining process of destruction.
The purpose of the guided missile that hit the bridge in Novi Sad was
primarily communicative, in other words, it was (a) ‘to send a message’ to
Milosevic and the world and (b) to televise the final approach of the missile
to the target, followed by an eloquent blackout. The bombing of the Novi Sad
bridge turned into a media spectacle, drawing hundreds of millions of viewers
worldwide. Maybe in the future broadcasting companies will sponsor missiles
and bombs with on-board cameras as they now sponsor Formula 1 cars.8
Since most contemporary wars are positioned in a global context, the art
of ‘sending messages’ (not only to the enemy but to the world at large) plays
an ever-increasing role in the conduct of war, sometimes eclipsing operational
efficiency. In earlier times, it was mostly military parades that functioned as
PR, but now war itself, like NATO’s operation in Kosovo, can be turned
into a PR campaign. Apparently, one of the reasons for starting the bombing
in late March 1999 was the illusion of an easy victory – a victory that would
fit nicely with the festivities surrounding NATO’s fiftieth anniversary in
April of that year. Witness Javier Solana’s repeated pronouncements that
the campaign would be over by the time of the Washington summit – NATO’s
birthday present to itself.
What likened NATO’s air strikes to a PR campaign was the goal of zero
casualties among the Allies, a figure which was quite normal for a parade
(unless an unfortunate onlooker falls under a tank), but not in a war. This
obsession with safety revealed a paradoxical aspect of the postmodern mind.
On the one hand, Western man is ready, indeed willing, to wage wars,
releasing his archaic instincts. But, on the other hand, his willingness to
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sacrifice himself has been irretrievably lost through forces of hedonism,
consumerism and atheistic humanism. That was the main problem of the
war in Kosovo, a campaign that the West wanted to fight wearing gloves.
(Or, as a feminist critic of US power like Cynthia Weber might have
suggested, wearing a condom.)9 The reluctance to endanger ‘our boys’ cul-
minated in an outspoken story about Apache helicopters. The twenty-four
battlefield helicopters were heralded as ultimate weapons able to hunt down
Serb tanks in Kosovo. It took a month to prepare their arrival, then they
were flown into Albania with much pomp, but they never got off the
ground for fear that they would have to fly too low, becoming vulnerable to
anti-aircraft fire. The Apaches stood idle while the Serbs were completing
the ethnic cleansing.
Kosovo was a truly postmodern war, an Oscar-winning action movie, a
new 3D computer game where one could employ emotion and skill, and
even be morally rewarded for defeating the evil – without risking one’s life.
However, there was blood behind the screens. There is a story by Jorge Luis
Borges in which two kings play chess on a hilltop; at the bottom of the hill,
two armies are fighting in accordance with the moves on the chessboard.
One king gains the upper hand, and so does one of the armies. As the
winning player declares checkmate, the other falls dead.
Postmodernism is an entertaining game on a computer screen, or on the
chessboard, but, to our sheer confusion, there happen to be real people
somewhere underneath. The more virtual a game becomes for ‘us’, the harder
it turns out for ‘them’. The safer an American pilot’s flight in the high-tech
skies over Kosovo, the bloodier is the mess on the ground (both from bombs
and ethnic cleansing). The bigger the speculative flows on global financial
markets, trading in virtuality, the more bitter are conditions for the ‘real’
economy in the Third World. Calls for curing the injustices brought on by
global interdependence, such as making NATO answerable to the UN, or
imposing the 1 per cent ‘Tobin tax’10 on global speculative transactions (see
chapter 5, by Heikki Patomäki), will hardly change the fundamentally
post-moral nature of the new world order.
Russia between derzhavnost’ and the dollar
The war in Kosovo can be seen as the playing out of the competition
between the two most publicised essays on international affairs of the last
decade, Francis Fukuyama’s End of History and Samuel Huntington’s Clash
of Civilizations. The prize in the contest was Russia. Had Russia chosen to
join its Slavic/Orthodox brethren in Serbia in defying the West, Huntington
would have prevailed. Had Russia, on the contrary, acquiesced with the
military power, moral arguments and, most importantly, economic instru-
ments of the West, the title would have gone to Fukuyama.
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In the first round, it seemed that Huntington was pulling ahead. The
reaction in Russia to the start of the NATO air campaign was overwhelm-
ing and unanimous. Deep political divisions and partisanship were put aside
in the protest against NATO and the show of solidarity with the Serbs. The
West had given Russia eloquent and powerful evidence of the fact that she
had lost the Cold War. In fact, the bombing helped to consolidate Russia’s
political elite and a large part of the population in the anti-Western camp,
playing directly into the hands of the communists and the nationalists.11
Psychologically, there was a meaningful difference between this situation
and Russia’s former geopolitical losses. Withdrawal from Eastern Europe
and the reunification of Germany were seen as a unilateral gesture of good-
will on Russia’s part – were they not? NATO’s expansion, for all its alleged
strategic damage for Russia, was nevertheless negotiated with Moscow, and
received Russia’s reluctant consent (crowned by the Russia–NATO Found-
ing Act). But here, for the first time in the post-Cold War decade, something
had been accomplished without any regard for Russia.
This was a revelation. The taboo of openly talking about Russia’s defeat
was lifted, with some profound psychotherapeutic effects. What followed
was a two-week carnival of national ambition. It was a ritual exorcism,
complete with spontaneous mass demonstrations at the US Embassy in
Moscow, the sign-up of volunteers for combat in Serbia, threats of supply-
ing arms to Milosevic and of re-targeting Russia’s nuclear missiles, and a
sharp increase in the domestic role of the military. This emotional outburst
proved once again, as did the 1993 and 1995 parliamentary elections, that
post-Cold War post-traumatic syndrome runs deep in the national con-
sciousness. However, once the taboo subject of Russia’s defeat was raised,
resentment and aggression were reified in a symbolic verbal manner (popu-
lar demonstrations, declarations in the State Duma, etc.), and, thus, some-
what mitigated and healed.
Indeed, the steam of the Russian nationalist engine all went into the
whistle. By mid-April 1999, nationalist fever had diminished. Admitting to
the impossibility of opposing the West or halting NATO’s bombing, Russia
took on a rather sensible wait-and-see position, criticising NATO’s action,
while gradually resuming cooperation with the West along financial lines.
Meanwhile, important domestic shifts were taking place. Prime Minister
Yevgeni Primakov’s heavy-handed mediation in the conflict in Kosovo gave
way to the more flexible and Western-minded efforts of former Prime Min-
ister Viktor Chernomyrdin. Later, Primakov’s fall from grace was confirmed
as President Yeltsin sacked his communist-dominated government and Sergei
Stepashin was appointed as Primakov’s replacement. The shaping of the
new government and its economic programme was closely coordinated with
international financial institutions.
Consequently, large-scale cooperation between Russia and these institu-
tions resumed for the first time since the financial crisis of August 1998.
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Finally, President Yeltsin emerged out of the political shadow, scoring two
major victories over the communist Duma: first, he defeated attempts to
impeach him; second, he succeeded in having his selection for the office of
prime minister, Sergei Stepashin, approved at the first attempt. The economy,
thought moribund, started showing signs of revival: the rouble was strengthen-
ing, and the stock market was recovering from the shock of August 1998.
Suddenly, against all odds, Russia embarked upon a ‘liberal spring’.
In other words, just as Russia’s political system had managed to absorb
the internal shock of the August 1998 financial crisis, so it handled the
external impact of the 1999 Kosovo crisis fairly well. Moreover, there had
been no long-term political repercussions on the domestic scene. The
consequences for Russian foreign and security policy, however, were less
salubrious. Generally, in the last seven to eight years, ever since the Andrei
Kozyrev line based on liberal internationalism and the abandoning of
‘national interests’ faded away, Russian foreign policy has oscillated between
minimalist cooperation with the West and damage limitation. The Kosovo
crisis once again sent Russian foreign policy into a damage limitation mode,
undermining mutual trust and the fragile mechanisms of cooperation with
NATO. The West’s war in Kosovo unravelled the political and psycholo-
gical achievement of the 1997 Paris Declaration and the NATO–Russia Found-
ing Act. From appeasing Russia the West turned to sidelining Russia – a
policy that was consistent with Russia’s dwindling economic and diplomatic
power, but one that sounded hardly encouraging to the country’s elite.
Apart from dealing a blow to national pride, the Kosovo crisis showed
that Russia remained vitally dependent on the new world order’s economic
environment, as represented by IMF loans, Western markets for Russian oil
and gas, and a vested interest on the part of the country’s elite and an
increasing number of ordinary citizens in economic and political openness.
Several polls conducted by Russian newspapers among anti-NATO demon-
strators near the US embassy in Moscow showed that people were ready to
burn American flags, but would never agree to give up the free circulation of
US dollars, or the opportunity to travel to the West. Respondents also did
not seem willing to support higher military outlays in the Russian budget.
The 1999 war in Kosovo was of symbolic significance to Russia. Like the
August 1998 financial crash in Russia, induced by a crisis in the emerging
markets and a fall in world oil prices, it clearly showed the limited role of
the Russian State with regard to transnational impacts, be it NATO or the
global financial markets. The 1998 crisis highlighted Russia’s economic
dependence, just as the 1999 Kosovo war showed Russia’s geopolitical
predicament. Or, put otherwise, the 1998 crisis demonstrated that Russia is
irresistibly drawn into the world of geo-economics, and ‘Kosovo’ illustrated
that Russia is invariably ejected from the world of geopolitics. Taken
together, these developments mapped Russia’s major drift from geopolitics
to geo-economics, a move which is obviously far from complete but has
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already progressed far enough to keep Russia anchored in a cooperative
framework at the margin of Western institutions and to guarantee against a
radical revision of Russia’s foreign and security policy.12
The crisis in Kosovo has thus had a dual effect on Russia. It created
some immediate damage to Russia’s relationship with the West. A more
important fact, however, was that Russia proved not to be inclined to neo-
imperialist temptations, and remained unlikely to slide into isolationism and
confrontation with the West even under the most adverse circumstances.
Russia was disturbed but not displaced. An ailing giant had been certainly
irritated, but did not care to move.
Other added value appeared in the field of information and international
PR. The geopolitical accident in Kosovo suddenly put Russia in the lime-
light. A lonely Russian reconnaissance boat travelling (at a top speed of
12 knots) into the Adriatic; Viktor Chernomyrdin’s shuttle diplomacy; the
Russian paratroopers’ surprise spurt to Pristina airport ahead of NATO
troops as KFOR was entering Kosovo in June 1999 – all of these made
international headlines. Russia suddenly became ‘interesting’.
After the West’s initial neglect, all of a sudden the West began looking
for ways to involve Russia in crisis management. Semi-isolated, Russia
unexpectedly started winning points on the diplomatic front. The crisis in
Kosovo created a common information field, a common context within
which the dialogue with the West resumed. Indeed, one can see similarities
with the debates on NATO’s expansion, which also gave Russia a voice and
a place at the negotiating table of European security for a good four years
(1993–97). Both NATO’s expansion and the war in Kosovo gave Russia an
interface with the West, providing a forum where Russia could claim its
national interests, which otherwise would not even be heard. In both cases,
Russia seemed to have come out a loser, but these perceived losses have raised
the level of global awareness about Russia, its problems and its residual
strengths. One is reminded of a daily ritual phrase, a magical incantation,
repeated by US and NATO leaders: ‘Our goal is to keep Russia involved.’
In the world ruled by mass media, it is perceptions and images that count,
not the actual territorial/strategic gains or losses. In both cases, Russia’s
role (often hypothetical and imagined) was emphasised by the global media,
evoking distant memories of its lost glory, and this partly compensated for
perceived geopolitical damages.
So what was the outcome of the Huntington–Fukuyama duel? In general,
Huntington’s argument was not fully relevant in Kosovo, where one could
see a clash of ambitions and a collision of destructive policies rather than a
genuine clash of civilisations. Everyone, including NATO and the Serbs,
Russia and China, played by the rules of the global civilisation. National
positions seemed to make little difference. ‘Kosovo’ has demonstrated that
Russia is drifting away from the good old world of ‘grand chessboards’.
After withdrawal from Afghanistan and NATO’s expansion, after Chechnya
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and Kosovo, any talk of Russia’s ‘national interests’ and ‘grand strategies’
serve mainly to make newspaper headlines and to increase the heartbeat of
the realist die-hards, rather than to position Russia in the twenty-first
century. Russia is being ‘seduced’ (in the Baudrillardian sense) rather than
coerced into the global civilisation, just as are its neighbour, China, and
much of the Arab world. The new world order (NWO) is a hegemony
working mostly by means of seduction, promoting brands like NATO,
Boeing, CNN, democracy, IMF, human rights, the Euro, Marlboro, etc.
Above all, coercive actions like the one in Kosovo are needed to enhance
brand recognition.
Fukuyama did not score a clear-cut victory in Kosovo either. His light-
hearted neo-liberal utopia had been devised with a good deal of irony, but
in Kosovo the NWO arrived in an unseemly and sinister manner. This was
not the history ending ‘with a whimper’, but rather the re-writing of history
with all its pitfalls, enmities and blood.
Behold, the new world order cometh
In 1970, the Polish director Andrzej Wajda made a film titled Landscape
After the Battle, which won him wide international acclaim. It is a love story
set in a concentration camp in Poland in late 1944, abandoned by the
German troops and taken over by the allies. It begins on a euphoric note,
showing prisoners in their striped robes pouring out of the barracks into the
fresh snow. However, the long-awaited liberation does not bring freedom.
Days go by, and as people are still kept inside the camp, the occupation
authorities install a new repressive order, using the prisoners as bargaining
chips in the geopolitical game of late Second World War. This is a film
about the absurdity of heroic myths, a story of both hope and disillusion-
ment, and of the anguish and torment that remain the lot of individuals
under any rule.
The landscape after the battle in Kosovo is murky and dubious. Together
with the return of over 800,000 ethnic Albanian refugees, almost 250,000
Serbs, Roma and others have been ethnically cleansed, or were forced to
flee.13 The UN civil administration UNMIK and NATO’s KFOR cannot
guard the monopoly on violence, and acts of ethnic revenge against local
Serbs are occurring on a regular basis, with several hundred reported killed
or missing. Various offsprings of the KLA, from militias to guerrilla groups
to criminal bands, are roaming free in the province.14 The advent of a new
democratic leadership in Belgrade following the popular uprising in October
2000, and two rounds of elections in September–December 2000, have
delayed the Kosovo solution even further. Ironically, the continuing rule of
Milosevic had been Kosovo’s best hope for independence, as the international
community regarded his claim to Kosovo as illegitimate. Now, however,
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Serbia is run by Vojislav Kostunica and Zoran Djindjic, legitimate leaders
recognised by the West. Both are equally unwilling to let Kosovo go; and
this time the West will have to give them a say in Kosovo’s affairs. It is
characteristic that the Kosovo Albanian leaders met this change of the guard
in Belgrade with suspicion. Now, as the dream of independence is virtually
slipping from their hands, in a twist unimaginable only a year ago, the next
stage of the conflict could take place between the Kosovo Albanians and
KFOR.15 The future of Kosovo suddenly looks more uncertain than it was
following the end of NATO’s air war.
On the military side, one of the biggest bombing campaigns in history
has proven far from effective. For seventy-nine days a relatively small
Yugoslav contingent with weapons from the 1960s and 1970s held its own
against the mightiest military machine in the world and retained its capacity
to respond with anti-aircraft fire – a remarkable achievement. Until the last
two weeks of the war, when the Kosovar guerrillas’ kamikaze tactics flushed
the Serbs’ armour into the open and rendered it vulnerable to NATO strikes,
the infamous Serb army had escaped serious injury.16 Even though Milosevic
is now toppled, Serbian resilience and NATO’s incapacity to diminish it and
halt the ethnic cleansing during the seventy-nine-day war have sent all kinds
of wrong signals around the globe.
NATO’s decision to attack was a mistake from the beginning. Once the
bombing had started, the Alliance proved surprisingly obdurate and inflex-
ible, as well as hesitant and indecisive. Despite mounting evidence of the
ineffectiveness of the bombing, loss of civilian lives, and the acceleration of
ethnic cleansing, NATO did not modify its strategy and opt for a wiser
course, a halt to the bombing or a riskier ground operation. This lack of
flexibility and political will is quite understandable, given that NATO is an
alliance of nineteen nations ruled by consensus and the politicians,17 not by
orders and the military; but it is nevertheless damaging to the Alliance’s
credibility.
In purely technical terms, the bombing campaign has not opened a new
chapter in the history of warfare, as some were claiming. It has once again
demonstrated that air power alone cannot produce victory. Military suprem-
acy and high-tech weaponry provide no substitute for political solutions;
on the contrary, they tend to increase tensions and reduce the likelihood of
a lasting settlement. NATO’s brand of military power may still be relevant
in ‘traditional’ inter-state wars and high-intensity conflicts; however, most
future conflicts will be of medium to low intensity, involving great numbers
of civilians, just as in Kosovo or in Algiers. Judging by the case of Kosovo,
NATO is ill-equipped to handle such contingencies.
The ‘message’ which the Kosovo war sent to potential perpetrators and
troublemakers around the world has been mixed. NATO has yet to prove
that it has the skills, tools and political will to handle any regional conflict
effectively. The absence of such proof is a truly dangerous development,
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with consequences reaching far beyond the Balkans. Should similar flare-
ups occur simultaneously in places like Tibet, the Caucasus, Kurdistan and
Eritrea, is NATO going to intervene, and, if it is, has it shown the capacity
to do so rapidly and efficiently? And if NATO does not intervene, will it
appear as a credible remote deterrent? While answers to these questions
remain at best in the balance, NATO’s operation in Kosovo served as a
background (and arguably a pretext) for the start of Russia’s second war in
Chechnya and for a regional conflict in Kashmir – involving two nuclear
powers, India and Pakistan. In general, NATO’s new role of self-appointed
arbiter in regional conflicts is likely to increase reliance on nuclear weapons
around the globe. The post-Kosovo world is not necessarily a safer place.
Nor does NATO’s recourse to moral argument as being superior to the
norms that govern international law make for a safer world. Laws, like
sovereignty, may be outdated, but they at least tend to be inviolate, pro-
viding for stability in the system. On the contrary, norms are always subject
to interpretation. Should Russia (or, hypothetically, the CIS Tashkent Treaty
on Collective Security) now decide that human rights are being violated in
Tajikistan, will the West endorse Russian intervention? Or what if Iran
resumes its war with Iraq on the grounds that Saddam Hussein has violated
Islamic norms?
What happens next? Fidel Castro, at the EU–Latin American summit in
June 1999, cited the possibility of a NATO intervention in Colombia’s
cocaine provinces on behalf of the ‘civilized world’. Meanwhile, protesters
in East Timor in 1999, prior to the entry of Australian-led peacekeepers,
were carrying slogans inviting NATO to their protection. Should the Alliance
have become involved? Or will NATO engage only on specific occasions
that (a) provide good PR feedback; (b) have no nuclear weapons and (c) run
no risk of Alliance casualties?
The problem here is not NATO. The Alliance is not driven by an indi-
vidual’s malicious will, nor does it, by itself, seek world domination. NATO,
and the nations that comprise it, is a mere instrument of a rising discourse
that is somewhat awkwardly called the new world order (inadvertently para-
phrasing the ‘brave new world’). The post-sovereign, post-Westphalian, world
need not be endowed with greater pluralism, freedom of choice and multi-
culturalism. Old national totalities are giving way to transnational ones;
discourses of power are changing location but not the mode of operation.
Or, rather, the discourse of power has become a-local (global) and a-topic
(Utopian). It is neither good nor bad: it is the ‘thin air’ air of postmodernity,
and it is not in our power to change the atmosphere.
However, one is always left with an option of deconstructing the new
discourse of power by looking into its innate binary nature. In the story of
Kosovo, the dichotomy imposed on the audience by the mass media was the
false choice between the clear and present evil of Milosevic (and everything
that comes with him, like violent nationalism and ethnic cleansing) and the
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seemingly unavoidable use of military force by NATO (complete with ‘col-
lateral damage’), a choice between ethnic cleansing and NATO bombing.
Apart from the fact that a ‘third way’ can often be envisaged (for example,
an earnest search for a political solution or the use of economic mechanisms
of ‘seduction’, whereby instead of bombing the enemy into submission one
can buy him into agreement by allocating just a fraction of the funds spent
on waging war), this dichotomy is clearly simulated. It is produced and
communicated within the same binary opposition, making the recipient
choose between ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, ‘Europe’ and ‘anarchy’.
Each side in this dichotomy has power as a goal and violence as its
means. But while Milosevic’s violence was ruthless and straightforward, the
use of power by the West has been disguised as principle. A violence of a
declining, archaic kind that has no moral pretence is opposed by a violence
of the future, endowed with most of the world’s resources and moral author-
ity. Choosing between them is like choosing between the atrocities of Dachau
and the bombing of Dresden, between Auschwitz and Hiroshima. Are we
forever confined to this binarity, to the vicious circle of violence?
The ‘new’ discourse on European security has so far failed to come up
with an answer. Indeed, the very notion of ‘security’ seems to have forever
chained Europe to modernity, the world of Yalta, Versailles and Kosovo
Pole, to the world of power, border and the Wall. One of the greater deficits
of the European project is not the lack of political resolve, or the lack of its
own peacekeeping force. It is the lack of imagination, as Europe has proved
to be unable to envision its own identity beyond the narrow confines of
security, systemic thinking and the friend–foe paradigm. Forget the Age of
the Internet: European security is still in the Age of the Brick, erecting walls
and destroying bridges, disciplining and punishing in a Foucauldian prison.
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Simulating European security: Kosovo
and the Balkanisation–integration nexus
Introduction: writing security
Security is among the most debated and contested concepts in the study of
international relations (IR). ‘Security’ commands a unique metaphysical and
disciplinary power which involves the drawing of imaginary lines, the consolid-
ated resentment of difference (vis-à-vis the ‘other’), as well as the constitution
of self-reflective collectivities (‘identity’). Although it has become slightly
embarrassing to make yet another effort to reconceptualise ‘security’, I argue
in this chapter that a critical approach is required, mainly because ‘security’
is a fundamental point of reference and an essential modifier for a state that
is gradually losing its pre-eminence within Europe and the wider world. In
many ways, it is ‘national security’ that has dominated the security debate
and has established a set of elaborate practices and traditions, all of which
have a rather formalised referent: the state. This conceptual hegemony has
crowded out other discourses, most notably on transversal and personal
security. For now there is hardly a tradition or body of literature that attempts
to conceptualise ‘security’ in non-statal terms. The only way to read security
is through the state, and in this way ‘security’ both writes and rights the
state in its claim to sovereign authority for disciplining space and people.
In this discursive context, ‘security’ therefore follows the old script of
political realism that defines the security problematique as the field and the
operations that touch upon the survival of the political unit: the sovereign
state. But, unfortunately for realists’ peace of mind, the contemporary
European political theatre does not follow the established script of security–
sovereignty written by political realism. Offhand and ad lib performances
by other (f )actors have turned this European stage in a politically surreal
territory in which the ontological givens of modernity have become unrooted.
Although governmental discourses about European security continue to
methodically mobilise the assumptions, codes and procedures that enforce
our understanding of humanity as subdivided in territorially defined statal
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spaces as their primary and natural habitat, it is becoming obvious that such
efforts to classify, organise and frame Europe’s collective consciousness along
these lines are ineffective as well as doomed to failure.
This essay argues that ‘security’ has remained captive to orthodox statal
thinking for too long. The argument is informed by the critical thinking of
Cynthia Weber and Ole Wæver, and asserts that in order to come to a
better understanding of contemporary Europe we should accept that the
idea of ‘European security’ no longer follows the logic of representation (in
which ‘security’ posits the state within legitimate boundaries), but now abides
by a logic of simulation (in which there is no longer a rooted foundation but
instead an unsteady chain of signifiers).1 Jean Baudrillard’s claim that ‘[i]t is
no longer a question of a false representation of reality (ideology), but of
concealing the fact that the real is no longer real’2 is especially relevant for
my argument. For Baudrillard, postmodern society has entered the era of
the simulacrum, the abstract non-society that is devoid of cohesive relations,
shared meaning and significant change.3 In this void, ‘truth’, ‘reality’, as well
as ‘power’, are devoured.
My point is that the contemporary European debate on security has trans-
mogrified the notion of ‘European security’ into a simulacrum, a representation
of the ‘real’ that is now omnipresent, so that it has become impossible to
distinguish this ‘real’ from its original referent. ‘European security’ has become
a complex sign, an image of the ‘real’ that constitutes a novel realm of experi-
ence and practice that is ‘hyperreal’. In the debate about European security
it has become clear that the representational relationship has been eclipsed
and the traditional subject–object distance erased. Old language games are
no longer appropriate, no longer based on stable meanings. Instead, the
original referent (the state) is, to all intents and purposes, vanquished and
assimilated by a new set of codes and models. In this new game, ‘European
security’ does not simply become a myth or a fantasy, but tends to become
hyperreal: depleted, dissipated and without power; it is hyped, feigned and
faked, and perhaps therefore is more real than the real thing: the state itself.
In this funhouse of the hyperreal, Europe’s postmodern security has
become an ersatz experience, an image which may sometimes conceal (but
usually just accentuates) that the ‘original’ of statal security no longer seems
to exist. This essay examines the war in and over Kosovo as an example of
how security is continuing to write Europe’s geopolitical space and argues
that ‘Europe’ has (mis)used Serbia and Kosovo in a classic modern exercise
of identity construction by disciplining the Balkan ‘other’.
‘Security’ as a political struggle
Like sovereignty, security is not so much an ontological given with a stable
meaning as the site of a continuous political struggle in which the nature of
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statehood as such may be inferred from practice and experience. All efforts
to define, redefine and reconstruct security therefore engage in a wider
political practice in order to stabilise the concept’s definition and purpose.
Wæver has argued that ‘security’ lacks a generic concept, but that it has
a clear temporal dimension derived from an established set of practices.
The label of ‘security’, says Wæver, ‘has become the indicator of a specific
problematique, a specific field of practice’,4 in which the state determines the
rules of the (language) game. In terms of semiotics, ‘security’ is therefore not
a signifier (indicator) which refers back to a referent (that it is supposed to
represent); rather the
utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving
a promise, naming a ship). By uttering ‘security,’ a state-representative moves
a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special
right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.5
Security has thereby become an act; the word–concept itself has become its
primary reality, affording the state special rights and privileges. By fixing
the meaning of security (always in spatial and temporal dimensions), secur-
ity thereby de facto writes the state.
Wæver identifies three major problems with the statal hegemony over the
security discourse. First, it tends to imply that any response to a security
problem, risk or perceived threat is to be expected first and foremost from
the state. Second, the concept of security tends to reinforce the logic of
nationalism and the Manichean us–them thinking grounded on the tradition
of viewing threats as coming from the ‘outside’ (i.e. beyond the state’s own
borders). This also tends to encourage the militarisation of our thinking.
Third, since the concept of security is basically defensive in nature, it tends
to defend the status quo and thereby precludes alternative realities that may
be preferable to that which is. Wæver summarises his arguments in his claim
that ‘[w]hen a problem is “securitized,” the act tends to lead to specific ways
of addressing it: Threat, defense, and often statecentred solutions’.6 The
discourse of security is not a neutral academic terrain, but a continuous
struggle for political power, access to resources and the authority to articulate
new definitions and priorities of security. ‘Security’ is therefore a socially
constructed concept that emerges from its discourse (or, in this case, through
a ‘speech act’) and the discursive practices that constitute the ever-shifting
boundaries and capacities of sovereign states and the interpretative commun-
ities in which they are embedded.
Clearly, in most discourses, the referent (object) of ‘security’ remains the
state. But how should we read ‘the state’ in the European context? Barry
Buzan has argued that states have three basic components: the idea of the
state (nationalism); the physical base of the state (population, etc.); and the
institutional expression of the state (political system).7 In the political dis-
course, ‘national security’ therefore represents three circumstances: the nation,
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the people and the government. Traditional approaches to this problematique
tend to be framed by a logic of representation in which the national commun-
ity formally authorises ‘its’ government to express ‘its’ voice in the interna-
tional theatre. Weber has argued, however, that this logic of representation
is seriously flawed, mainly because it has become unclear what the boundaries
of the ‘people’ are and what means (and legitimacy) the national government
has to serve as the signifier (and voice) of this ‘imagined community’.8 Fol-
lowing Baudrillard, Weber therefore suggests that the state has become a sign
without a referent and, hence, is hyperreal.
This may explain why the popular media continues to endow the state
with a sanctity that is, to say the least, mystifying. The socio-spatial modern
triad of security–sovereignty–territoriality is more often than not treated as
if it were the nation’s equivalent to virginity, with the inevitable implication
that losing ‘it’ would be a decisive stage, at times comparable only to rape.9
But the anthropomorphism inherent to this individual–state analogy over-
looks that pre-given material bodies may not be unproblematical in terms
of identity and politics.10 State power may also be read as a gendered
problematique insofar as it is ‘a historical product and expression of male
predominance in public life and male dominance generally’.11 Weber argues
that the sovereign state has a clearly feminine domestic side and a masculine
international side, which implies that the international arena ‘refers to the
projection of this domestic identity into the public sphere of relations among
states’.12 By paying homage to the state’s virginal identity, we therefore
continue to worship the state as the optimal cultural and democratic area,
whereas the postmodern state is now selling the remains of its sovereignty to
the highest bidder on a daily basis. European states are clinging desperately
to as much political authority, democratic legitimacy and problem-solving
capacity as they possibly can, but are also prepared (and occasionally
coerced) to re-read the notion of territorial sovereignty as a quid pro quo to
remain in the ‘geopolitical business’ in the first place. Within the global
political space, states are occasional criminal rapists as well as defenceless
victims. National virginity has been lost long ago, but we continue to believe
in the state’s virginal conception and its capacity to deliver.
In her work, Weber identifies the concept of ‘sovereignty’ as the principal
sign that through a swirl of discursive practices rescues and writes the state’s
hegemonic fantasy. But the same can be said for the code of security, a
concept policy makers and diplomats like to call upon to legitimise their
particular international practices, without realising that the ‘security’ they
refer to has become a hollow shell: it lacks a nation, a people, as well as a
government. ‘Security’ therefore now mainly has (following Baudrillard’s
nomenclature) an ‘alibi function’: it tries to assert the realness of the state
and its components; it tries to reaffirm and discursively frame and read that
which it is supposed to signify in the first place. But given the continued
hollowing out of the territorial state, to do so has become increasingly
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difficult. Especially in Europe, the idea of ‘national security’ fails to pass
most serious reality checks, which may explain why the anaemic notion of
‘European security’ is now being reinscribed with new meanings and given a
new lease of life in the invigorated context of post-Cold War European
integration.
European security as a tabula rasa
Wæver has made a persuasive argument that during the Cold War, the
concept of ‘European security’ has functioned as a means and a mechanism
to enforce cohesion within the two halves of Europe.13 The discourse on
European security was not so much on what was threatening Europe from
the outside as a continued debate on how to frame Europe from within,
which in turn limited the options of Europe’s actors within confined discip-
linary parameters. This reading of European security has been one of the
most notable casualties of the deep geopolitical quakes of 1989–91, leaving
most policy makers and academic analysts in the dark as to how to reinscribe
this concept with meaning now that the reductionist categories that dominated
the traditional security discourse have passed away.
This discourse has immediately raised the question of whether one can
meaningfully debate European security in the absence of clear foundations?
The answer seems to be less than clear-cut. It is clear that to tell stories
about European security is to imply the very existence of ‘Europe’ as a
referent object. This is the alibi function of all discourses of European security,
since assuming that ‘something’ is (possibly) threatened is to insist upon its
very existence. In this sense, ‘security’ functions as the alibi for ‘Europe’.
The European security discourse also discursively frames the diverse meanings
of ‘Europe’, fixing its geopolitical boundaries by locating its practices and
by speaking as if a stable European citizenry already existed which it could
authoritatively represent – this, whereas the notion of ‘Europe’ is a forest of
ideas, symbols and myths. ‘Europe’ seems to function as a mirror reflecting
the image of a multitude of ideas and meanings, rather than as a prism
concentrating the minds and hearts of its peoples around a central theme.
What is Europe and what does it stand for? Who is European, and what does
being European imply? These are questions that the discourse on European
security not only fails to answer, but deliberately ignores, since efforts to
‘find’ answers concerning the foundational authorities would detract from
the logic of simulation which underpins this debate. Policy makers and
theorists try to ‘solve’ these questions of Europe’s foundations by preventing
such interrogations from being seriously undertaken in the first place.
It is this locale, this site of friction, which should be the focus of aca-
demic analysts of European security, since the meaning of ‘Europe’ is fixed
and stabilised by the invocation of the security speech act. Security, perhaps
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by default, is the main tool for writing Europe, a tool for claiming its
essential foundations through fixing the boundaries between inside–outside
and the claim to organise, occupy and administer Europe’s space. Since the
European Union (EU) is the only truly European security institution func-
tioning on the supranational level, the process of European integration has
become the main platform on which European security can be constructed.
From Europe’s perspectivalist vision of its space, the contours of a Euro-
centrically calibrated world map of security are gradually becoming clear.
By adopting a ‘European’ security perspective, a process of distantiation
of appearances and events is supposed to emerge, setting priorities and
seeking to ‘arrange and display the world around a sovereign center of
judgement, a rational I/eye that observes and in so doing disciplines the
ambiguity, contingency, and (barbarian) chaos of international affairs and
the world’.14 The European security discourse is therefore an effort on the
part of all European states to set Eurocentric standards to describe, read
and write the continent’s geopolitical structure in an effort to colour Europe
as a patriotic – and therefore ‘safe’ – (blue) space. This follows the argument
made by Gearoid O Tuathail and John Agnew that ‘[t]o designate a place is
not simply to define a location or setting. It is to open up a field of possible
taxonomies and trigger a series of narratives, subjects and appropriate foreign
policy responses.’15
By conceptualising European security, ‘Europe’ is politically spatialised
to represent its own ‘imagined community’, its own hyperreal political stage
on which its performative identity may gradually take shape. But by doing
so, Europe inevitably challenges traditional statal notions of security. This
makes the notion of ‘European security’ so problematic an abstraction,
since in its textuality it is challenging, and is itself continuously challenged
by, ‘security’ tout court. The discourse of ‘European security’ should there-
fore be deconstructed by problematising its limits and conditions. Rather
than a genealogy of European security (which would trace historically how
theorists have defined ‘European security’), we need to analyse the textuality
of the concept and find out how ‘European security’ is being produced
within the various discursive networks of difference.16 This would follow a
Derridean approach by displacing the question of ‘European security’: it
would problematise its circulating limits and conditions and investigate its
conceptual meaning(s) in the reading and writing of European security as a
text. We should therefore not assume that the notion of ‘European security’
is self-evident and non-partisan, but ask how it is charged by particular
meanings and strategic uses within the existing (but ever-changing) context
of power/knowledge networks. ‘European security’ is therefore itself a sign
which marks a specific site within a wider geopolitical space/power/know-
ledge system, a system which produces the scripts for many actors, which
affects the dramas and comedies that are being played, and which therefore
never passively is, but is always under dynamic (de)construction.
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Many tactical interventions can be made to illustrate and analyse the
different aspects of the wider problem of how ‘European security’ is con-
structing Europe’s political space. No doubt there is a need for more con-
centrated attention in order to congeal more exhaustively the meaning(s)
around this concept. The remainder of this essay investigates how the
marginal – and at the same time very central – question of ‘Kosovo’ has
turned into the principal paradigmatic sign in the complex text of European
security. It asks how its very marginality has emphasised the unravelling
fringes and limits of the sovereign presence of what ‘Europe’ thinks it
stands for, and how it has affected (and continues to affect) the concept of
‘European security’.
Kosovo and the margins of modernity
In its efforts to write Europe’s geopolitical space, the EU has adopted a
Wittgensteinian approach, using the metaphor of Familienähnlichkeiten (i.e.
‘family resemblances’) to illustrate the complex networks of similarities of
Europe’s peoples who are nevertheless quite different in their essence. Ludwig
Wittgenstein argued that in the various resemblances between the members
of a family ‘we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and
crisscrossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities in detail.’17
In its semantic politics, the EU has continually applied this metaphor of
family resemblance (the ‘European family’) to illustrate how Europe could
relate to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (and vice versa). In
doing so, the EU has rejected the framing of an undisputed definition of
‘Europeanness’ and has not codified the unequivocal features and character-
istics of those who belong to Europe and those who do not. Apart from an
internalised culture of cooperation, a deeply ingrained willingness to make
compromises, no checklist of criteria that will assure entry into this ‘Club
Europe’ has been presented.
But despite this acknowledgement (even appreciation) of difference, the
EU now seems to have fallen in the traditional trap of modernity and its
concomitant quest for control and planning. The EU is willing to accept
difference in the pluralism of its prosaic politics (language, culture, education,
etc.), but certainly not in the area of heroic politics, the reading–writing of
‘big events’. In this field of heroic politics, the EU has hardly been able to
make its voice heard and is competing with potent statal claims to ‘security’.
As happens with organisations such as NATO, the EU’s ‘desire for security
is manifested as a collective resentment of difference – that which is not us,
not certain, not predictable’.18 The ‘enemy’ of Europe’s volatile identity is
thereby defined as the ‘unknown’, the ‘unpredictable’ and the ‘unstable’. By
reading Europe’s ‘other’ in this way, the meaning of ‘European security’ is
stabilised as efforts to limit the pluralism of the continent’s centres, to limit
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its multiple meanings to a strict canon and a fixed site, and to solidify the
current fluidity of Europe’s identity.
The challenge for the EU has been to prevent a slow drift from a
postmodern politics of family resemblance to a narcissistic policy of passive
self-absorption and epistemic closure. It was Sigmund Freud who observed
(in 1917) that ‘it is precisely the minor differences in people who are
otherwise alike that form the basis of feelings of strangeness and hostility
between them’.19 This ‘narcissism of minor differences’, as Freud labelled it,
is a discursive mechanism which frames the meaning of European security.
Michael Ignatieff has argued rightly that these ‘differences’ (be they between
the sexes, between religions, races or nations) are in themselves neutral, but
that a ‘narcissist is incurious about others except to the extent that they
reflect back on himself. What is different is rejected if it fails to confirm the
narcissist in his or her self-opinion.’20 This closure for the ‘other’ and the
‘outside’ is where prosaic politics ends and heroic security concerns begin.
Narcissism thereby marks the inside–outside divide by feeding modern fears
of fluidity and by (sometimes violent attempts of ) keeping ambiguity at bay.
Nowhere have these margins of modernity been more clearly marked
than in Kosovo (and earlier, but less distinctly, in Bosnia). Starting with the
dissolution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, rump-Yugoslavia (nick-
named ‘Serbia’) was identified as the strange and alien entity threatening
European security at the end of the millennium by its ethnic and sectarian
essentialism, its barbarian methods of ‘ethnic cleansing’, and its altogether
premodern values, attitude and practices. In short: Milosevic’s Serbia was
not sticking to the carefully crafted script of ‘European’ conduct. By falling
out of line, by not accepting the rationales of European integration and
European security, this Serbia was posing itself as the main challenge to the
emerging new European order (NEO). By ignoring the logic of NEO realism
(or, as Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen calls it in chapter 9, the West’s emerging
‘governmentality’), Serbia brought a question to the fore, one which European
policy makers and theorists have tried to ignore: on what stable foundations
can ‘European security’ be constructed?
It is here that, from a Foucauldian perspective, the story of NATO’s
military intervention against Serbia (as well as its Montenegran appendix)
might tell us how the West’s disciplinary power has been involved in the
actual construction of ‘European security’. This is a story of the discursive
production of an operational meaning along the lines laid out by Weber, who
has argued that ‘intervention is understood as the flip side of sovereignty
. . . And what it means to violate sovereignty is decided by theorists when
they operationalise the meaning of intervention.’21 In Europe’s security
discourse, ‘Kosovo’ therefore tends to allegorise the Balkanisation of Europe,
the ultimate metaphor of chaos and disintegration which supposedly is the
antithesis of the real Europe of peace and stability. As Wæver argued in
this context: ‘Balkanisation is a tool for legitimising an international order
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without a named enemy . . . “Security” thus becomes shorthand for the
argument: We have to do everything to ensure that integration, and not
fragmentation, is the outcome.’22 To speak of Milosevic’s Serbia as the
ultimate threat to ‘European security’ is to imply the strategic relevance of
the notion of security through integration. Kosovo therefore serves as a
useful alibi for the stabilisation of what ‘European security’ actually means
by operationalising it through military intervention. Thanks to these acts of
stabilisation, Kosovo has written (and, to some extent, continues to write)
European security.
The story of Kosovo tells us that those political actors who do not accept
NEO realism, who defy the logic of integration and cooperation, de facto
deny their Europeanness, their family resemblance to other European (fam-
ily) member states, and should expect to face the serious consequences.
Serbia’s eruption into premodern savagery in the ‘heart of Europe’ has
offered the rest of Europe a not-to-be-missed chance to manifest and con-
stitute itself as the pinnacle of modern rational civilisation. Serbia’s killing
of Kosovo has set the parameters of the Balkanisation–integration nexus,
offering ‘Europe’ (and the West in general) a unique opportunity to suggest
itself as the strong centre that keeps the margins from running away. This
may explain the comical pride of many Romanians to be situated ‘north of
the Danube’, as if the Danube were a twenty-first-century Styx, a mythical
border between life and death, between European affluence and Balkan
anarchy. But by posing this nexus as the main (if not only) platform for
discourse, ‘European security’ becomes a speech act itself: it becomes the cen-
tral tool for building an integrated Europe by solidifying a socio-political
order that does not (yet) exist in actuality. Here, again, hyperreality takes
precedence over the ‘really real’. But this time it might be (merely) a weak
version of hyperreality, since the difference between Europe and its copy
are all too well understood. The all-too-human observer, however, ‘consci-
ously chooses the illusion, the hyped, the fake, or the copy as somehow
better, sexier, more exciting – more real’.23
Writing security on the Balkan screen
What happened in the Balkans during the 1990s is therefore often seen as a
somewhat bizarre, and certainly counterproductive, revolt against the logic
of European integration. The death of Yugoslavia in 1991 (coinciding with
the birthpangs of Croatia and Slovenia after their recognition as independ-
ent states by Germany in December of that year) implied a reversal of
Europe’s commitment to a unitary Yugoslavia. The crumbling of a federal
political entity like Yugoslavia was (and remains) a painful screenplay for
the rest of Europe to witness, reminding the other (family) member states
how fragile the continent’s peace and calm actually are.
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The Bosnian slaughterhouse has projected the horrors of war and
ethnic strife with an unprecedented transparency and visibility onto the
mental and TV screens of Europeans, crushing the comfortable distance
between ‘Europe’ and its supposedly premodern Balkan antipode. Bosnia
has made war a live drama with exaggerated, almost obscene, images of fear
and hate. European viewers easily (and readily) forgot that the Bosnian war
was in essence a modern war, a quest for space, territory and identity. It was
a war about questions still very much alive in the rest of Europe, although
most other European states had by now learned how to resolve (and/or
suppress) these disputes through complex political and administrative mech-
anisms. It uncomfortably reminded Europeans that their efforts to deter-
ritorialise politics remain a fragile and far from completed project whose
ratchet may well break under the combined pressures of sectarianism and
narcissism. ‘Bosnia’ and ‘Kosovo’ therefore function as disciplining alleg-
ories of what a forthright assault on Europe’s current political project of
integration may ultimately lead to, reminding all observers, almost on a
daily basis, how the veneration of identity may undermine the multicultural
ideal of Europe.
This has been the irony of the West’s actions in Bosnia and Kosovo,
since in its claim and efforts to promote tolerance it has been prepared to
use (military) force, if necessary. But, as Stjepan Mestrovic has suggested,
the ‘postmodern program of promoting organized tolerance is fundament-
ally flawed, and doomed to failure’.24 Mestrovic points out that Western
tolerance ‘denotes an air of contemptuous superiority on the part of those
who do the tolerating. To tolerate is to put up with something or someone,
not to sympathize or understand.’25 Europe’s approach to the Balkans has
therefore been based upon narcissism, rather than a sense of genuine tolera-
tion based on compassion. Europe is saying to Serbia what Baudrillard has
said on ‘America’: ‘utopia has arrived. If you aren’t part of it, get lost!’26
When Serbia claims political authority over Kosovo simply because this
territory is an integral part of its history, and of its cultural and religious
identity, it is challenging Europe’s now dominant postmodern narrative of
culture as consisting of rootless, circulating fictions and signs that no longer
refer to history, ethnicity and accepted myths. This explains why after
having declared the ‘end of history’, fundamentalist ethnocentrism and
Balkanisation caught the West completely off guard. It was shocked by the
real blood seeping from the Balkans which gradually reached the virginal
doormat of the European ‘centre’.
In his fury over Europe’s passive Bosnia policy, Mestrovic has depicted
the West as a ‘voyeuristic consumer of abstract fiction because the dis-
tinction between fact and fiction has been lost’.27 The Balkans have become
the site of a prolonged docudrama with stereotypical characters, Mestrovic
argues, who stage a play full with the usual sordid images western TV
audiences have by now got used to; scandalous, violent and even sexual
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images which may, according to Mestrovic, raise the question whether the
Balkan wars are a ‘prelude to a future in which audiences will have been
reduced to postmodern Romans watching bloody spectacles in the electric
arena comprised of televised images?’28 Following a somewhat perverse
Baudrillardian logic, this would turn the Balkans into a hyperreal site of
simulation precisely because it is televised, made abstract on a screen which
produces little other than violence and sensationalism. Real war and televised
war therefore blend together, preventing real emotion and real compassion
for the still very real victims of ethnic strife and attempted genocide. Or, as
Andreas Behnke argues later on in this book:
Only when [NATO’s] verbal representation is controlled, structured and dis-
seminated by spin-doctors and clever spokespersons, only when the visual
‘evidence’ is presented in the form of videogames, only when we stay within
the framework of this de-ontologised version of warfare, can NATO’s claims
[of moral superiority] be sustained.
Bosnia has shown for the first time how the referents of Western modernity
– truth, morality, justice – have now been emptied of real content, seemingly
confirming Baudrillard’s conjecture that social reality is composed of mere
fictions mostly played out on the TV screen. ‘Kosovo’, on the other hand,
has provided the West with an opportunity to publicly visualise these lost
referents by claiming the moral highground and re-establish the rhetoric of
Europe’s Enlightenment ideals.
NATO’s air campaign against Serbia (not to be confused with something
as arcane and brutal as ‘war’ – see Pertti Joenniemi’s chapter in this volume),
started on 24 March 1999 and lasted seventy-eight days. NATO warplanes
flew 37,465 sorties (an average of 480 every 24 hours), dropping more than
20,000 ‘smart bombs’, destroying parts of Serbia’s industrial and civilian
infrastructure, and killing an unknown number of Yugoslav troops as well
as some 500 civilians (the exact figure is still unknown). The tragedy of
Kosovo finally seems to have dehypnotised the West’s post-emotional stare
at the Balkans and to have provoked Europe to draw its own ‘line in the
sand’ by including Kosovo in Europe’s security equation.29 But in practice
this ‘line’ was drawn in the air, indicating that Europe did not want to
become ‘engaged’ on the ground but was committed to Balkan security in
only a general and abstract way through an antiseptic aerial operation. The
proclaimed victory of the West’s airpower has confirmed these ocularcentric
fantasies of technological mastery and transcendence, stimulating the deter-
ministic logic of mediated vision and techno-imagery. NATO’s air cam-
paign and its video-supported mission briefings have made it clear that these
new technologies open up the possibility of simultaneous engagement and
disengagement with the ‘other’ we encounter on our mental and our TV
screens.30 The ‘line in the sand’ is therefore also a protective line that keeps
these images from obtruding too deeply into the European consciousness.
Simulating European security 43
Technology thereby serves to isolate and insulate the viewers from the
frightening immediacy of Balkanisation. Speaking of the problematique of
postmodern involvement in the world, Kevin Robins has therefore claimed
that the ‘point now is not whether we can achieve a certain distance and
detachment from the fearful principles of reality, but whether we can ever
become reconnected to a world that we no longer take for real, a world
whose reality has been progressively screened out’.31
It is here that ‘European security’ is being framed most clearly. The
televisualisation of European politics has reduced the multiplicity of differ-
ence and abridged power and authority to an entertainmentised phenom-
enon. Technology has imposed a distance between the ideal of a peaceful and
stable ‘Europe’ and the ‘other’: vision is mobilised and employed to avoid
direct contact lest we be contaminated with the Balkanisation-bacillus. High-
flying fighter-pilots are called upon to hit their targets without physical
contact with the enemy, ensuring their visual sovereignty through smart
bombs and surgical strikes. With each bomb, NATO and Europe have been
building their own utopia, their own secure space over which they have
full control, a new European order that is beyond disappointment and
disillusionment, a transparent space that can be controlled from a safe dis-
tance with a sovereign Cartesian perspectivalist gaze. This is the ultimate
simulation of ‘European security’, since the really real has been disciplined
to fit the imagined ideal of European security. By simulating European
security, Europe has been disembodied and the option of chaos and cata-
strophe suspended (or even annulled).
It has become tempting to assume that this technological superiority and
rationality legitimises Europe’s hegemony over the ‘other’ (and, most notably,
other cultures). But, despite this panoptic ambition, full mastery over Europe’s
space will prove to be a dangerous illusion. The ontological closure that it
involves does not make moral questions meaningless or irrelevant. The
psychic numbing of the European audience may have detached vision/
knowledge from feeling. The telegenic war in Kosovo and Serbia may have
concealed the fact that, despite surgical strikes, really real victims still scream
and they do still bleed really real blood. But the world of the image and the
simulation has not removed the moral obligation to remember that in the
discursive construction of its security Europe has for three months intimidated
an entire population, dropping cluster bombs and killing and maiming thou-
sands of innocent people as the ‘accidental collateral damage’ accrued in the
great cause of European peace and stability.
Kosovo: the pre-context of European security
In this ‘space-between’ knowledge and power in European politics, the textual
nature of ‘European security’ becomes intelligible. Any approach emphasising
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textuality recognises that ‘reality’ is not a simple description of a lucid world
of facts, but that it concerns meaning- and value-producing practices and
language. It is of little use to challenge the boundaries of the battlefield of
ideas concerning ‘European security’ without acknowledging this inevitable
intertextuality. It is therefore much more important to understand how one
approach and reading of ‘European security’ comes to stand above other
readings and silences them by often arbitrarily separating them from the
canonical version of ‘events’. The Kosovo drama has again indicated that
rationalist and technological approaches to European security have now
taken on the character of simulacra which may be ‘appealing and persuasive
in their modelled abstraction, but metaphysical and exclusionary in their
hyperreal application’.32
NATO’s air campaign has legitimised not only NEO realism: it has made
another step in legitimising the structure of meaning that circulates in the
very debate on ‘European security’. It goes without saying that this NEO
realism implies a collective amnesia about other possible forms of meaning
and the marginalization of other readings and philosophical vocabularies.
This discursive formation of meaning has now resulted in a logocentric
disposition which imposes the Balkanisation–integration opposition as the
practical nexus on which all events and policies must be situated. By this
move, ‘Europe’ situates itself as the coherent sovereign voice (which it isn’t),
making itself unproblematical (or at least less problematical), and assuming
an extra-historical identity that is beyond critical interrogation. Moreover,
by invoking the notion of ‘security’, modern discourse has tried to discipline
and stabilise ‘a region of historical contingency and chance that refuses to
submit to the sovereign truth of reason and that calls forth the means of the
state to exclude or subdue it in the name of reasoning man’.33
The discourse of ‘European security’ therefore produces a parallel para-
digm of European sovereignty, a paradigm that faces serious challenges of
local resistance (of the still-resilient state), as well as external opposition
(which questions the notion of ‘Europe’ as a privileged space of peace and
stability). It is at these unruly frontiers and borders that the concept of
‘European security’ is being challenged and problematised. Balkanisation
testifies to the recalcitrant domain of anarchy within Europe, a domain that
has to be subdued by the sovereign figure of the ‘international community’.
Much of this book deals with how these practical and theoretical frontiers
are being shaped and what their wider implications will be for ‘Europe’ in
general. Whereas ‘Europe’ should stand for the sovereign centre of domestic-
ated territory and originary presence, ‘Kosovo’ stands for the continuity of
‘international politics’, the inside–outside divide that privileges and legitimises
the domestic space of identity and continuity over the anarchic space of
difference and discontinuity. It is this residual Balkan space that still seems
to escape the rational truth of ‘integration’ and ‘reasonable humanity’, and
must therefore be silenced and disciplined.
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It is also in these locations that the new mode of NEO realism, the mode
of order, is being produced, and occasionally imposed. Without the clear
signs of ‘war’ and ‘security’ as the inscription of international dangers, ‘there
would be no notion of a well-bounded domestic social identity – a popula-
tion of sovereign men who know themselves to be at one with a social
totality that is imperilled’.34 Kosovo therefore illustrates Michael Shapiro’s
argument that enmity and war are essential for the maintenance of a coher-
ent society and body politic.35 Since security is what takes politics beyond
the ordinary, beyond the established rules of the game,36 it allows (and even
calls for) extraordinary measures to be taken to address the existential threat.
The novelty with Kosovo is that this mode of statecraft is not practised
within a statal context, but that it is in the name of ‘Europe’ that a new
narrative of modernity is constructed to fabricate and rationalise European
domestic society vis-à-vis the unruliness and backwardness of the Balkan
fringe. It is in the name of ‘European security’ that boundaries are drawn to
discipline the behaviour of those within and to distinguish ‘Europe’ from
the ‘other’. By altering the referent of security as a speech act, ‘Europe’ is de
facto finding and constructing itself.
It is therefore all the more fitting that the writing of ‘European security’
has taken place in the only true hyperreal country in the world, since the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) did not really exist (and has never
existed de jure as a sovereign state).37 Perhaps this is exactly the sort of
anomaly that can find no place in the NEO realism of the twenty-first
century, the sort of (what Weber calls) ‘formless feminine fluids’ that must
provoke ‘Europe’ to use its ‘stabilizing influence . . . so [that it] may
heterosexually serve masculine purposes’.38 Kosovo stands for an under-
standing of ‘European security’ that legitimises the use of military force in
order to delegitimise the use of military force. It is the site where people
have been killed and bombs have been dropped for the sake of stability,
peace and human rights. It remains the domain where the forces of integra-
tion and Balkanisation do battle, since ‘the multiculturalist doctrine that is
fragmenting our universities as well as our intellectual life, and the “ethnic
cleansing” of the Serbs, belong to the same troubling cultural and historical
moment’.39 In Kosovo, Europe is still fighting itself in a narcissist attempt to
get rid of the undesirable, of chaos and anarchy.
Kosovo is therefore both the pretext and the ultimate context in which
the contemporary reading of ‘European security’ is taking place. But it
remains problematic to accept the ‘other’ as a legitimate ontological pres-
ence, mainly because doing so raises the possibility ‘of accepting the Other’s
characteristics as a legitimate alternative and, consequently, of being taken
over by the Other’.40 The Milosevic regime has never been the opposite of
the NEO, but rather its ultimate symptom, its hyperreal foundation from
which a new mode of order now seems to be emerging.41 In this sense,
therefore, Baudrillard was correct when he argued that the ‘real story is that
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the Serbs, as vehicles of ethnic cleansing, are at the forefront of the con-
struction of Europe. For it is being constructed, the real Europe, the white
Europe, a Europe whitewashed, integrated and purified, morally as much
as economically or ethnically’.42 On this reading, ‘Europe’ seems to have
(mis)used Serbia as well as Kosovo to acquire a sense of self, to temporarily
and spatially define what it is not. If Europe’s simulated security in future is
not constituted on a more substantial basis, it will remain a travesty and
an apparent and transparent fake. But perhaps that’s why we will like it all
the better.
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Kosovo and the end of war
Introduction: deviant voices
NATO’s bombing campaign in Kosovo and the refusal of most Western
leaders to regard it as war have prompted numerous questions about
the nature of this episode in recent European history. How should ‘Kosovo’
be categorised? Can it be covered by the usual linguistic repertoire, or does
‘Kosovo’ testify to the fact that ‘war’ has become conceptually inapplicable?
For most observers the term ‘war’ remains good enough. In their view,
war is well and alive. The bombing campaign in Kosovo may not cor-
respond to the Clausewitzian definition of war, but war antedates the
modern state by a good number of millennia, and is therefore more than
the continuation of statist policies by other means. Hence, the concept’s
transcendental nature gives it the power to bridge even significant temporal
and spatial variations. In mainstream strategic thinking, Operation Allied
Force does not stand out as an exceptional case in the history of armed
conflict, and ‘war’ has therefore been used to label it without too much
hesitation. Without doubt, collective violence has been employed, which
allows ‘Kosovo’ be referred to as a war in this basic sense. With only a few
exceptions, it is therefore still claimed that the Kosovo encounter has featured
too few irregular and asymmetrical aspects to undermine the contingent
character of war. Deviant voices can still be silenced.
Nevertheless, doubt about this orthodox reading of ‘Kosovo’ is mount-
ing. Some critics now claim that ‘Kosovo’ just does not fit the standard
categories of armed conflict and war, and that many irregularities have to be
studied. These critics refuse to adhere to orthodox vocabularies and call for
new analytical conventions that go beyond the accepted mainstream. They
concede that coercive elements have indeed been involved in the Kosovo
campaign, including the collective use of violence, but that there are many
features of ‘Kosovo’ that radically deviate from what we traditionally have
come to understand as ‘war’. The distinctions and borderlines that have
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over time helped to carve out the concept of war (setting it apart from
non-war) now seem to be faltering. A previously well-delineated and uncon-
tested concept, ‘war’ no longer seems to be its good old self, the critics
claim. ‘Kosovo’ therefore not only sets in motion a conceptual transition
by breaking essential boundaries, but it may well be indicating a full-fledged
conceptual crisis which needs to be reflected in the terminology that is to be
used to describe these new phenomena.
‘Kosovo’ therefore signals a profound ontological clash, which has turned
war into an openly contested concept. War has become increasingly debatable;
it has become a moving target that appears to be losing its name. For
Western policy makers and analysts this is especially disconcerting, since
this emerging conceptual ambivalence applies not only to remote armed
conflicts on the international system’s periphery, but now seems to have
infected the centre of Europe as well.
My aim here is to probe this breach in the discourse on war. The
emerging clash of concepts is used as a vantage-point for an inquiry into
the discursive strength of the concept of war in its different articulations.
I ask how and why this concept is being rendered open to doubt? What is
the significance of the various efforts of re-articulation; and what efforts
are being undertaken to close this uncomfortable debate prematurely? In
order to place this debate in perspective, I first review the unfolding of the
concept of war during recent years. Such an inquiry is necessary since some
of the arguments presented in the context of ‘Kosovo’ feed on previous
claims of ‘endism’, i.e. that modern war seems to be withering away. This
essay therefore argues that war is dying out, as it were, and that it is this
change in the transcendental nature of war which has opened up space for
doubt concerning the ‘established truths’ about conflict in general. This
shift allows previously invisible and marginalised views to come out into
the open.
However, it is also possible to think that the Kosovo debate – and the
uncertainty about the core terminology – actually involves a broader prob-
lem. In fact, it could point beyond ‘endism’ (be it the end of war, the state,
or other central planks of modernity). The search for new terms further
undermines the central tenets in the established discourse on war, and may
well contribute to the legitimising of new ones. What is underway may not
be just the faltering of traditional categories but the emergence of new ones,
and these rewritten concepts are by no means neutral and descriptive in
essence. These efforts are elements of a process of signification and legitim-
isation which may be part of the formation of a new discursive order. We
should therefore ask ourselves what the Kosovo campaign was really about,
and, more generally, what such a reconfiguration of war would imply for
the emerging NEO? What are the discursive consequences of these new
interpretative schemes, and how do they contribute to the shaping of new
identities, subjectivities and social order?
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These questions are posed since we need to know what kind of vocabu-
lary we should (and can) use to describe an event like ‘Kosovo’. It is
of particular importance because our understanding of war has been cen-
tral to the story of sovereign authority and modern statehood. The aim of
this essay is therefore to map the alterations in the vocabularies used to
describe ‘Kosovo’ by focusing on the productive aspects of war. I argue
that this concept is changing rapidly and dramatically, and I try to trace
the subjectivities and particular social formations that hinge on such a
change.
War: a floating signifier?
Taking into account that many of the established features of the inter-
national system now tend to appear less natural, authorised and permanent,
it is hardly surprising that basic questions concerning war have been
problematised as well. It is recognised that war is not a permanent and
unchanging principle or institution, but rather a social practice with its own
history. Quincy Wright has argued that modern war ‘rests upon an elabor-
ate ideological construction maintained through education in a system of
language, law, symbols and values’.1 War is a practice with typical modes of
performance; it is historically constructed and (therefore) variable. War is
an essential part of an international system dominated by states whose
sovereignty is (or has been) the prime constitutive principle. War’s histor-
ically variable modes of performance are closely linked to the nature of the
political system itself, whereas war has also been constitutive of the political
framework in which the performance occurs. With this in mind, war is
increasingly approached – to use a term introduced by Ernesto Laclau and
Chantal Mouffe – as a ‘floating signifier’.2
It may well be that the modern project can no longer muster the strength
to anchor the concept of war and offer it a privileged, distinct place and role
within the international system. During the twentieth century, modernity
has defined the legitimate understanding and role of war, and has furnished
it with a temporal and spatial permanence. This effort has not, primarily,
been one of trying to do away with war, but can perhaps be better described
as an essential aspect of modern inter-state relations. It is precisely the
recognition and delineation of the sphere of war that has been conducive to
a certain ‘taming’ of war, and, more generally, to the delineation of the
unknown. As an unproblematic given, war has ratified and sanctioned the
establishment of homogenous and stabilised ‘insides’, while deferring dif-
ference and contingency to the ‘outside’, i.e. the sphere of anarchy and
unpredictability. By defining the ‘outside’ as the space of war, modernity
has made the world of politics readable and instructive. The modern fram-
ing of the inside–outside dyad has been so firm and uncontested that it has
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become possible to consider war as an ‘institution’, or a ‘regime’, which also
allows us to use such generalisations as the ‘war-system’.
The distinction between the spheres of war and peace (i.e. the domestic
intra-state realm) has served as the basis for border drawing in general, and
allowed the establishment of divisions between order–anarchy, cosmos–chaos,
we–they, self–other, inside–outside, domestic–foreign, friend–foe, and a long
list of other binary oppositions.3 Anchoring war has brought about onto-
logical security through stable social identities. The idea of two different
political spaces in the modern world of sovereign states – one within states
and another between states – has also made it possible for international
relations (IR) theory to comport itself as a theory of survival, while political
theory and law have been reserved for questions dealing with social order,
the organisation of the ‘good life’, as well as the notions of ‘progress’ and
‘history’ through cumulative scientific and political achievements.
However, the widening search for alternative expressions now confirms
that the concept of war is in trouble. Edward Luttwak, for example, has
coined the expression of ‘postheroic warfare’ by distinguishing between
traditional and novel forms of war.4 Chris Hables Gray uses the more gen-
eral term ‘postmodern war’, whereas Mary Kaldor prefers the more limited
notion of ‘post-Clausewitzian war’.5 Richard Mansbach and Franke Wilmer
may be closer to the ‘endism’ debate with their notion of the ‘end of the
Westphalian period’, a term closely related to the ideas of John Mueller and
Christopher Coker on the fundamental ‘obsolescence of modern war’.6 Some
concepts related to war which for a long time have been pushed to the
sidelines – such as the ‘just war’ – now seem to be resurfacing.7 The search
for alternative vocabularies – either denoting ‘endism’ or attempts to provide
novel labels for new kinds of (armed) conflict – confirms that conceptual
destabilisation is having its effect. The central ingredient of the emerging
counter-discourse on war is that war and violence are now increasingly
defying the inside–outside nexus, thereby questioning the centrality of the
state and the continued relevance of the story of modernity.
Apart from the challenge of ‘Kosovo’, war (like the notion of sovereignty)
has become vulnerable to the ongoing pressures of globalisation and the
complementary move of localisation. This should not come as a surprise,
since the disregard for historical and cultural articulations in this connec-
tion has been accompanied by an eruption of contingency. The arrival of
complex and ambiguous forms of armed conflict implies that traditional
political vocabularies no longer serve as reliable points of reference. They
are no longer helpful in drawing the inside–outside borders that have shaped
our conventional understanding of what wars – and, more generally, inter-
national relations – are (supposed to be) all about. Kalevi J. Holsti has
therefore claimed: ‘War today is not the same phenomenon it was in the
eighteenth century, or even in the 1930s. It has different sources and takes
on significantly different characteristics.’8
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Some critics of the traditional approaches to ‘war’ – including the milit-
ary historian Martin van Creveld – even argue that the concept should be
consigned to the dustbin of history. This claim rests on the observation that,
over the last few decades, inter-state war has become improbable. Traditional
‘war’ has become the ultimate exception to the rule, rather than the essential
(and even constitutive) component which defines the very nature of interna-
tional politics. With the vanishing of (military) violence, security has become
less of an issue, opening up space for other arguments and concepts –
integration, for example – which are now allowed to take the initiative in
organising the political scenery. The ongoing debate on the ‘end of war’
illustrates and supports this change. Coker argues that humankind ‘may
have been reprieved from the undertow of violence which marked the twen-
tieth century’.9 Van Creveld claims that a ‘ghost is stalking the corridors of
general staffs and defense departments all over the developed world – the
fear of military impotence, even irrelevance’.10 Van Creveld is supported by
Michael Mandelbaum, who argues that it is ‘possible that not only war –
protracted struggles among great powers with revolutionary consequences
for international politics – but even modern war – the use of mechanised
weapons in formal battles between the professional armed forces of sover-
eign states – is dying out’.11
However, the ‘endism’ debate is limited to traditional inter-state war,
which, as an ultimate instrument of power-politics, no longer dominates the
security environment across large areas of the world. Even though ‘war’
continues to offer IR a unifying code and language (despite the fact that
armed conflict is relatively rare and is geographically unevenly spread), it is
no longer read as a structural necessity, which has opened the way for new
organising principles and departures. The grand narrative of regular and
instrumental major war has been replaced by a pattern of violence which is
more localised and less easy to define as either ‘internal’ or ‘external’.12
Students of global politics are therefore faced with a choice: should they
continue to label these (armed) conflicts ‘wars’, even in a very general
meaning of the word, or should they develop new vocabularies more in tune
with the determining aspects of these new kind of conflicts?
Max Singer and Aaron Wildawsky have suggested that the concept of
‘war’ be divided into two different spheres.13 They argue that a certain dif-
ferentiation is in order since inter-state relations are no longer imbued with
anarchy and that broad ‘zones of peace’ exist in parallel to ‘zones of tur-
moil’. Clearly, there is no peace in the absolute sense as the political scene is
coloured by manifestations of political violence such as terrorism, civil strife,
massacres and, occasionally even genocide. Today’s violence is often initi-
ated by non-statal actors, killing soldiers as well as civilians and frequently
organised in non-territorial ways. Mark Duffield and Mary Kaldor have
further argued that contemporary conflicts usually are not conducted in a
statist manner and not limited to a clear territorial space.14 These conflicts
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now tend to blur the prevalent inside–outside logic, since they appear in
small pockets of conflict, crossing statal lines of demarcation. In terms of
temporality, conflicts may be characterised by their longevity and protracted
nature, or they may take the form of occasional clashes and outbursts with
a shorter duration.
But the unravelling of modern war also includes the language itself, since
we now tend to talk about ‘strife’, ‘low level conflicts’, ‘private and informal
wars’, ‘wild zones’, ‘kalashnikov zones’, ‘no-go areas’, ‘pathological anarchies’
and ‘insurgencies’. Other new terms (such as N. Theyer’s ‘wars without
reason’, Alain Minc’s zones grises – i.e. geographical and social areas where
the rule of law does not apply – and Philip Cerny’s notion of ‘insecurity
from below’), also indicate that essential changes are taking place.15
It therefore appears that the concept of war, in defying the desire for cat-
egorisation and definability, does not stay within the confines and the dis-
cursive principles of modernity. The image of statal actors aiming their
military forces against each other, followed by combat between their organised
armed forces – an image upon which the discourse of (modern) war basically
rests – has been blurred. Patterns appear to be unfolding that go beyond
any narrow conceptualisation of ‘war’, bringing about ‘noise’ instead of eras-
ing it, and failing to draw clear boundaries by means of which we are able to
identify and separate identities.16 Now that modern state-based faultlines have
lost much of their importance, the concept of war seems to be both debordered
and rebordered.17 The inside–outside delineation of states is crumbling and
no longer defines distinct coherent security spaces now that armed conflict is
no longer part of the standard repertoire of Western politics. Instead, violent
conflicts stand out as enclaves amid an otherwise rather peaceful environment,
and within such a more mixed and complicated political pattern states stand
out as one category of actors among many others. With conflicts no longer
confined to armed struggle between statal actors, many states have gradually
lost the primacy which they were supposed to have as the monopolists of
legitimate violence and the guarantors of political order.
These deviations explain why the concept of war has become insecure
and why basic questions about war have re-entered the political agenda. A
number of redefinitions have occurred that signal an epistemic change in the
discourse on war. There is no longer one dominant form of conflict that
dictates what war is about, but rather a proliferation of particularisms.
Previous knowledge, which has privileged state-centred perspectives and
territorially bounded violence, now seems to be unable to contribute to our
understanding of contemporary events. Consequently, ‘war’ is treated in a
less coherent and dogmatic manner, and various interventions on its nature
open up perspectives which previously were difficult to explore with any
credibility. At the same time, it should be acknowledged that efforts to
divorce oneself from traditional understandings of war remain the exception,
rather than the rule, and they tend to remain exploratory in character.
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War as usual
How should we approach the Kosovo campaign against the background of
war’s increasingly uncertain meaning? Is ‘Kosovo’ to be read as ‘war as
usual’, or do the critical voices have a more convincing story to tell on the
basic nature of this event?
In general, the Kosovo campaign has only added to the problematising
of our notion of what war is all about. It has certainly not encouraged a
return to war as an unproblematic given, although there has been room for
rather conventional interpretations as well. For quite a number of observers,
‘Kosovo’ has been ‘business as usual’, a conflict that should be framed in
a traditional manner. In the view of (what probably is) the majority of
analysts, no ‘contamination’ has occurred and the old register of concepts is
considered both useful and sufficient. In this perspective, the concept of war
is both self-evident and non-debatable; it dispels doubt and suggests that the
name of the game has remained unchanged: simple and straightforward
‘war’. This modern ontology of war still dominates the debate on Kosovo,
where the story of the conflict is told in terms of order versus anarchy,
whereby the principle of sovereignty continues to draw lines between friend
and foe. In this perspective, war remains the ultimate boundary-making,
and not boundary-breaking, form of political action.
One clear example of this traditional view is to be found in the recent
writings of Ivo Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon, who read ‘Kosovo’ as a novel
manifestation of the old story of ‘order versus anarchy’.18 Adopting a Realist
nomenclature, they talk about ‘Kosovo’ in terms of ‘the path to war’, ‘losing
the war’, or ‘winning the war’. They uncritically assume that the discursive
strength of the classical notion of war remains intact and they are not
troubled by the fact that in the case of the Kosovo campaign NATO achieved
its objectives without a single combat fatality (at least on its own side). They
also disregard the inequality of the actors in the campaign, or the absence of
the usual mutual recognition of sovereignty, which during modernity has
constituted warring factions and framed the idea of what war is (or should
be) all about. Daalder and O’Hanlon concede that events have unfolded in
a somewhat exceptional manner, but are not convinced that the traditional
reading of the ‘war’ concept has been undermined by these irregularities,
which would necessitate the use of alternative vocabularies to describe con-
temporary armed conflict. Like many other proponents of the ‘war-as-usual’
outlook, these authors agree that war takes a variety of forms, making it
occasionally difficult to recognise. However, the possibility of war remains
and continues to form the liminal condition against which international
politics is being conducted. This is supposed to assure the traditional register
of politics and security, and to confirm and stabilise its validity and relevance.19
Jenny Edkins arrives at similar conclusions, although she responds prim-
arily to the way in which tropes such as the Holocaust and Nazism have
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been used to articulate humanitarian concerns during the Kosovo cam-
paign.20 Edkins argues: ‘What Kosovo represented was by no means the
beginning of a new form of governance in which humanitarianism overrides
state sovereignty, as liberal humanitarians argue.’ She claims that ‘Kosovo’
has shown us a repetition of the old form of sovereign politics – a politics of
exclusion, or a politics of the sovereign ban. She adds, however, that ‘the
sovereign power produced this time was NATO’, i.e. the institutionalised
entity being constituted was not a state (in opposition to other states), but a
broader transatlantic community.21 Yet, Edkins claims that this change in
spatiality and the emergence of a broader community do not imply that
‘war’, as a concept, has now become a misnomer.
By categorising these different authors, it appears that those who concur
with the Serbian reading of the Kosovo campaign often have little doubt
about the essence of the event. Their verdict tends to be clear: the bombing
campaign has been a classic act of aggression, albeit one disguised as a call
to construct a ‘global village’ and formulate its new rules. It has been seen
as an infringement of the sovereign rights of an independent country and as
an unjustified meddling in that country’s domestic affairs. In this view,
‘Kosovo’ has been an ‘aggression’ on the part of the West and an attempt to
bomb Serbia into submission.22 Clearly, these critical accounts also use the
traditional conceptual repertoire of state-based sovereignty, territorial integr-
ity and non-interference in the sphere of domestic affairs. ‘Kosovo’ was
therefore a conflict over the preservation of Serbia’s internal integrity and
an attempt to keep Kosovo a part of the Yugoslav federation. In this reading
of ‘Kosovo’, there is little doubt about what vocabulary should be employed
to describe the essence of the event: it was seen as ‘war as usual’, whereby
the notion of war is used to stabilise and fortify existing identities and
political realities.
Towards a higher order?
But ‘Kosovo’ can be depicted differently. Michael Ignatieff, for example, has
drawn attention to the conceptual deviancies and oddities of ‘Kosovo’, and
argued that the conflict has been one of the first ‘virtual wars’. He claims
that many facets of ‘Kosovo’ have been kept hidden and that the public
image of the conflict was markedly different from the ‘reality’ on the ground.
Ignatieff is troubled by the concepts and the images that are now used,
arguing that ‘virtual reality is very seductive’.23 He seems to be aware of the
trappings of virtual war, with its own fables and representations based on
self-righteous invulnerability: ‘We see war as a surgical scalpel and not as a
bloodstained sword. In so doing we misdescribe the instruments of death.’24
But these ‘make-believe’ aspects of ‘Kosovo’ do not seem to have carried
very far, although they were certainly there. One may argue that the nineteen
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NATO countries were not aiming to hide their true aspirations. Contrary to
Ignatieff’s suspicions, they were not trying to turn the ‘real war’ into some-
thing else by resorting to some linguistic subterfuge. On the contrary, they
have aimed for genuine communication, but were often unable to get their
message across since their line of argumentation clearly deviated from the
traditional war-speak of modernity. In many ways, ‘Kosovo’ was all about
safeguarding and enabling unhindered communication and exchange. It has
stood out (here I follow Michael Shapiro’s line of thinking) as a process in
which war transcended its modern meaning by reaching out and expanding
the domain of political action.25 NATO countries portrayed themselves as
humanitarian champions enforcing respect for human rights. Since NATO
did not label its campaign a ‘war’, it was already indicating that something
new was underway. NATO’s alleged civilisational aims called for new moral
and legal criteria in order to pass judgement, which would, one could argue,
call for a new military logic of action as well. But NATO’s military actions
were not exceptional; they did not even try to go beyond politics. On the
contrary, they were part and parcel of a broader package of political aims,
one that under normal circumstances is advanced by less violent means. To
quote a representative statement from a NATO press release:
NATO is not waging war against Yugoslavia. We have no quarrel with the
people of Yugoslavia who for too long have been isolated in Europe because
of the politics of their government. Our action is directed against the repress-
ive policy of the Yugoslav leadership. We must stop the violence and bring an
end to the humanitarian catastrophe taking place in Kosovo. We have a moral
duty to do so.26
For NATO countries, ‘Kosovo’ did not signal a real war. They did not
believe that the discursive power of the concept was intact, or was in line
with their aspirations. There was neither a declaration of war nor parades to
mark its end. More importantly, for NATO, ‘Kosovo’ was about something
quite different, since the classic Realist reasons for war fighting (the conquest
of territory, oil, empire, or other ‘sovereign rights’) did not apply. These
modern reasons for war were absent because the conflict in Kosovo centred
around the pursuit of moral aims (rather than traditional politics) by other
means. The vocabulary employed related more to the tradition of a just war
(a notion that preceded the era of modern wars), which was firmly grounded
in denationalisation and aimed to replace politics with the imperative of
universal principles and virtue.
In positioning themselves in a context that was no longer premised on
geopolitical logic, NATO countries argued that their political agenda was
based not on power, but on values; it was grounded in the representation
not of national interests, but of international responsibilities (which included
the inviolability of human life). NATO found itself engaged in a new kind of
cosmopolitan mission, entangled in a battle in which ‘difference’ was not
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necessarily interpreted as enmity. NATO countries took care not to define
Serbia – and particularly not the Serbs as a people – as their enemy, and
continued to stress that they were out to defend human rights and not
to conquer the country. Their effort was not one of pursuing egoistical
self-interest within a Hobbesian setting, but to fight what Ulrich Beck has
labelled a ‘postnational war’.27 Beck has labelled NATO’s new political
approach as ‘military humanism’, a phrase which tries to capture the break-
down of classical notions of war and tries to grasp the novelty of NATO’s
efforts.28 NATO’s aim was to enforce respect for the values of a higher
supranational order and community, thereby constituting NATO itself as
well as its own sphere of security.
During the Kosovo campaign, the security of the Allied states themselves
was not at stake, at least not directly. NATO countries were not in danger
of being attacked and their borders or territorial integrity were not under
threat. It therefore appears that the transatlantic community that was
constituted by the Kosovo experience was based not on the presence, but
rather on the absence, of the traditional argument of statal security. The
entity being created was based on arguments that go beyond conventional
readings of security since it was exempt from the logic of anarchy. In order
to be present at all, the notion of ‘security’ had to adapt itself to the core
constitutive themes of individual rights, exchange and openness. As Andreas
Behnke has argued, the security argument was employed in a derivative and
protective manner, rather than in a productive way.29 During ‘Kosovo’, the
notion of security was deprived of its traditional linkages to sovereignty and
instead referred to the safeguarding of an emerging non-sovereign com-
munity – one represented thus far by the idea of ‘Europe’. Clearly, such an
abstract referent object is no longer territorially bounded. The derivative
nature of security, and the functions of such an argument in terms of border
drawing, also implies that the Kosovo conflict turned into a kind of
non-divisive war. It has been a conflict that defies bordering and thereby
also the clear-cut classification of political space along modern lines.
Dealing with a residual case
More generally, the Kosovo move was conceptualised as a method to bring
a residual case in line with the general requirements of the emerging post-
Cold War system. ‘Kosovo’ was about constructing the new Europe, the
configuration of a stable political sphere which extends the European project
to cover some of its resistant fringes and to fend off subversive tendencies
which tend to question the legitimacy of the ‘new system’. In their efforts to
legitimise their action, NATO countries have resorted to new vocabularies,
using words and concepts different from the ones employed in the context
of ‘war’, be it during the Cold War or its traditional predecessors. In doing
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so, the often propagated idea of a ‘war against war’ has acquired an altogether
novel meaning.
Instead of leaning on the traditional state-centred repertoire, the Kosovo
campaign was defended by arguments that border on idealism. Here, a
group of Western countries was claiming that it was transcending its war-
like past in favour of a broader collectivity, one of international collaboration
where the rules of the game were no longer predicated on sovereignty and
national interest. Such interests were still present, it was argued, but they
were moulded and had gone through a civilising process. Beck has tried to
capture this intriguing aspect of ‘Kosovo’ in his reference to the new notion
of ‘military pacifism’.30 The bombing took place, it was claimed, to ensure
respect for what were seen as the foundations of the post-Cold War order in
Europe. NATO was not fighting for the sake of preventing Serbia from
joining this new order or to exclude it from this new sphere of stability and
‘non-war’. Rather, NATO’s campaign was being conducted in order to
ensure that this still fragile post-Cold War order could flourish and could, in
future, incorporate Serbia as a possible new member. It was an effort to
construct a new political spatiality which would go beyond the traditional
us–them dichotomy. NATO saw itself confronted with a country which, due
to unfortunate circumstances and bad leadership, had been isolated from
the European democratic family of nations. Serbia (as well as Serbs) was
not constructed as an outsider and made ‘foreign’. Instead, it was depicted
as an entity that defines the boundaries of ‘our’ community, and treated as
a challenge – even as a case that could serve as a litmus-test to verify the
very existence of that community. In other words, NATO countries gave up
their sovereign right to decide upon the friend–foe distinction. Without the
naming of enemies, and with the efforts of denationalisation, a system reach-
ing beyond the modern script was provided by subjectivity.
The ‘other’ that was being constructed in this new kind of discourse was
an echo, a faint reflection of the West’s own non-civic past. In a way,
NATO countries were bombing a mirror-image of their old selves. In this
reading of the Balkan mirror, Serbia could hardly be depicted as a straight-
forward opponent, or as the ‘enemy’. But it was also not viewed as a full-
fledged sovereign entity, or as a dignified actor which deserved NATO’s
respect and could be placed on the same level as ‘us’. Serbia was not located
on the outside in order to reify old statal identities, or to confirm the traditional
state-based system of international relations. This could not be done because
the new cosmopolitan construction lacked an agreed upon external border
which would allow for such a move.
The discrimination and singling out of Milosevic’s Serbia therefore had
to be based on its moral inferiority. This categorisation, one no longer
premissed on a mediation between sovereign actors, was already present
during the Rambouillet talks (of February–March 1999). The end result of
the Rambouillet ‘negotiations’ could therefore only be a Western dictate.
Kosovo and the end of war 59
Serbia was nothing more than an object located within Europe’s shared
space; it was considered an inferior entity, a child that should be compelled
to swallow a bitter medicine. Judgement on the scale of moral superiority–
inferiority provided the rationale for treating Serbia as a body upon which
NATO countries could actualise their self-endowed role as the guardians of
a civilisation in the making. Serbia, as a problematic case, had to be ‘Euro-
peanised’ without ousting it into the sphere of external ‘otherness’. Instead
of confirming and constructing the traditional inside–outside nexus (which
would uphold the us–them distinction), the aim was primarily to achieve
de-bordering and inclusion. In doing so, NATO was doing nothing less than
turning ‘war’ into the opposite of its modern self.
In the context of ‘Kosovo’, the logic of enmity was not to be confirmed,
but to be transcended. The friend–foe, self–other divisions were to be broken
down by bringing Serbia in from the ‘cold’. Serbia, as a deviant case, had to
be patronised (even by rather harsh measures) into the community of
‘civilized’ states in Europe. Although this move was non-exclusive, it was
also clearly not benign. The end result was therefore a unity and homogene-
ity premised on civilizational claims – one without an outside, since these
claims were considered universal. In other words, the subjectivity which was
being created owed nothing to the ‘outside’, and this absence of any kind
of external debt to difference (such as the debt represented by a deviant
Serbia), resulted in NATO’s claims of its own inherent boundlessness.
Averting the mirror image
In their search for legitimisation, NATO countries premised their action on
a new reading of ‘Europe’. The American, British and French political leader-
ship argued that NATO’s aim was to prevent ‘Europe’ from returning to
its old self – an entity fraught with Realpolitik and power-political conflict
and war. The leadership argued that a liminal case at the fringes of the new
system had to be sorted out. The difference of a stranger, which functioned
as a kind of ‘internal other’, had to be tackled and ‘normalised’ in order to
prevent the spread of this kind of deviant behaviour. Such behaviour had to
be discouraged as it could undermine the social and political cohesion of
Europe’s new post-Cold War system based on human and political rights,
openness and dialogue. Against this background, the concept of war was a
misnomer, since the act of bombing was not a reversal to power politics, or
‘war as usual’. Instead, it signalled something revolutionary: it represented
(in temporal terms), a moment of becoming, overtaking the modern concept
of war and substituting it for something new, unknown.
In a similar vein, the breach of old political habits was illustrated by
the fact that the bombing took place without the approval of the United
Nations Security Council, a body imbued with a power-political logic from
60 Pertti Joenniemi
which the ‘New Europe’ wanted to disassociate itself. International law, as
interpreted by Amnesty International in its report on ‘collateral damage’,
was equally refuted.31 Behnke has therefore argued that
the re-introduction of a discriminatory concept of war no longer rests on the
normative and political efficacy, or are dependent upon, a legal-institutional
‘legitimisation system.’ Instead, the new formulation rests on the purported
empirical ‘facts of life’ in international politics. Scientific knowledge about
realities of international politics provides its legitimacy.32
Another way of putting it would be to say that NATO grasped the oppor-
tunity to re-engage itself with Europe’s own history. Through ‘Kosovo’,
NATO turned itself into an agent of more universal aspirations, trying to
abandon traditional identities and assuming a far broader sense of ‘we’
than that of the various statal actors which were performing in the
campaign per se. Instead of falling prey to history, NATO countries aimed
at grasping the opportunity of making history by virtue of a set of super-
ior civilisatory values. Such a moment of ‘becoming’ – instead of just con-
cerning itself with sovereign ‘being’ – was made possible by Serbia’s refusal
to abide by such Western values. Therefore, to describe NATO’s bombing
as ‘war’ – at least from a NATO perspective – would be a misnomer and
would even undermine NATO’s effort to construct itself as a new trans-
atlantic community.
‘Kosovo’ has helped to construct a new doctrine of international politics
by trying to come to terms with the paradoxical interplay between the
global and the local, and by carving out a new kind of political space which
reaches beyond statal parameters. This new doctrine of humanitarian inter-
vention is no longer ‘modern’ in the sense that it is not predicated on the
notions of sovereignty, a clear line between inside–outside, friend–foe or
self–other. Rather, it is premised on ambivalence and ambiguity, caused by
the blurring and transcending of numerous political and conceptual bound-
aries, including those that are essential to the modern understanding of war.
Thus new terms had to be invented and applied in order to underline the
difference with modern ‘war’. Various neutral ones, such as ‘campaign’,
‘operation’, ‘mission’, ‘strike’, ‘attack’, ‘intervention’, ‘coercive diplomacy’
or ‘struggle’, were frequently employed; in other cases, NATO could simply
resort to using technical jargon (such as Operation Allied Force.) But
despite the many non-war concepts, NATO leaders found it difficult to
come up with intersubjectively shared concepts that would get across their
intentions and views in a credible manner. The notion of ‘war’ stood out as
a fixed, even inflexible, term, making it difficult to ignore or overrule due to
its long history and its still dominant position. This may explain why NATO
spokesmen used the term ‘humanitarian war’, albeit somewhat reluctantly.33
The precise difference between ‘war’ and ‘humanitarian war’ remains hard
to explain, although some discrepancy was certainly evident.
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Conclusion: war as a stranger
So, has war remained its ‘old self ’, has it metamorphosed into something
altogether new, or might it be even disappearing altogether? Is war still an
integral part of inter-state relations, has it gained new meaning now that
it is associated with the West’s efforts to establish a neo-Kantian cosmo-
politan community, or is it losing ground altogether through a radical change
in its discursive power?
The debate on ‘Kosovo’ indicates that there is considerable uncertainty
about war as a concept. Core actors have found ‘war’ an inapplicable
notion and have refrained from using it publicly. A serious critique on the
concept of war has surfaced, and alternative articulations are now frequently
explored. The concept seems to suffer from being inherently modern in
essence and hence out of tune with the emergence of a plurality of centres,
altered borders, multiple meanings and fluid identities that increasingly
characterise the post-Cold War European strategic landscape. War is no
longer what it used to be, and there are obvious difficulties in adapting it to
the new political circumstances, although it does not seem to be disappear-
ing altogether. The concept has only limited discursive currency, although
(perhaps through a process of inertia) some of it is still there. In order to
trace its current position and to locate the source of some of its continued
discursive strength, a triad of basic constellations may be outlined.
Firstly, one may argue that a broad sphere of non-war has now emerged.
Within such a new constellation, war remains first and foremost a memory
from the past. The security logic has lost its foothold, and politics no longer
seems to be focused on averting war and purely military threats. Con-
sequently, a broad repertoire of varied civil identities has surfaced which is
detached from war and matters military. The unfolding of political space
no longer hinges on securitisation but, as a discourse, on themes such as
markets, media, technology and other arguments geared towards unifying
rather than dividing peoples and communities. The realm of ‘international
relations’ is changing in meaning since it no longer stands out as the domain
of exception, as the state of emergency and the field of Realpolitik. Instead, it
increasingly assumes the nature of ‘politics as usual’. Security-related argu-
ments appear – to the extent that they are there in the first place – in a ‘soft’
form and are relegated to the fringes of the system, to be tolerated only if
they can be accommodated within the dominant set of border-breaking
principles. The increasing use of the notion of co-operative security is a case
in point.
Secondly, there is the sphere of classic war, which remains based on the
modern story of states, sovereignty and territoriality. In this constellation,
war is used to safeguard established identities that are cast in terms of
unambiguous friend–foe relations, and is aimed at resisting subjugation to
the global–local divide that threatens to dethrone war and classic security
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concerns as the core principles in the construction of political space. In
many cases, the option of war serves the purpose of averting systemic change
and avoiding the destabilisation of cherished entrenched identities. The sphere
of war therefore constitutes a residual sphere with homogeneity on the
inside and difference on the outside. In this sphere, threats of inter-state war
remain credible and there is little need (and therefore little discussion) of
introducing other referents.
Finally, there appears a sphere where old and new conceptions of war
clash. It constitutes the sphere of ‘uncommon’ violence and new excep-
tional forms of war and armed conflict. In these cases, war appears to
have escaped the confines of both modernity and the modern state, and
is enmeshed in the dialectical interplay between local and global forces. In
this sphere, the boundaries of war’s discourse (in its modern meaning) are
dissolving: the inside–outside divide of states no longer seems to constitute
coherent and alternative security spaces. As a concept, war is being under-
mined, encouraging the search for alternative terms and articulations. Security
no longer circumscribes spheres that are confined to blocs and states, but
imagines and creates areas of overlapping entities defined by multiplicity.
War and violence assume a limited and enclaved quality in the context of a
broader logic that pertains to the unfolding of international politics and
political space in a more general sense. War does not stand out as a normal
state of affairs within a domain marked by its very presence, but occurs
as an exception and a stranger. War represents a form of discontinuity of
politics-as-usual, with war unfolding as something unexpected in the midst
of a broader setting coloured by the general absence of securitisation. The
international community is now considered to have become the norm,
whereas local conflicts are increasingly depicted as exceptions conducted by
‘outlaws’ (or by so-called ‘failed states’), and are therefore subject to
West-mediated remedies and normalisation.
The pluralism of the Kosovo campaign and the variety of interpretations
concerning its essence make it difficult to place ‘Kosovo’ into perspective
and to offer it a distinct location within the three alternative spaces outlined
above. ‘Kosovo’ is neither a constitutive part of ‘war’ as a new constellation
nor as wearing its traditional military battle gear. It allows itself to be
interpreted from a variety of standpoints, new as well as old. It may be seen
as war-as-usual, staying put and untouched by the forces of change, but it
may also be interpreted as signalling – due to its many peculiarities – the
very demise of modern war.
And yet the third alternative appears to be the most credible sphere of
analysis. ‘Kosovo’ seems to represent a case where the logics of the new and
the old are being played out simultaneously. A strong echo of the tradi-
tional notion of war remains present, whereby the ‘old’ seems to be resisting
the ‘new’ and the incoming, albeit (perhaps) not very successfully. The Kosovo
campaign seems to be imbued with aspects of these two rather different
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logics, and in order to figure it out, one has to bridge these different strands
of thinking about war. ‘Kosovo’ indicates that the contemporary notion of
war operates in multiple registers simultaneously, based on a dialectical pro-
cess of opening up and closing down, of bordering as well as de-bordering
political entities and communities, old and new concepts and ideas. Clearly,
both of these contending aspects are present.
In Kosovo, war has transcended its modern meaning without becoming
an integral part of the new and incoming, and without altogether leaving
behind the old ideas of war. Defining ‘Kosovo’ is not merely providing war
with a new referent or using more clearly differentiated conceptualisations.
Above all, it has to be furnished with an ontology that reaches beyond the
modern one. War has to be envisaged without the modern baggage that the
concept still carries around, and by loosening up the conceptual ties to
notions like sovereignty, statehood and traditional readings of security. But
such a refiguring of war obviously has implications for a number of other
concepts and practices associated with war. The events in Kosovo in 1999
exemplify war in its new disguise. ‘Kosovo’ stands for a site where a number
of conceptual tensions, inherent in the clash between the old and the new,
have been forced into the open, for everyone to see and so that no one can
ignore them. ‘Kosovo’ therefore provides an opening for rethinking war,
although the renaming of ‘war’ still runs against the numerous conceptual
limitations set by the modern project. Luckily, some departures have now
been made which may allow us to explore beyond what we know already.
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Kosovo and the end of the legitimate
warring state
Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives
at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; human-
ity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from
domination to domination.1
Introduction
One of the starting-points of this volume is that the Weberian principle of
the state as possessing a legitimate monopoly on violence is fading. Sover-
eigns no longer hold this monopoly; it now belongs to the international
community. This chapter investigates the effects of this fading of legitimacy.
If war is seen as the extension of politics by other means, then there are
three crucial questions to be asked about its legitimacy. First, which actors
are seen as legitimate wagers of war, and by whom? Second, over what
kinds of issues is it legitimate to intensify politics by going to war (ius ad
bellum)? And, third, what are the legitimate ways of waging war?
Expanding on a framework suggested by the Copenhagen School of
international relations, this chapter argues that the Kosovo war is a crucial
part of two on-going shifts. First, it is increasingly time that the actors going
to war are states acting in alliance – and in the name of humanity. Second,
war is legitimised less by reference to the safeguarding of state citizens and
their well-being, and more in terms of infringements on human rights. It is
further argued that one vital precondition for this shift is that, with the demise
of the left–right divide which for the last 200 years structured politics, there
is only one camp left in possession of the resources to legitimately represent
‘humanity’. In Kosovo, the states going to war as the NATO Alliance repres-
ented themselves as ‘humanity’, the implication being that Serbia was cast
as an enemy not only of human rights but of humanity as such. There is an
irony here, as the kind of state infringement which NATO worked on Serbia
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by going to war over its internal politics was itself considered a casus belli as
recently as twenty years ago. In Kosovo, it was actually Serbia that embodied
traditional thinking about the legitimacy of war, and NATO the break with
that tradition. Serbia appears, therefore, as a living reminder of how the
nation state, which was considered normal not too long ago, used to act.
The Copenhagen School and violisation
It is unlikely that war as a form of intensified conflict between different
human collectives will disappear. Sometimes such conflicts result in the use
of violence, which is itself met with violence. As a consequence, war becomes
a reality, and organised violence forces itself into our repertoire of social
possibilities. War is a continuation of politics by other means.
Politics is, among other things, an ongoing negotiation about who ‘we’
are. Since a ‘we’ is untenable without a relationship to some group, a ‘they,’ the
political question of who ‘we’ are is in fact a matter of separating ‘us’ from
‘them’. To use Carl Schmitt’s formulation, it is a question of separating
friend from enemy.2 In light of this, the question may be recast as one of
how certain symbolic economies – certain packages of elements of a story of
self as well as the relations between them – work to produce war as an
outcome of ever more sharply defined friend–enemy relations.
Over the last decade, the Copenhagen School has concentrated on expand-
ing the referents of security from states and individuals to society, and on
analysing how political concerns come to be treated as security concerns. As
Ole Wæver, in the published version of the 1988 paper that launched the
concept of ‘securitisation’, put it: ‘State security has sovereignty as its ultimate
criterion, and societal security has identity. Both usages imply survival. A
state that loses its sovereignty does not survive as a state; a society that loses
its identity fears that it will no longer be able to live as itself.’3 A major
problem with this dichotomisation (which, I hasten to point out, definitely
has its uses in opening up the debate on the referents of security) is that in
fact it has a detrimental effect on questions of war. The declaration of war,
after all, is an activity where states still play a crucial role. While societies
and society-level groups may continue to be active in a number of ways,
both before and after the declaration of war, interesting grey areas emerge
when a state’s idea of itself can no longer be easily represented.
The Copenhagen School argues that what it refers to as securitisation can
be thought of as an extension of politicisation:
[I]ssues become securitized when leaders (whether political, societal, or intel-
lectual) begin to talk about them – and to gain the ear of the public and the
state – in terms of existential threats against some valued referent object.
Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization. It
is the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency
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sufficient to have substantial political effects. In theory, any public issue can
be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized (meaning that the
state doesn’t deal with it, and it is not in any other way made an issue of
public debate and decision); through politicized (meaning that the issue is part
of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocation or
more rarely some other form of communal governance); to securitized (mean-
ing that the issue is presented as an existential threat requiring emergency
measures, and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political proce-
dure). In principle, the placement of issues on this spectrum is open; depend-
ing on circumstances, any issue can end up on any part of the spectrum.4
Politicisation is a matter of inscribing certain differences between self and
other with meaning as the defining diacritics of self and other. That is,
certain differences, which until now have not been activated as part of the
political, are being politicised. This makes it possible, retrospectively, to talk
about them as having been ‘non-politicised’ before they were ‘politicised’.
Securitisation, on the other hand, includes the added burden of defining
what constitutes the security politics of a certain human collective in estab-
lishing political diacritics. Wæver, who subscribes to a Schmittian definition
of the political as a question of separating ‘friend’ from ‘foe’ (see above),
tends to think about security as existential or ontological politics – that is, the
political at its most political: the questions of telling friend from enemy,
the defining of who ‘we’ are and, functionally, the threats to who ‘we’ are.
The theorem proposed is thus one in which issues can be non-politicised,
politicised or securitised, and for which there exist four processes, known
respectively as politicisation, de-politicisation, securitisation and de-
securitisation. An identity, for example, may be securitised by speech which
inscribes that identity with meaning in terms of security politics, and may
also be de-securitised by speech unsubscribing such a representation.
Emphasising the importance of speech to the process of securitisation,
the Copenhagen School highlights the constructed intrasubjective character
of the concept of security and hence also of the modus operandi of security
politics. Using the concept of discourse in order to de-differentiate words
and action, the Copenhagen School has advanced convincing work. The
outbreak of war may, of course, also be conceptualised as a speech act, such
as the case when the statement ‘I hereby declare war’ is indeed to go to war
(provided one’s institutional station and preparations are appropriate). The
actual waging of war, however, requires more than speech declaring war: it
requires the use of force, or a violisation of politics.5 Waging war is, by
definition, a question not only of speech, but of actions. A crucial role in
war involves the act of killing, and, more generally, the acts of violence
which literally inscribe the will of one collective onto the physical bodies
making up the body politic of another human collective. There is a reason
why the number of people killed, be that 317 or 1,000, almost always
becomes the defining trait of what war is.6
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Actually, there are intimations inside the Copenhagen School itself that a
speech act perspective is hardly sufficient as a focus of political analysis. For
example, Wæver quotes Clausewitz to the effect that ‘[w]ar is an act of viol-
ence pushed to its utmost bounds’.7 When war-like activity does not include
acts of violence it is referred to by modifiers, such as ‘a war of position’ and
‘a cold war’. In order to link the work of the Copenhagen School to the out-
break of war, it may be useful to differentiate the concept of securitisation,
reserving that concept for those acts of speech which perform the tasks Barry
Buzan, Wæver and others have assigned to it, and subsequently adding a
new category for cases where large-scale violence is actually in evidence.
We can best apply the Copenhagen School’s framework to this question
by defining the threshold between securitisation and violisation as the point
of the outbreak of war itself (violence on a certain scale), rather than at the
point where an individual dies. This is not to deny that a certain identity is
already violised in situations such as when arson is being committed against
a refugee asylum, resulting in death; it is simply to acknowledge that the
question of scale must be addressed. It is not societal security and the identity–
society nexus that are under consideration here, but identity and war, and I
will argue that this question still implicates the state very directly. Thus, for
this purpose, societal violence, which is not intended to impinge on the
question of state borders, may be bracketed, and attention focused on cases
where the issue is the representation of states. In this way, Clausewitz’s
formulation of war as the continuation of politics by other means can be
classified, both directly and indirectly, within the Copenhagen School frame-
work of politicisation and securitisation. If we add the category ‘violised’ to
the three already in circulation, and introduce the two corresponding pro-
cesses of ‘violisation’ and ‘de-violisation,’ we get the following extended
continuum: non-politicised–politicised–securitised–violised.
An obvious case to which the proposed extended continuum could be
applied is the war in Kosovo.8 We have in this situation a number of cases
where national identities became not only securitised but violised. Serb and
Croatian national identities, Bosniak political identity and Muslim religious
identity provide suitable examples. By contrast, Macedonian and Albanian
ethnic identities were securitised but not violised (again, the use of the sug-
gested term ‘violised’ applying only when violence takes place on a certain
scale). It would be interesting indeed, if it could be demonstrated that the out-
breaks and non-outbreaks of war are usefully analysed in terms of violisation
of identity. If it turns out that the structure of identity was not a crucial factor
in the outbreaks of these wars, then this would also prove insightful.
War as legitimate violisation of politics
A different aspect, indeed a crucial concern, of the war in Kosovo is the
problematique of who can legitimately wage war. For the last 500 or so
70 Iver B. Neumann
years, this function has fallen to states, and states have orchestrated a legal
discourse which consecrates their going to war in certain circumstances,
over certain issues. When fought by states in accordance with this ius ad
bello, war has been a legitimate form of violisation (inside the international
law discourse). In Kosovo, however, two phenomena may be observed.
First, although in accordance with the discourse of international law states
were still the actors to go to war, the relevance of this discourse for the work
of legitimisation that was carried out by the instigators of war was not
deemed to be sufficiently wide ranging for it to stand alone. Additional
legitimacy was sought by stipulating that it was an alliance of states which
went to war, and that the war itself could be seen as contributing to a
change in the discourse of international law, and not simply as a case of
following its rules. In this way, the war in Kosovo was represented as being
constitutive of a new era. This change in who could legitimately wage war
(alliances of states acting as self-proclaimed representatives of humanity)
was intimately linked to the question of over what issues it is legitimate to
go to war (alleged infringements of human rights, that is, the rights of the
constituent members of humanity).
This constituted a breach with an epochal tradition. In seventeenth-
century Europe, the framework of spiritual life – Protestant or Catholic –
was central when defining military goals. In the eighteenth century wars
evolved around disputes over inheritance and land, whereas the Napoleonic
Wars added the type of regime – republican or monarchic – to the matters
of contention. An illustrative example of this tendency appears in the
memoirs of the Yugoslavian communist Milovan Djilas, in which he refers
to a conversation with Stalin in 1945.9 This war is not like other wars, Stalin
said to Djilas; the conqueror spreads his political system as far as his men
can go. It cannot be any other way. The major point here for our purposes
is the plurality of actors involved in constituting the major conflict line at
any one time in the history of the European states’ system: two during the
seventeenth century, many during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
again two during the twentieth century. Now, with the United States being
the only superpower around, the so-called ‘unipolar moment’ has arrived –
but it is also a unipolar moment when it comes to the number of systems-
constituting identity projects available. There is only one: liberal globalisation
– and its opponents. This is an important condition for how human
rights can emerge as a key legitimising resource, and so I return to this
problematique below.
The Kosovo war defines the epoch exactly because it focused on the
simultaneously existing conflict lines upon which politics is constituted. Since
the end of the seventeenth century political life has centred around two
great themes; the economic division between classes, and the question about
which community in the nation the state rests upon. There is a tension
between these two considerations. The existence of classes, understood as
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groups of people with different relations to the means of production, gave
rise to divisions within the state. Today’s European party system is still, first
and foremost, the result of the previously existing class struggle about the
economic distribution of wealth. The right–left axis was the political frame-
work of industrial society. Conservative, liberal and socialist ideologies spoke
to a reality dominated by the agencies of social classes clear enough that one
could talk about a natural categorisation of people as between ‘left’ and
‘right’. Politics needed this type of categorisation in order to operate. Pol-
itics is both a conflict and an arrangement to facilitate the solution to that
conflict; the order is etymologically bound to the Greek polemos, war.
However, politics can also be traced to another Greek word, polis. In our
context the point to retain is that politics turns itself around conflict, and
the existence of the city state is dependent on the ability to restrict or apply
this notion to the community. Therefore it is not accidental that the emer-
gence of industrial society had as its accompaniment the emergence of the
nation. While industrial society established new social divisions, casting
worker against bourgeoisie, nationalism offered both groups a new com-
munity to which they could attach themselves. This was a community that
bound them together and gave them a framework within which they could
quarrel about material goods without experiencing the conflict as if they
were two wholly different groups.
Between socialism and nationalism a connection was thereby established,
one that served a complementary purpose. As we know, this constellation of
classes and nations gave rise to two programmes of modernisation: commun-
ism, which would solve the problem through the elimination of classes, and
nationalism, which would solve the problem by inserting political parentheses
around the classes. The Cold War was the end-point for this development,
in two respects. In the West the connection between the classes and the
means of production dissolved. The struggle between socialism and capitalism,
between East and West, was portrayed as a struggle between classes. In the
modern West, however, the proletariat no longer exists as a production
community, and the Soviet State as the kernel in the proletariat’s own inter-
national order has disappeared. The carpet has been taken away from under
the feet of the main principle of the organisation of politics, both at the
national and at the international level.
This can of course be celebrated. It is potentially liberating for politics
that the principles of the old order are disappearing. But the end of the Cold
War had a second less welcome consequence. As was earlier maintained,
politics needs conflict in order to function: the Cold War evolved around
the idea of conflict and of conflict solution. Conflicts must be arranged in
circumstances and around fundamental dividing lines that can be disputed
for a long time. The right–left axis served as such a mechanism, until recently,
for both the national and the international order. But what happens when
this axis no longer exists in the same form as before?
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With the extinction of the right–left axis, nationalism once again stands
alone. The historical nationalism was an ideology, which worked as the
political foundation of the right–left matrix, yet nationalism is now itself
about to become the matrix for political life. The political struggle, which
really caused problems, was not formulated as an economic redistribution
question, but as a question about who we are, and it is exactly this question
that nationalism has an answer for. In this context it is not a coincidence
that the Balkan wars of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia were fought out
directly between ethnic groups, whereas the previous civil conflict, in the
wake of the Second World War, had been fought out between proletarian
and middle-class partisans. It follows that, in order to mediate between
these ethnic tensions, one needs a multi-ethnic rhetoric, and no longer a
class rhetoric. Therefore, resistance to war developed first and foremost as a
programme in favour of a common multi-ethnic society and against nation-
alism (and not, as it did fifty years ago in the case of the communist par-
tisans, as a class rhetoric).
This same pattern can be identified in the international context. The
drama being enacted in the Maghreb can be portrayed as a struggle between
land and town, between proletariat and town elites, but it is formed in
principle as a struggle between the local and the global. To quote a well-
known book title, it is a case of ‘Jihad vs. McWorld’.10 And these two
political powers work together, like all constellations, in order for politics
to function. The so-called fundamentalist Islamic opposition in the Maghreb,
and the politicians who mobilise ethnicity in the former Yugoslavia, are react-
ing to, among other things, increasing globalisation. And these reactions take,
above all, a national identity. The Jihad, at its starting-point, was inextricably
connected to the idea of a universal religion, in itself a form of essentialism,
which has evolved historically to take on key nationalist traits. Globalisation
has evolved as a threat to this nationalism, a nationalism that is now arming
itself to fight against ‘post-nationalism’. Here we have the new main axis,
one which will order our political lives in the future.
Reactions against globalisation of course vary. What they have in com-
mon, however, is a local support for the local nation, which you find within
many groups. Nation states in Europe were similar – and the bearers of that
designation thought of themselves as being of a kind – because they all
adhered to a common idea, namely that those who shared a cultural commun-
ity should also share a political community. They had a project in common,
even if they did not have a common project. The same may be said about
today’s opposition to integration and globalisation in the name of the classical
nation state. Furthermore, in Europe, given that the European Union is a
reality, the structural similarity between the traditional platforms from which
the EU is being composed make for a structural conflict almost everywhere.
Those who welcome globalisation also, as a rule, welcome integration,
whereas those who oppose the one generally oppose the other as well.
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If national–post-national as the main political axis has replaced the right–
left axis, then we will see immediate negative consequences influencing the
potential for constructing a consensus. As long as the right–left axis pre-
dominated, the main concern within politics was with economic distribution.
Distribution could be ordered by a medium eminently divisible: money.
Therefore, the so-called class compromises could be operationalised by the
redistribution of money. Furthermore, it was possible to operate with a
far-reaching social mobility. The adherence to the notion of class could also
serve as a mechanism for manipulation. For example, one could change the
factors determining one’s class: position, language, address, etc. Ethnic
belonging, however, is not so easy to change. The markers that define ethnic
identity can be difficult to manipulate. How is it possible to change one’s
skin colour, for example? The colour of skin cannot be changed.11 It can
only be acknowledged as more or less politically relevant.
If nationalism is determining politics, and if nationalism manifests itself
in such a way that people with a certain colour cannot be a member of that
nation, then the outlook for social mobility is extremely marginal. And yet,
at the same time, there is no obvious medium to be used so as to reach
compromises between different ethnic groups, the same way that money
could be used between classes. Money can change one’s job, language and
address, but not one’s skin colour. Classes used to be socially complement-
ary: where purges took place within certain classes, as in the Soviet Union,
the whole society deteriorated as a result. Ethnic groups are not com-
plementary in themselves. Ethnic cleansing can be carried out without the
society immediately collapsing functionally. (As the Czech example shows,
however, ethnic cleansing can produce long-term morally destructive effects:
one is still troubled long after the purge of the Sudeten-Germans.)
To sum up: liberal globalisation is left as the only political programme
with a worldwide appeal. It feeds opposition, but that opposition takes local
forms, and has so far taken the shape of negations of globalisation (ethnic
and religious revivalism, nationalism, etc.) What shape globalisation will
take, and how effectively it will spread, are not issues here. The claim I wish
to posit is that globalisation constitutes a major precondition for how, in
the Kosovo war, NATO could so easily represent itself as the guardian of
human rights and, by extension, pose even as the representative of human-
ity as such. There simply was no major force around to issue a credible
counter-claim.
The ontologification of war
War is a matter of who we are and how we are supposed to continue to
exist. These aspects of war can be more or less central, possessing a radic-
ally different meaning for each of the two sides participating in a conflict.
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The stronger one side feels towards the fact that ‘we’ can no longer be
‘ourselves’ if ‘we’ lose the war, the more fundamental a conflict is perceived.
We have, from ancient Greece, several examples of how defeat in war meant
that women and children were taken as slaves and the men executed. The
rationale for some wars is thereby still the physical existence of one of the
combatants. It is rarely so radical, but the American tradition to demand
the enemy’s ‘unconditional surrender’, is a reminder that such absolutism
is still strongly evident in the thinking of our time. One can imagine a
spectrum running from Hegel’s approach to war – as a situation where right
stands against right – to the (mainly) Catholic tradition of ‘just war’, in
which it is perceived that one side is fighting for the good, while the other is
cast as evil.12
Developments in the 1990s indicate that we are moving towards this
latter understanding of war. The notion of a ‘just war’ was once again raised
as part of the discussion. This perspective has certain advantages to it,
mainly because it offers us an opportunity to talk about war in such a way
that moral aspects are emphasised. The danger of this perspective, however,
is that one can easily be led to demonise the enemy. Just war becomes ‘holy’
war. Not least where the legal discourse is concerned, Kosovo may point in
the direction of an undermining of the adversarial head of state’s legitim-
ate position. Previously, one looked upon the opposing head of state as
symbolic of the adversary. This was the person who, if the surrender was
not unconditional, was to become an important negotiating partner. Whereas
today, referring to the international order, it is possible to issue a warrant
for an arrest if the head of state does not seem sympathetic. War becomes
more a question of good versus bad, and less of a way to settle disputes
between two contradictory laws. Kosovo demonstrated this trend.
One could say a lot of good things about moral commitment to a just
war and to the evolution of humanitarian law concerning war crimes. After
Auschwitz, the GULag and Srebrenica, it is difficult to defend a point of
view saying that there is no evil in politics. There are situations in which it is
legitimate to talk about an evil opponent. But, although it is tempting to
succumb to the passing of such a judgement, the act must be postponed as
long as possible. Even when such a judgement has been passed one must
never cease to question whether the judgement is right, and how many
individual members of the collective enemy it is legitimate to include. The
moralising that takes place does not necessarily take these circumstances
into consideration, and induces great expense. What follows is an inten-
sification of what is at stake. As a consequence of moralisation, for both
parties, war becomes a question of who we are. It is less concerned with
specific war goals such as redistribution of material resources among differ-
ent groups in the society or the securing of strategically important resources.
It is more difficult to negotiate with an opponent about who ‘we’ are than
it is about specific resources, for the simple reason that resources can be
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divided into smaller pieces, about which one can reach a compromise. In
contrast, one cannot divide identities in the same way.
If war is going to be a case study in how humanity itself is emerging as a
political community, then this is an instance of good fighting evil, and it is
of little point to ask how the war goals are perceived by the opponent,
because he has already been cast in the subject position of evil itself. The
thought behind a ‘just war’ has the disadvantage that one is not continu-
ously evaluating the way in which the other side looks at the world. One
knows the nature of the evil, and one knows that it is impossible to influence
evil intent by arguments, but only by means of resolute action such as war.
The other side
A discourse that has no subject position for others than ‘humanity’ is a
totalising discourse. It is always worth asking where the other is, and how
she perceives the relationship. The case of Yugoslavia can be no exception.
When one is to defend the old order, such a defence manifests itself in the
purest form. Milosevic’s Yugoslavia illustrates for us the ultimate con-
sequences of a national doctrine that rejects everything and anyone which
and who does not belong to that nation. However, before we reject this as
unfamiliar, we should remember that this was a creative part of the Euro-
pean political order for 200 years. It is pathos in the war in Kosovo. The old
has no possibility of victory. As Karl Otto Hondrich stated in Die Zeit: the
Serb military are not permitted to fight on equal terms, and therefore it is
only by not retreating that they can win the respect and dignity that fighting
embodies.13
Sergei Medvedev notes in the first chapter of this book that ‘Milosevic is
a classic sovereign’. Indeed, the notions of sovereignty, the right of self-
determination and the right to determine one’s own internal affairs, dom-
inate the Serbian discourse. Milosevic could hardly be expected to enjoy the
fading of that pivotal principle of the classical European state system: the
immunity of sovereigns. In the Serbian discourse, the fading of that prin-
ciple, from the aftermath of the Second World War at the tribunals of
Tokyo and Nuremberg via the formation of a body of humanitarian law
to the founding of the International Criminal Court and beyond, has
been determinedly discounted. NATO’s policy is portrayed as that of an
aggressor, culminating in an intrusion into other people’s affairs. The
main pillar in the Serbian national policy is the nation state, which they want
to protect against interference and aggression from the outside. There is, of
course, the problem of where to draw the borders for this nation state: for
many Serbs, the Serbian ‘we’ is connected to Greater Serbia. But, aggres-
sion against areas outside Greater Serbia has never been on the agenda. The
often drawn parallel with Hitler therefore has a fatal weakness, namely that
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it has never been a question of Serbia attacking the great powers of Europe
or of instituting a new regime type throughout Europe. On the contrary,
Milosevic and most of the Serbs argue from a set of fundamental conceptions
that has been common in Europe for more than a century, namely that
political division in the world runs between the ‘we’ in one’s own nation state,
on the one side, and all the others outside, on the other.
As recently as twenty years ago, Vietnam intervened in the internal
affairs of Cambodia, overthrowing Pol Pot and his regime and establishing
its own man in his place. It did not matter that Pol Pot as ruling head had
several million human lives on his consciousness; the united West condemned
Vietnam’s conduct. The murder of his own citizens was therefore not
accorded special political weight. This occurrence in Cambodia in 1979 serves
as an example of the paucity of humanitarian intervention over the past
century. Obviously, the situation has now changed. The new NATO has
appeared as the flag bearer, restricting violence and defining order in the
world. This new order is post-national, and must be understood as such. In
opposition stands the old national state order, Milosevic and the old order
proponents. One can perhaps even talk about this in a social context,
Yugoslavia standing for the old order and NATO and the West for the new.
All over Central and Eastern Europe people and states have to decide whether
they want to submit to the post-national order, global capitalism and multi-
ethnic politics, or whether they will remain within the old nation state.
Perhaps one of the reasons why Milosevic had so long enjoyed the support
of the Serbs was the fact that the lifestyle resulting from the Western
hegemony did not necessarily appeal to the majority of the Serbs.
Legitimising weapons, targets and victims
If the subject who wages war is ‘humanity’, then a representation of the
opponent as non-human lies close at hand. At least, it invites a dehumanis-
ing gaze at the enemy. If the enemy is defined by such a dehumanising gaze,
it may have consequences for what one considers to be the legitimate means
in fighting that enemy. The less human the enemy, the fewer the holds
barred in picking your weapons and your strategy.
After Kosovo, the means employed in warfare have become an import-
ant issue. A so-called ‘revolution in military affairs’, or rather a revolution
in American military affairs, is taking place. New sorts of weapons have
emerged; new constellations are presented for the organisation of military
personnel. This debate has taken place in a field where every weapons sys-
tem and every organisational model has its acronym. Therefore, there are
few people who have the opportunity of including this development in their
comprehension of the world. This concerns not least the politicians, who
during the Cold War used to leave the military aspects of politics to the
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military, and so felt no urgent need to be updated in what was happening in
the defence laboratories. But, as Kosovo shows, developments in areas such
as aviation power came to play a crucial role in how the war developed.
From the White House one could send a message to the Pentagon saying
that one was going to bomb without losing either personnel or planes. The
military simulated several war operations to estimate the minimum height
for planes in order not to be shot down by Serbian air defence. An altitude
of 15,000 feet was estimated to be the minimum, an appraisal that turned
out to be technically correct given the mission: although one plane had been
shot down, not a single soldier had lost his life.
During the Gulf War, in which aviation power also dominated, the French
philosopher Jean Baudrillard wrote a set of controversial articles about the
conflict, saying that the war had already taken place, or alternatively, that it
did not take place at all.14 This was a familiar French provocation. Few
people, particularly outside of the Left Bank, made an attempt to try to
understand what he meant by this. After Kosovo it may be easier to
comprehend. One aspect of war that is noteworthy nowadays is that it takes
place in advance, as simulated exercises. There is, of course, nothing new
about practising war. However, the planning in detail and the simulation of
operations in advance – which is made possible by new communication
technology – are new. This new technology can easily lead to a planning
hubris, the thought that the future can be predicted in detail. Even the air
raids on Kosovo became simply a routine repetition of something that origin-
ally had been done in a closed computer system in the Pentagon. It was in
Washington, and not in the air above Kosovo, that it was decided which
sorts of bombs should be dropped where and when.
Consequently, one could argue that the war in Kosovo had already taken
place – inside the Pentagon. It becomes really problematical, however, when
one also can claim that the war between Yugoslavia and NATO in Kosovo
never took place. This must be understood in the sense of one antagonist
using his superior technology to win a victory without getting involved in
live warfare. The actions and battles which were fought did not happen
between NATO and Yugoslavia, but between Yugoslavia and a third party.
What was happening on the ground and in the air were, of course, closely
connected. They were probably connected in the sense that the killings
would not have been possible in such a form and to such a degree, had it not
been for the success of the air war. And yet, they were two quite different
phenomena.
The fact that the Americans had access to technology of such superiority
that they did not have to conduct war in the sense of real fighting is prob-
lematical in a number of ways. In the first place, it breaks with our con-
ception of the kinds of weapons that are legitimate in war. In the history
of Europe, there have been several conceptions of the means which are
legitimate in particular circumstances. For example, in the late Middle Ages,
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it was good Latin that one could use squared bullets against infidels, whereas
against a Christian enemy one should use a round bullet.15 In this area,
international law (as ius in bello) has played a crucial role. We have had a
debate on the legitimate bombing targets. We have, not least in connection
with the Vietnam War, had earlier debates on the legitimate bombs. We
need another such debate. The point is not to abolish bombing as such, but
to restrict the kinds of bombs one should be able to use. This needs to be
done in order that the Air Force officers, and those of us who find ourselves
on the bombing side, can look at ourselves in the mirror the next day.
Bombs are technology, and an approach to the problem that considers
which kinds of technology the fighters should be using is a necessary part of
our conversation on war. There is, however, another aspect to the way in
which the war was conducted, one that gives rise to even greater anxiety. It
is the question of military decisions taken by the politicians. In the Kosovo
war, it was asserted by Alliance politicians collectively that a loss of person-
nel could not be tolerated by public opinion. As a consequence, aircraft flew
higher than the military would have preferred. The consequence of flying
higher was that the bombing was less precise, and, as a result, the number of
civilian casualities was higher than it would have been at lesser altitude.
This tendency to an ever-increasing distance between, in this case, the pilot
and the target, and the multiplication of standard procedures, has reached
new heights. How should one comprehend this? Is it possible to find a
proportion, so that one of ‘our’ pilots, for instance, should be worth 5,000
civilian lives? That would be a way of thinking which would totally break
with our fundamental conception about human worth. If one assumes, how-
ever, that politicians are elected and are responsible to an electorate which
demands that war be conducted without loss, this logic is sequential.
The free exchange of views in our societies makes it, at least in this case,
more difficult to reduce violence, not easier. When civilians present the case
so that it seems as if it is the pilot’s own will (or lack thereof ) to sacrifice his
life in operations, they grasp an important part of the problem. People who
have chosen to become officers have chosen a kind of lifestyle in which
something – it can be a number of things – is more important for them than
this extra risk they take by choosing the military way of life. The respons-
ibility of politicians to their own officers and other volunteers is thereby
associated with formulating clearly defined goals for military action, and
making it possible for the officers to execute these in a way which they see as
professionally justifiable. It is not the responsibility of politicians to entirely
exempt them from the possibility of dying. When politicians insist that their
own personnel are not going to die, this cannot be understood as some kind
of concern for these people. Rather, it must be perceived as an attempt to
avoid the political problems induced by a critical public opinion.
A no-own-losses war has indeed increased the civilian casualties which it
was seeking to prevent. The political reality is that the expense of suffering
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losses has become so high that the temptation to let other people die instead
is almost irresistible. In this case we face two concrete questions: first, whether
it was immoral to start a war at all; and, second, whether it was immoral to
start a war in the way it was started, namely without a ground invasion, i.e.
in a way that showed no intention to accept own losses. Conducting a war
without a willingness to sacrifice life seems especially problematic. And yet
nothing is easier to understand politically than politicians wanting to do
everything to reduce damage to themselves among their own electorate.
We have here an especially difficult case of a general problem, namely
how to balance our own citizen’s rights against the rights of other parts of
humanity. The old thinking used to hold that the nation state’s sovereignty
made it relatively easy to put aside the rights of the rest of the world.
In Kosovo, we faced the paradoxical situation in which bombing was legiti-
mised by breaking this logic. What happened did not involve Yugoslavia’s
internal affairs, but above all human affairs. By choosing bombing, how-
ever, we opted to save lives on ‘our’ side by killing even more of ‘them’.
What has emerged is thereby a bargaining game about how war should be
comprehended after Kosovo. We do not agree with ourselves at this junc-
ture. If we want to achieve a way of conducting war in which the use of
violence is mostly restricted, the war in Kosovo does not seem to be much of
an ideal.
Those who revel in the fact that not a single American life was lost in
Kosovo contribute to the assertion that war simply is a form of politics,
along with other instruments like economic aid. Air war becomes a policy
option, to which one can have recourse whenever one fancies, sometimes
before all of the other alternatives have been tried. If this is to become the
place of war in the political arena, it is very unfortunate. Niccolò Machiavelli
argued in his Discourses that in war there is always a tendency to build
quickly.16 He suggested that the bare existence of fortresses could fool the
Prince to use this technology to keep the population in check. In the same
way, one can today issue a specific warning to Western politicians and the
military not to build too many of these advanced fighting planes, because
the mere existence of these superb machines tempts those in power to use
them as ordinary political instruments. The wise Prince restricts violence by
choosing more indirect tools for ruling.
Conclusion
The three questions put in the beginning – which actors are seen as legit-
imate wagers of war, over which issues it is legitimate to go to war and what
are the legitimate ways of waging war? – have a certain common denomin-
ator. That is, ‘humanity’ may exist as a political notion, and increasingly as a
legal concept, but it is not (yet?) strong enough to carry the burden placed
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upon it by NATO countries of legitimising the waging of war in Kosovo. As
Jean-François Lyotard has argued:
The ‘reason to die’ always forms the bond of the we. The paradox of the order
to die is that the name of its addressee, if he or she obeys the order, can never
again figure upon the addressor instance of subsequence, direct phrases, and
in particular of normative phrases like ‘I decree as a norm that . . .’.17
States could pose as the legitimate wagers of war so long as that right had
been conferred upon them by the community of states acting in unison, as
legislators and guarantors of international law. The question, therefore, is
whether it was humanity acting through the security community of NATO
that was waging war, or whether it was NATO member states acting together
as an alliance. A related problem is the dogged unwillingness of the entities
involved actually to suffer losses in the process. ‘Humanity’ may be invoked
as a legitimising speech act inside the discourse of the international law, but
it spectacularly fails to legitimise the violence which follows its invocation.
Serbia’s attempts to legitimise its stance as a warring state defending the idea
of state sovereignty was represented as an anachronism. Indeed, in Kosovo,
the end of the legitimate warring state was at stake. Where is the political
entity that may legitimately speak in the name of humanity?
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Kosovo and the end of the
United Nations?
Introduction
Kosovo is not a security issue for Europe only: it must be seen in the context
of global political processes. In this chapter, I argue that Kosovo was an
episode in the long-term process of the domestication and marginalisation
of the United Nations (UN) by the United States. These relations of dom-
ination are underpinned by Manichean dichotomous myths of good and evil
and by rituals of enemy construction. Yugoslavia (Serbia) assumed the role
of evil enemy, allegedly committing grave human rights’ violations and, in
Kosovo, even genocide. The complicity of Kofi Annan’s UN appears to give
the US the sovereign right to decide about global friends and enemies, in the
name of a universal morality that it legislates, interprets and implements.
Although the systematic domestication of the UN began in the Reagan
era, following the defeat of radical Third World calls for reforms, I start
by reconstructing the 1990s’ conflict between the United States and Boutros-
Ghali’s UN. This opens a window to an understanding both of the mean-
ing of earlier actions and of the course of later developments in global
politics, including Kosovo. What happened between the United States
and the Boutros-Ghali-led UN in 1992–96? I treat Boutros-Ghali’s book
Unvanquished. A U.S.–U.N. Saga,1 a story about his five-year term as UN
secretary-general (1992–96), as a crucial new piece of evidence.2
On the basis of Boutros-Ghali’s testimony, and with the help of theoret-
ical and explanatory literature, I formulate four principles of the US foreign
policy of the 1990s, and show how Boutros-Ghali seemed to offend all of
them. These offences explain why the US wanted to get rid of Boutros-
Ghali. In addition to drawing on explanatory theories, I supplement this
evidence by an analysis of published UN documents, that is, press releases,
speeches, reports and agendas. I also utilise a number of second-hand sources
that make reference to US policy statements and opinions expressed by
the UN.
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Having completed an analysis of the reasons for Boutros-Ghali’s expulsion,
I discuss the functioning of the US-domesticated UN, led by the new secretary-
general Kofi Annan. As it will turn out, recent developments, including the
Kosovo episode, seem to confirm both the reconstruction of the deep gram-
mar of US foreign policy and my analysis of global relations of domination.
This chapter is first and foremost a contribution to discussions about the
prospects and consequences of US hegemony. These discussions originated
in the debate about the hegemonic stability theory that took place in the
late 1970s and for much of the 1980s.3 Following the end of the Cold War,
the same assumptions, themes and tenets reappeared in the revisions of
the Cold War’s history4 and in the topical security policy discourse about
unipolarity and US hegemony.5 In contrast to neo-realism, my focus is on
social meanings and practices, relations of domination, and their political
economy underpinnings.6 From this angle, I analyse the global consequences
of the tendency on the part of the US towards an ‘ever-harder will’ and in-
creasingly ‘narrow power’. My rather strong conclusion will be that the US
– currently driven, torpedo-like, by a predestined and potentially destructive
programme – tends to be dangerous both to itself and to the world as a
whole.
The UN has had a useful role in alleviating and transforming conflicts in
global politics. Kosovo indicates that the domestication and marginalisation
of the UN has already seriously impaired its role and capabilities. In addition,
the UN has also had a lot of potential in the governance of processes known
as globalisation. Yet, there seems to be very little room to rejuvenate,
empower or democratise the UN. Therefore, it is my further argument that
the time may have come to build foundations for a new, universal, global
political organisation, at first perhaps in spite of the will of the US (and its
closest ally, the United Kingdom).
Principles of US foreign policy in the 1990s
First principle: The US is the world leader and others should follow it
In his book Unvanquished. A U.S.–U.N. Saga, Boutros-Ghali depicts himself
as a Western-minded scholar and politician. In the mid-1950s, when Nasser
nationalised the Suez Canal, Boutros-Ghali, already active in Egyptian
politics, was labelled ‘pro-American’ and was not permitted to travel abroad.7
In the UN office of secretary-general, more than thirty years later, he recog-
nised ‘America [as] the only superpower’ and argued that ‘the first priority
of a Secretary-General has to be the relationship between the United States
and the United Nations’.8 However, he also asked for relative autonomy,
for instance in a meeting with Secretary of State Warren Christopher and
the US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright:
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‘I know that I must have the US support to succeed. But,’ I said, ‘please allow
me from time to time to differ publicly from US policy. This would help the
UN reinforce its own personality and maintain its integrity. It would help
dispel the image among many member states that the UN is just the tool of the
US’ . . . I was sure that Christopher and Albright would understand my point
of view. I was completely wrong. My words appeared to shock them . . . They
didn’t speak . . . It would be some time before I fully realised that the United
States sees little need for diplomacy; power is enough. Only the weak rely on
diplomacy . . . But the Roman Empire had no need for diplomacy. Nor does
the United States. Diplomacy is perceived by an imperial power as a waste of
time and prestige and a sign of weakness.9
When it became clear in 1996 that the US was ‘not in favour’ of his re-
election for a second term as secretary-general, Boutros-Ghali made inquiries
about the reasons for this opposition to him. He found the response hard to
believe: ‘Boutros-Ghali has been too independent.’10 One US official even
explained that ‘he would not do what we wanted him to do as quickly as we
wanted him to do’.11
Was Boutros-Ghali ‘too independent’? There are reasons to believe that
he was. During his five-year term, Boutros-Ghali had many substantial dis-
agreements with the US. He did not approve of the standard Western anti-
Serb interpretation of the events in Bosnia. Furthermore, he accused the
Clinton administration of prolonging the conflict by its vacillating policies
and myopic and one-sided criticism of the Vance–Owen plan: ‘The United
States wanted to reduce the 43 per cent of the territory that the Vance–
Owen plan gave the Serbs. It would take two and a half more years of
bloody war and war crimes before the United States, at Dayton, would give
the Serbs 49 per cent.’12
As for Somalia, ‘Clinton’s inclination was to blame the United Nations
for what had been entirely an American disaster’.13 In the cases of Libya and
Iraq, Boutros-Ghali claimed that the Western powers were acting against
international law.14 Clearly, for the US all this constituted too much inde-
pendent thinking. Even worse for Boutros-Ghali, he considered himself a
man of principle. Irrespective of the context, he could not accept the anti-
diplomatic rudeness of the US foreign policy makers. Although he was
ready to make compromises towards meeting the US demands for full and
absolute sovereignty, reverence for its power and respect for its national
interest, he could not accept the total denial of the principle of the equality
of states.15 Nor could he accept the way the US chose to violate interna-
tional law as it wished.
At the very end of his term, in autumn 1996, Boutros-Ghali wrote An
Agenda for Democratisation, a follow-up to his An Agenda for Peace and An
Agenda for Development.16 The latter half of this text, which he wrote him-
self – even against the advice of many members of his staff – is entirely
dedicated to the democratisation of international relations. This is the most
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radical and frank of all of the texts he wrote as secretary-general, and it
stemmed directly from his personal experiences both as an African and as
secretary-general. As he explains in his A U.S.–U.N. Saga:
The U.S. veto was a rejection of democracy. That America would argue for
democracy within every state but reject it in the world’s organisation of states
was a theme heard over and over in the Arab and third-world press. It seemed
strange to me too, because the key theme to my term as secretary-general was
democratisation. The fact that a single vote – that of the United States – could
dictate the outcome at the United Nations threatened hopes for increasing
democratisation on the international scene.17
The Agenda for Democratisation emphasises that although ‘interrupted by
the Cold War’, democratisation in accordance with the spirit of the UN
Charter is also about ‘the project of democratic international organisations.’18
‘A supportive international environment for democracy’ requires, in the
post-Cold War situation and the context of globalisation, ‘democratisation
at the international level, so that democratisation within States can take
root, so that problems brought on by globalisation which affect all States
may be more effectively solved and so that a new, stable and equitable
international system can be constructed’.19
Second principle: US foreign policy is constituted by Manichean
myths and rituals of enemy construction
Boutros-Ghali is very explicit about the first principle, but in explicating the
second we need some external help. My theory-informed claim is that the
US foreign policy discourse is based on the Manichean dichotomy between
good and evil. This claim, although able to explain a number of Boutros-
Ghali’s concerns, has both a methodological and a normative problem.
Methodologically, it is problematical because it is so strong and simple that
it tends to eradicate nuances and complications. Normatively, it is problem-
atical because it lapses so easily itself into a form of Manicheanism.
So let me explicate this claim.20 The claim is that there has been a tend-
ency in post-Second World War US foreign policy discourse, first of all, to
imagine a morally pure ideal: ‘free market, human rights and democracy’.21
Second, the actuality of the real world is counterpoised to the ideal. There
is totalitarianism, tyranny, un-freedom, violation of fundamental human
rights and violence. Less radically, there is also the corrupted and sinful world
that leans towards state-centrism, collectivism and socialism, although this
partially deviant element may respect, for instance, human rights and the
principles of liberal democracy (think about the ‘corrupt’ and often criticised
and ridiculed case of the ‘Third Way’ of Sweden22).
As in many other cultures, in the US there is a widely felt need for
something that would give meaning to life and world history. Because of its
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artificial nature and abstract individuality, this need may, indeed, be par-
ticularly strong in the United States. Purpose also gives legitimisation to a
state and its decision making. Hence the struggle to make the world accord
with the morally pure ideal.
The most common way of finding purpose and legitimacy is by way
of constructing enemies. First, the enemies are named or labelled. Second,
this naming has to be legitimised in public. Third, myths demonstrating
the necessity or inevitability of ‘X’ being an evil-doer are told and circu-
lated. Fourth, these labels, legitimisations and myths, are sedimented into
the deep structures of discourses, from where they can be drawn – also
for strategic purposes. Fifth, rituals of ‘realism’ and crudeness performed
against the evil-doers serve as ‘vivid re-enactments of the myths’ essential
themes’.23
Boutros-Ghali’s problem was that although he accepted the basic tenets
of the moral ideal of the capitalist market economy, of human rights and
democracy, he was an outsider both to the USAmerican myths and practices
of constructing enemies. Let’s consider again the substantial disagreements
between the Clinton administration and Boutros-Ghali. The case of Bosnia
is perhaps the most telling of them all:
One week later, Carrington and I met on the thirty-eighth floor of the United
Nations. ‘If I may update you on Bosnia-Herzegovina,’ he said, ‘most people
see it as poor Muslims being put upon, wicked Serbs, and neutral Croats. In
fact, the Serbs are wicked, but so are the others.’ I was inclined to agree with
him. The West seemed to regard the Serbs as the only wrongdoers, whereas
I felt that no party in Bosnia was free of at least some of the blame for the
cruel conflict.24
But, if this is true, why were the Serbs chosen as the enemy? The Slovenians
and the Croats are supposedly Western, in contrast to Muslims and Serbs. But
why Serbs, not the Muslims? My hypothesis is that it was because the Serbs
were willing – unlike the other nations of Yugoslavia – to continue the identity
of Yugoslavia and its unifying Socialist Party. Thence, the others could be
seen as legitimate liberation movements fighting against the corrupted evil-
doers, namely the Serbs still inclined to bad socialism.25 Of course, as Peter
Viggo Jakobsen has pointed out, the Croats and the Bosnians were busy
constructing this image of the Serbs in the US. They hired public relations
firms to give them a better image in the US; moreover, the Croats and the
Muslims had powerful friends in Washington – something that the Serbs did
not have.26 Furthermore, in the course of the war, this image was reinforced
by Serb dominance in the battlefield and the related atrocities. Whatever the
true explanation, clearly Boutros-Ghali offended the USAmerican myths
and the US sovereign right to determine the identities of the evil enemies.
This was repeated with regard to the Middle Eastern enemies Iraq and
Libya. By thinking and arguing that it was the West, and not the Arab usual
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suspects, that was violating international law, Boutros-Ghali intervened in
Western myth making and its rituals of enemy construction. Quite inno-
cently, his judgement may have been made in his capacity as a legal scholar
(between 1949 and 1977, Boutros-Ghali was professor of international law
and international relations at Cairo University) and an international civil
servant aiming at impartiality, but that excuse was unavailable to the US
and the UK.
Third principle: US foreign policy should maximise the instant support
of public opinion
Media and public opinion figure everywhere in Boutros-Ghali’s book. In
many cases, the media are described as a strategic instrument for politicians.
Strategic actions were conducted by way of leaking information – and, at
least as often, misinformation – to the media. The US foreign policy makers
used this tactic also against Boutros-Ghali.27 Many analysts agree: cases
such as the (second) Gulf War and Haiti show how the US government has
been using the media in support of its preferred policies.28
For Boutros-Ghali, even when the media were apparently representing
actualities (‘news about recent developments’), they seem to have, rather,
constituted those actualities, often on the basis of systematic distortion and
misrepresentation. Commercial media seem to operate outside the scientific
principles of source criticism and public verifiability, and the democratic
principles of accountability. The result tends to be a set of very specific
social practices resembling Baudrillard’s infamous self-referential system of
simulation, in which all sense of truth and origin is lost in the play of
endlessly replicating systems of commodified signs and images.29
Sometimes, in Boutros-Ghali’s story, the function of the commercial
media is simply to draw attention away from real world issues.30 People
were, for instance, busy watching the Olympic Games in Atlanta and
nobody paid any attention to the ‘diplomatic embarrassments to the Clinton
administration delivered in Yaoundé, Beijing and Moscow’.31 Moreover, it
has been argued that with the increased privatisation and commercialisation
of the globalising media, there is a real tendency for ‘info-tainment’ and
‘titty-tainment’ – with strong tendencies to reduce everything to entertaining
simulation – to substitute debates and documentaries for in-depth public
affairs analyses.32 Again, this tends to detach media representations from
external reality and create instead a system of self-referential commodified
signs.
Yet, the media are powerful in structuring political actions. Among pol-
iticians and analysts alike, there is a sense of the increased importance of
real-time television in particular. Also, in Boutros-Ghali’s story, the media
appear constantly to have been setting the stage for public politics. Somalia
is a case in point:
88 Heikki Patomäki
Television news programs, which earlier had aroused a groundswell of public
sympathy for the victims of famine imposed by Somali gunmen, now broad-
cast, over and over again, distressing scenes of the captured American heli-
copter pilot and the footage of the dead US Ranger being dragged through
Mogadishu streets. Congressman Charles Rangel, an old friend, told me that
the American public was particularly outraged by this event because those
who were dragging the body of the American soldier were black.33
Consequently, the public opinion of newspaper editors and congressmen
‘surged strongly against the US presence in Somalia’, although, according
to Boutros-Ghali, in reality ‘the October 3 raid had in fact dealt an almost
devastating blow to Aidid’s position’.34 But the media seemed to be inter-
ested only in the dramatic sensations of the killings of the USAmerican
soldiers.35
Boutros-Ghali also provides further structural criticism of the commer-
cial media (in the US, in particular). An important theme of the book is the
alleged short-termism of the media and its fatal consequences to the UN.
Only sudden violence and dramatic failures seemed to be gaining attention;
all success stories were silenced because there is nothing dramatic about
them.36 Let me try to analyse the role of the media in US foreign policy in
greater depth.
Firstly, the US foreign policy makers seem to have been guided by the
rule of instant maximisation of favourable public opinion, which is con-
stituted by two interrelated things: media coverage and framing; and weekly
or monthly opinion poll results.
Secondly, only the USAmerican opinions count, since only the citizens of
the US can vote in elections or lobby effectively in Washington. Even that
audience is unrepresentative: around only 40 per cent of Americans vote,
and lobbying requires money and contacts. Moreover, although the US
media corporations have been globalising since the 1970s, this globalisation
is asymmetrical: the US is a huge exporter and a very modest importer of
movies, popular music, TV programmes, news, books, magazines, advertise-
ments, and associated lifestyles and values.37 Most USAmericans are never
exposed to foreign news, documents or entertainment, not even foreign
material in English. And even when their interest is aroused they are usually
ignorant of the very basics of the countries, regions and organisations
concerned. Consequently, given also the tendency of the media towards
mere simulation, it is possible to mislead and manipulate US citizens, par-
ticularly by ritually re-enacting the fundamental myths and their essential
themes referred to earlier.
Thirdly, USAmerican public opinion follows the commercial logic of the
media, for which sex and violence (including death/war) are topics warrant-
ing by far the most intensive coverage.38 This seems to be due to the com-
mercial exploitation of fundamental fears and desires of the human condition;
and due also to their strong contrast to the boring reproduction of everyday
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necessities and tightly regulated behaviour at work. Sensationalised spec-
tacles of love/sex and violence/death are captivating – but only for a while.
Fourthly, there are two rules of operation that public opinion seems to
follow in relation to foreign policy: (a) a successful and limited war tends to
unite the nation behind the president and his administration; but (b) there
is only limited toleration for media representations of dead US soldiers,
a legacy of the Vietnam experience.39 Hence, a limited and low-risk use
of military force in particular can serve to increase the support of public
opinion; even higher risks may be tolerated if vital values and interests are
presumed to be at stake. The real risk is, of course, that there will be
casualties and an escalation of hostilities from which there is no exit, i.e. a
full-scale war.
Finally, although these globalising media presuppose some kind of crude
global ethics – ‘The evil-doers are killing them/us, and something has to be
done!’ – it follows the logic of selective sensationalism. How does the system
of selection function? There seems to be a hierarchy in the value of human
beings. On the one hand, USAmericans are irreplaceable and the most valu-
able; West Europeans come a close second; and at very bottom are black
Africans, while others fall somewhere in-between. On the other hand, a
capability to pay yields disproportional coverage (also because the advert-
isers are more interested in paying customers). Indeed, it can also be asked:
how is it possible to get covered if you are not rich? ‘Maybe you have to die
in large numbers in one spot at one time.’40 So the rules behind the selection
of topics come down to sensationalising dramatic situations and selecting
the people in terms of their geographical location and wealth. Sensation-
alism is what really matters: even poor and less valuable people can be
covered if they die in large numbers in one spot at one time.
The implication of enemy construction is that the ‘evil-doers’ are denied
their humanity. They can be killed.41 Given that an evil-doer can be located,
it is often good politics for US foreign policy makers to attack foreign,
mostly unfamiliar, places by military means – but with the condition that
there is no real or significant (perceived) risk to US soldiers. Technologically
advanced ‘air campaigns’ and particularly attacks by cruise missiles are the
optimal military facilities for these purposes.
Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan and Yugoslavia have been very good targets,
because very few USAmericans have more than a very superficial know-
ledge of these countries anyway. They are good targets also because human life
in those countries is considered much less valuable (particularly the lives of
the evil-doers, whether presumed terrorists, fundamentalists, ethnic cleansers,
supporters or soldiers of a tyrant, etc.) than are the lives of USAmericans. At
the level of legitimisation, these kinds of military actions constitute rituals
of ‘realism’ and crudeness against the evil-doers.
However, while the architecture of the new world order may consist of
simulations, its impact will be all too real for those actors that are targeted
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militarily, punished economically, or otherwise threatened.42 In the 1990s,
the US has intervened dozens of times in different countries in all con-
tinents, and has imposed new unilateral economic sanctions, or threatened
legislation to do so, 60 times on 35 countries which together represent 40 per
cent of the world’s population.43 Sheer economic interests apart, these sanc-
tions have typically stemmed from the (simulatory) process of identifying
evil-doers and punishing them.
Fourth principle: The US stands for the absolute, global freedom
of corporate capitalism (except sometimes in the US)
Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Development begins with the premiss that
the motor of development is economic growth. The book assumes that a
vibrant private sector and participation in an open world economy are the
conditions for achieving this aim. Yet, Boutros-Ghali did not satisfy the
orthodox economic political aspirations of the US foreign policy makers.
After all, from 1974 to 1977, Boutros-Ghali was a member of the Central Com-
mittee and Political Bureau of the Arab Socialist Union, and until assum-
ing the office of secretary-general of the UN he was also vice-president of
the Socialist International. Also, in the 1990s, despite his ‘modern’ outlook,
Boutros-Ghali was too much of a social democrat to accept USAmerican
free-market fundamentalism.
What was the principle that Boutros-Ghali offended? It seems that the
US stands for the absolute global freedom of corporate capitalism. Suffice it
to point out here that the origins of this preference lie in the rise of the
group of USAmerican statesmen, capitalists and labour leaders in the 1930s
and 1940s. This group identified Americanism with liberalism.44 The turn to
neo-liberalism in the 1970s meant, ideologically, that this group was recon-
stituted along more orthodox lines. Consequently, the US started to assert
its visions and interests unilaterally. Since the early 1980s, the US has
acquired an increasingly strong grip on the systems of global governance,
and has advocated the absolute global freedom of corporate capitalism
everywhere, having indulged in partial state regulation of the market since the
1930s. Relations of domination also play a role in multilateral negotiations
and arrangements. The initiatives for further liberalisation and corporate
privileges have come from Washington, with the ever-loyal support of the
UK. Since the US has had the largest resources, routinely used as leverage
in negotiations, with the best-informed and best-equipped staff to take
care of its national interests, such multilateral arrangements have constantly
reflected the vision of the absolute freedom of corporate capitalism, and
have also protected the areas vital to the ‘national interest’ of the US.45
US policies may have benefited the USAmerican national economy, but
the rest of the world has been doing much less well since the Bretton Woods
era. Besides economic indicators showing worsening global conditions, the
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poor of the world are now absolutely poorer than they have been since the
beginning of the nineteenth century. Except for some improvements in health
care and literacy, absolute and relative poverty have increased not only in
Africa, but in Asia, the CIS countries, Eastern Europe and Latin America.
In 1998–99, with the world gross output per capita growing at the rate of
1.5–1.8 per cent46 more than eighty countries have lower per capita incomes
than a decade or more ago, and at least fifty-five countries have consistently
declining per capita incomes. The income gap between the 20 per cent of the
world’s people living in the richest countries and the 20 per cent in the
poorest was 74 to 1 in 1997, up from 60 to 1 in 1990 and 30 to 1 in 1960.
Income inequalities have also risen sharply within the rich countries – par-
ticularly in the US and the UK – and the global poor are now as poor or
poorer than they were in 1820.47
It is in this context that Boutros-Ghali’s social democratic tenets offended
US foreign policy makers:
The rich countries feared the rise of another movement from the poor regions
of the world demanding redistribution. They were inclined to dismiss the
entire subject with the assertion that development was a concept whose time
had gone; any country nowadays, they said, could emulate the ‘Asian tigers’ if
it could just summon the will to adopt the market economy. Yet this was
patently impossible for the poorest of the poor, particularly Africa. They
lacked the human resources, the capital, and the infrastructure to take advantage
of the new global economy. And soon the Asian economy itself would falter.48
As if to foment the fears of the US and the UK, Boutros-Ghali himself
argued that ‘the gap between rich and poor was becoming morally insup-
portable and economically irrational, even for the wealthiest nations of the
world’.49 To grasp the extent and substance of these disagreements, let us
have a quick look at his Agenda for Development. In it, there is a strong
emphasis on the need for active governmental intervention.50 Against the
strictly universalist principles of structural adjustment programmes like the
International Monetary Fund and those of the World Bank, the Agenda
underlines the crucial differences between contexts of development. ‘As con-
ditions, circumstances and capacities differ, so too must the mechanisms for
generating growth.’51 The Agenda is also explicitly in favour of ‘land reform
and other measures of social justice’, and there is also a commitment to full
employment, poverty reduction, and improved patterns of income distribu-
tion through greater equality of opportunity.’52 All of this amounts to too
much independent thinking.
The limits of US domination in the UN
The US had its way: Kofi Annan became the new secretary-general as of
1 January 1997. UN developments, decisions and actions after Boutros-Ghali
have certainly not helped to dispel the image that the UN is merely a tool of
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the US. Since the early 1980s, the US has, step by step, secured a stronger
hold over the UN, also by means of financial conditioning. In 1985, the US
Congress passed legislation that posed a serious threat to the financial situ-
ation and organisational principles of the UN. The Kassebaum Amendment
provided that the US could pay no more than 20 per cent of the annual
budgets of any part of the UN system without weighted voting on budget-
ary matters. A more implicit condition was to make the discourses and
policies of the UN more pro-American (and pro-Israel). Also US budget
cuts led to American withholdings from the UN budget.53 Yet, simultane-
ously, the US rejected the proposal to reduce the USAmerican contribution
of 25 per cent of the UN budget.54
The result has been a constant financial crisis for the UN (many countries
have followed the example of the US in not paying their dues in time), and
an annual struggle over the US arrears. In effect, the Clinton administration
has continued the agenda that was set by Reagan: the stated object is to
‘reform’ the UN, but a failure to ‘reform’ according to US guidelines may
lead to the withdrawal of the United States.55
The outcome of these financial and political pressures has been a gradually
increasingly USAmericanised United Nations. Boutros-Ghali allowed for
an over-representation of USAmericans in top UN jobs (also in the name of
efficiency and a merit-based system56) – and when he occasionally struggled
against it, the US got its way anyway.57 On top of the overall change in the
UN system after Boutros-Ghali, the thirty-eighth floor is also controlled by
USAmericans. Half of Kofi Annan’s speechwriters are USAmericans, and
in effect the speechwriters act as the secretary-general’s censors.58 Yet, this
strengthening of the US grip over the UN system has not changed the
financial stand of the US.
Although the US can, to a large extent, control the bureaucratic system
of the UN – and even censor discussions and research reports – and although
the US can use its superpower status, ties of alliance, consent, loyalty and
gratitude, as well as its financial and diplomatic resources, as leverage in
persuading and inducing other states to agree with it, it can never control
the UN system totally. No matter what the US does, there are other perman-
ent members in the Security Council who can, at any time, choose to vote
differently. Even the disempowered General Assembly has the power to
deny the vote of the US because of its illegal arrears (a threat that has been
repeated annually).
Also, from within the UN system – either spontaneously from the less
obedient UN agencies or from the transnational civil society that is being
incorporated into the functioning of the UN – ideas and initiatives can and
do come up that are not in accordance with the principles of US foreign
policy. Hence, for the US, the UN is a constant nuisance. So no matter how
USAmerican the UN in fact becomes, it can still refuse to grant authorisa-
tion for US actions, or can even come up with initiatives that go against the
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will of the US. And although UN authorisation and the UN logo have often
been useful, there are thus sufficient reasons for the continued US hostility
towards, and impatience with, the UN.
The UN after Boutros-Ghali: implementing the will of the US in
Kosovo and elsewhere
There are thus two major tendencies: the USAmericanisation of the UN; and
the marginalisation of the UN. Along these lines, there have been substan-
tial changes since Boutros-Ghali. Let us consider his An Agenda for Peace.59
Despite disagreements between Boutros-Ghali and the US (and other West-
ern countries) on a number of crisis situations, the concepts introduced in
An Agenda for Peace have turned out to be the least controversial. In fact,
they have been path-setting and widely accepted. Concepts such as ‘peace
making’ and ‘peace enforcement’ are now part of the mainstream Western
security discourse. Rupasinghe has suggested that ‘the world’s military
establishments have seized upon these military elements in An Agenda for
Peace and have been keen to interpret the United Nations’ enhanced profile
in terms of greater role for their own interests’.60
However, the pluralistic nature of the UN and its Security Council has
been a major problem for the US (and the Western Alliance). The authority
of the UN has given, and may give, legitimacy to peace making and military
operations, but within the UN it has also been possible to legitimately con-
test US moral, legal and factual interpretations – in effect, the claims to
unproblematic leadership; the autonomous rituals of enemy construction;
and the domestically driven or interest-based imperatives to act ‘decisively’
in certain, selected cases.
From this perspective, the undeclared NATO war against Yugoslavia
also can be seen as a Western liberation from the constraints of the UN –
with the approval of its new secretary-general.61 For years, as long as the
situation – and the struggle against Serb repression – remained non-violent,
the US and the West did not pay much attention. Once more systematic
violence was started by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the situation
deteriorated quickly. The Serb police started fighting back by crude means
familiar from other anti-guerrilla wars. Quickly, Kosovo became an issue,
and thereafter increasingly made the headlines and TV news. As the media
demanded in early 1998, ‘something had to be done’.
At first, the UN authorised the actions. UN Security Council Resolution
1160 of 31 March 1998 condemned the violence of both sides and advocated
autonomy for Kosovo within Yugoslavia. After the fighting of the summer
of 1998 and the consequent flood of mostly Kosovar Albanian refugees,
Security Council Resolution 1199 of 23 September 1998 was directed more
clearly at the Serbian security forces. Since Bosnia, it has been self-evident
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that Serbia is the principal evil-doer, not least for Mrs Albright. However,
mainly because of the resistance of Russia and China, the new resolution
stopped short of authorising the use of force. Next day, although the use of
force was not authorised by the UN, the NATO Council asked the member
states to make commitments to participation in air strikes against Yugosla-
via. Finally, UN Security Council Resolution 1203 of 24 October 1998 con-
firmed and validated the tentative treaties on armistice and its surveillance.
The task of supervision was given to the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
Despite the armistice, new violent incidents had occurred already before
Christmas 1998. On 21 December, a Serbian policeman was shot dead in
Podujevo, and three days later the KLA declared the armistice void. In
early January 1999, both sides committed further acts of violence. On 15
January, in Racak, following a Serbian police operation, the bodies of forty-
five Kosovar Albanians were shown to the OSCE and, most importantly,
the Western media. On the basis of Ambassador William Walker’s offhand
and rather one-sided interpretation, this incident was broadcast widely as a
cold-blooded massacre by the Serbs – naturally accompanied by graphic
pictures of the bodies.62 It led to further outraged demands ‘to do some-
thing’. Moreover, Kofi Annan accused the Serbs of ‘disproportionate use of
violence’.
A new threat of air strikes by NATO followed. A 21-day limit was set for
both parties. This brought them to the negotiation table in Rambouillet,
France. In effect, at the Rambouillet negotiations NATO put forward an
ultimatum to Yugoslavia: ‘Either you accept our peace plan, or we will
bomb you until you will do so!’63 After a confused period of hesitation and
resistance, the KLA accepted the plan on 18 March 1999 (in any case, the
Kosovar Albanians would not have been bombed), but the Serbian author-
ities did not. 64 Why? The public picture of the negotiations remains unclear.
Nonetheless, there appears to have been an agreement about the basics of
autonomy and the political organisation of Kosovo.65 There may have been
some remaining disagreements about the authority and entitlements of the
KLA, but it seems that the main reason was that Yugoslavia did not accept
the contested Appendix B: Status of Multi-National Military Implementa-
tion Force of the agreement.
Mrs Albright gave this new text to the parties only eighteen hours before
the end of talks. Yugoslavia would have accepted the OSCE presence, and
was ready to negotiate the composition of ‘international presence’, but could
not accept foreign military troops – and the NATO troops in particular –
and their far-reaching rights to operate freely and with immunity anywhere
in Yugoslavia. In a resolution of the Serbian Parliament just before the
bombing, when that body rejected the presence of NATO troops in Kosovo,
support was given to the idea of UN forces to monitor a political settlement
there.66 For these reasons, a widespread suspicion emerged that Appendix B
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was merely an excuse for the war against the ‘evil-doer, Serbia’, and that the
real reasons for the war lay, in part, somewhere else.67 The war may have
been an attempt to draw attention away from the Monica Lewinsky affair
in the US; and/or to reinforce the US leadership in NATO; and/or to extend
the mandate of NATO and give it an independent and central position in
the management of global security.
Because Yugoslavia did not want NATO troops on its territory, it got
war with NATO. Directly, the NATO bombings caused the death of,
perhaps, 2,000 people, many of them civilians (roughly as many casualties
as in the Kosovo crisis before the war). The infrastructure and economy of
Yugoslavia was badly damaged, and the cost of reconstruction alone will be
at least US$40 billion. No one has even tried to measure the loss of output
and the decrease in the living standards of the citizens of Yugoslavia. The
NATO countries spent some US$50 billion on the war, more than their
annual official development assistance budget. Indirectly, the bombings pre-
cipitated the war between the KLA and the Serbian authorities in Kosovo,
with a consequent death toll of 5,000–10,000 people. The bombings, the war
and the related Serbian criminal terror campaign led also to a huge refugee
problem: most Kosovo Albanians fled from their homes for one reason or
another. Last but not least, the war also led to increases in NATO military
expenditure and triggered a further development of European defence
capabilities.68
Kofi Annan made the UN complicit with the US and the UK in NATO’s
bombing. Even though it was widely accepted that the NATO bombings
verged on a breach of international law, particularly the UN Charter but
also NATO’s own founding document, the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, Kofi
Annan did not, at this point, raise any criticisms of NATO (though he has
subsequently raised some critical questions).69 Instead, he repeatedly gave
his support to the Western interpretations, actions and peace plan. Before the
bombings, he criticised Serb actions in Kosovo for breaching humanitarian
law.70 After the bombings had started, he ‘urged the leaders of the North
Atlantic Alliance to suspend immediately the air bombardments,’ on the condi-
tion that the Yugoslav authorities accept all the conditions that NATO had
put forward.71 A few weeks later, he appears to be giving a moral justification
for his compliant position in terms of the rights of Kosovo Albanians:
No government has the right to hide behind national sovereignty in order to
violate the human rights or fundamental freedoms of its peoples. Whether a
person belongs to the minority or the majority, that person’s human rights
and fundamental freedoms are sacred. Emerging slowly, but I believe surely,
is an international norm against the violent repression of minorities that will
take precedence over concerns of state sovereignty.72
In the absence of condemnation of the violation of existing international
law, and in the absence of any mention of the procedures according to
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which new international law should be legislated and violations of universal
morality determined, Kofi Annan’s compliance at the time of crisis seems
to have far-reaching consequences. What is particularly important in this
context is that it seems to give the US (and the US-led NATO) what it
wants:
(a) unquestioned leadership;
(b) the sovereign right to determine global friends and enemies, in the name
of the universal morality that it legislates, interprets and implements;
(c) sovereign right for the US government to act in accordance with its
domestically driven public opinion imperatives, and its economically or
militarily driven national interests, given that those interests are com-
patible with universal morality.
The UN’s compliance is guaranteed even when UN procedures are disregarded.
Parallel to these three consequences is that Kofi Annan’s compliance has
authorised the further marginalisation of the UN in global peace, security
and human rights matters. His attempts to defend the principles of the UN
Charter appear weak.73 It is also telling that US officials appear to be blam-
ing the UN for the post-war situation in Kosovo, a situation that was
brought about by NATO.74 Besides marginalising the UN, and making it a
scapegoat for NATO’s failures, the Kosovo episode has also contributed to
an obscuring of the everyday violence and suffering that exists in the global
political economy. More than ever, political attention and funding are con-
centrated on short-term crises.75
Conclusion: the dangers of hard will and narrow power
In a book written almost forty years ago, The Nerves of Government, Karl
Deutsch maintained that will is related to power.76 An actor or an organisa-
tion may try to act ‘in character’, that is, by refusing to learn and by remain-
ing unchanged. This is what Deutsch calls ‘hard will’. He explained that ‘by
the power of an individual or organisation, we then mean the extent to
which they can continue successfully to act out of their character’. Power is
therefore also the ability of organisations ‘to impose extrapolations or pro-
jections of their inner structure upon their environment’. He argued that
‘power in this narrow sense is the priority of output over intake, the ability
to talk instead of listen’. In this sense, the US is more powerful than ever.
Yet it has also become more dangerous than ever, for such ‘narrow power
becomes blind, and the person or the organisation becomes insensitive to
the present, and is driven, like bullet or torpedo, wholly by its past’.
Will – like character – is constituted by one’s understanding of the world,
of genuine identity, of the right conduct of action, as well as by one’s his-
torically constructed interests and preferences. In the absence of resistance
and conflicts, narrow power can continue to resemble Richard Ashley’s
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understanding of hegemony as ‘an ensemble of normalised knowledgeable
practices, identified with a particular state and domestic society, that is
regarded as a practical paradigm of political subjectivity and conduct’.77
However, the more there are differences, organised resistance and system-
atic conflicts, the more the attempt to act in character will become violently
Weberian. Indeed, some already argue for stronger and more decisive US
actions, on the grounds that the chief threat to the unipolar system is US
failure to do enough (perhaps also because of the constraints of domestic
public opinion and international law).78 An actor’s fate can also be self-
destructively wilful if the actions upon that will turn out to be counterpro-
ductive. As Deutsch argues:
Will and power may easily lead to self-destructive learning, for they may
imply the overvaluation of the past against the present and the future, the
overvaluation of the experiences acquired in a limited environment against the
vastness of the universe around us; and the overvaluation of the present expecta-
tions against all possibilities of surprise, discovery and change.79
At the moment, the tendencies to simply reinforce the hard will and narrow
power of the US seem strongest: the relative success of the privileged US
economy within the largely stagnant and very unstable global economy; and
the apparently unquestioned success of the US in imposing its will upon the
world. At play is also the traditional Hegelian fallacy of identifying success
with being right. Moreover, it is its political success that gradually destroys
the possibility of the US elite hearing anything different. The domestication
of the UN is a case in point. Kosovo is merely an indication of this more
general tendency. Perhaps only a major economic collapse of the US would
enable it – in particular, its foreign policy-makers – to learn something new
and, in particular, to learn to listen to others. But perhaps even the now
long-overdue stock market crash will not be enough.
The UN’s General Assembly has been the only truly global public
political forum for which all states are equal. It has provided a frame-
work for decolonisation and the pursuit of the reform of international
institutions. The UN Charter has provided seeds for a claim made on
behalf of an alternative organising principle of world affairs, namely for a
democratic community of states, with equal voting rights in the General
Assembly of nation states, openly and collectively regulating international
life in accordance with the UN Charter and human rights conventions.80
Despite its many practical shortcomings and problematic state-centrism, the
UN has thus provided a forum, constituted by legal procedures and rules,
where differences have encountered each other in a peaceful manner and
where, sometimes, common policies on a number of issues have been worked
out.
The domestication of the UN by the US has severely damaged both the
moral basis of UN pluralism and the legal procedures and rules on which
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the UN has been based. After the events of the last fifteen years, very little
of the spirit of the UN Charter is left; and NATO is seriously aspiring to the
role of the global security organisation. There are also very few signs to
indicate that the US would allow a rejuvenation or a democratisation of the
UN, or even grant more autonomy to the present UN. Nor is it easy to
organise resistance against US hegemony in the struggle for transformations
within the UN without becoming just another enemy for the US, given its
economic privileges and interests, its Manichean tendencies, and the entan-
glement of its public politics with the functioning of the short-sighted, self-
referential and simulatory commercial media. It is likely that the consequent
confrontation would quickly bring any progress made to a halt.
Hence, the UN can only survive and succeed in transforming itself with
the help of organised, non-confrontational, external support. The best way
seems to be to tackle an essential aspect of globalisation, at first without the
consent of the US, by organising an arrangement that will also yield revenues
to the global community. In effect, this means global taxation, but first on a
non-universal basis. A means of feeding part of the revenues into the UN
system should be found.81 In this way the UN could be emancipated from
the financial stranglehold of the US. Even this may be difficult to achieve. It
is telling that, in January 1999, the 1996 Helms–Dole Bill was re-introduced
in the US House of Representatives (Prohibition on United Nations Taxa-
tion Act of 1999). This bill prohibits US ‘voluntary and assessed contri-
butions to the UN if the UN imposes any tax or fee on US persons or
continues to develop or promote proposals for such taxes or fees’.82 Even
remote association with attempts to seize control over globalisation by means
of introducing global taxes or fees may thus turn out to be detrimental to
the UN.
However, the idea could be to develop a system of taxation outside the
UN framework and then to feed part of the revenues into the UN system.
By selectively allocating the funds to those activities that have been governed
on a more democratic basis, the systematic bias of the present UN system
could be dissolved. This should also open up a public political space for
differences. But even then there is no guarantee. After all, the special veto
power accorded to the permanent members of the UN Security Council may
eternally prevent all changes.
David Held has observed that ‘the titanic struggles of the First and
Second World Wars led to a growing acknowledgement that the nature and
process of international governance would have to change’.83 Perhaps the
choice, then, is either to wait passively for the next titanic catastrophe which
is likely to come in one form or another, or to begin building a parallel and
more efficient and democratic global system than the UN. In the latter case,
we can at least hope for an opportunity to transform that parallel system
into a new universal political organisation, which perhaps will help prevent
that catastrophe from ever occurring.
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Kosov@ and the politics of
representation
On 24 March 1999, NATO started a bombing campaign against targets on
the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in order to stop, or so it
was claimed, alleged human rights’ violations by armed forces in what, in
Serbian, is called ‘Kosovo’. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), with
a coalition of parties in government, which had previously been opposed to
any use of force beyond its borders, especially in the absence of a UN
mandate, deployed forces to participate in this operation. Federal Chancellor
Gerhard Schröder insisted that there was no alternative.1 Foreign Minister
Joschka Fischer asserted that only the last resort of violence was open.2
NATO’s actions were, in other words, made inescapable by reality.
This reality was, in NATO’s portrayal of the situation, one of a ‘deepening
humanitarian tragedy unfolding in Kosovo as Yugoslav military and security
forces continue and intensify their attacks on their own people’.3 The Milosevic
regime, however, claimed this to be untrue and spoke of NATO aggression
against Yugoslavia.4 Milosevic insisted that the French and British people
‘should be ashamed of themselves because of the threats of NATO-thugs
against a small people’.5 The debate over what exactly had happened ‘on the
ground’ in Kosovo before and during NATO’s intervention carried on even
after the bombing raids were over and international troops had been sent to
the area. The scale of human rights’ violations (hence the number of victims),
for instance, was considered crucial in terms of justifying NATO’s actions
as imperative on humanitarian grounds.6 In relation to this, a debate ensued
over whether the estimated figure of about 10,000 Albanians killed by Serb
forces could be corroborated on the basis of the number of bodies found.7
This is a contest over the accuracy of representations. Hence, the point of
the debate is to prove or disprove one or other version of reality through the
use of evidence. Fact-finding missions in Kosovo after the bombing campaign
and their use in this kind of debate are part of this conception of the world.8
In this view, linguistic representations may communicate material realities
but the representations are in some way separate from these realities. More
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crudely put, they are names for objects. While this notion of the relationship
between what we call reality and language may, as any look at the reporting
of Kosovo shows, be in tune with what passes for common sense, the idea
that language simply names objects has long been challenged.
This chapter considers a different conceptualisation of reality and rep-
resentation in relation to the Kosovo conflict. The first section looks at
Ferdinand de Saussure’s arguments in order to offer some thoughts on the
role of naming in relation to the Kosovo conflict. Naming concerns the
relationship of language and reality. Using Jacques Derrida’s thought,
the second section argues that the idea of the existence of a reality, which
constrains our actions, is itself a representation, which has political implica-
tions. The third section explores how NATO’s Kosovo operation and the
FRG’s participation were represented as demanded by reality and, building
on Derrida’s arguments, highlights the problematic nature of these statements.
The conclusion stresses how the representation of the situation in Kosovo as
an inescapable reality places it beyond our responsibility and thereby, at the
very moment of its representation, it undermines the claim that the military
operation was necessary in the name of a common humanity. Grasping the
conflict as an ethico-political matter requires, or so I argue, a rethinking of
the limits which we hold to be those of reality.
Naming: reality and representation
When we refer to a political situation, we invariably name who and what is
involved. We name, for instance, ‘Kosovo’ as the territory or political entity
where specific events are unfolding; ‘the Serbs’ and ‘the Kosovo Albanians’
as those involved; and, say, ‘human rights’ violations’ as what is going on.
This may seem innocent enough, a process of identifying something which is
already there. We simply match a list of terms to things. The idea that the
words we use in language stand for ‘objects’ and thus reflect an independent
reality has, however, been challenged by some thinkers who have contri-
buted to a ‘linguistic turn’ in philosophy.9 Ferdinand de Saussure who is
engaged in linguistics and whose work has been crucial for poststructuralist
thought has also fundamentally questioned it.
Saussure rejects the idea that language consists of a list of terms, which
corresponds to a list of things. He particularly objects to the assumptions
that ideas exist prior to and independently of words and that the link between
a thing and a name is unproblematic. Rather Saussure asserts that a linguistic
sign is a link not between a thing and a name but between a concept and
a sound pattern.10 Crucially, the sign functions on the basis of differences in
relation to other terms of language, and it is arbitrary, or rather unmotivated,
because the link between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary.11 The
sign is, however, pre-given to the individual.12 Language as a system always
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already exists and the speaker must operate within it. It is important that
words do not represent independently existing concepts but are part of a
system of language. Saussure draws attention to the arbitrariness of signs by
pointing out that the same objects are called different names in different
languages.13 Hence, names are not natural or necessary in linguistic terms.
However, their relation to the linguistic context, and hence arguably to the
political context, is not arbitrary at all.
Throughout the ‘Kosovo’ crisis, naming played a crucial role. Both the
territory and a political entity were consistently identified by Western govern-
ments as ‘Kosovo’, a Serbian term, whereas Albanians refer to ‘Kosova’.
Both mean ‘blackbird’. The problem is, whether the place in question right-
fully belongs to Serbia as the birthplace of the Serb nation in the 1398 battle
on the ‘Kosovo’ field,14 or whether autonomy or even independence should
be granted to ‘Kosova’ on the grounds that its population today, which is
largely Albanian, is seeking self-determination. In this context, the persist-
ent usage of either of two equally arbitrary signs should be of concern, not
merely to the sensitive scholar but to much wider audiences. In fact, this
problem was one mentioned in the press.15
The usage of Kosovo rather than Kosova implied that independence was
not on the cards. What was at issue was a ‘troubled province’ of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia rather than a newly or future independent state.16
Hence, despite their explicit support of the Albanians as victims of Serb
atrocities, in using the Serb name Western governments already construed the
situation in a way that favoured the Serb, rather than the Albanian, view.
Obviously, this is not to say that they really supported the Serbs rather than
the Albanians, but that naming already implied taking a position. The inevit-
ability of this positioning is reflected in the need felt by those writing on
Kosovo to protest that their usage of the Serb term is merely a matter of
practicality and not, as Tim Judah puts it, ‘a secret signal of support for one
side’.17 However, the German Green Party attempted to avoid altogether a
political decision inherent in the naming, and proposed to write Kosov@,
which was supposed to capture both the a- and o-endings. Predictably, this
move was considered somewhat ridiculous, especially as it is impossible to
actually pronounce Kosov@.18 A recent visit to the website of the Green Party
showed that it now also uses the term which dominated the discourse: Kosovo.19
The use of Kosov@ and even the sensitivity to either ‘Kosovo’ or ‘Kosova’
are based on a prior process of naming. ‘The Albanians’ and their concerns
are separated from ‘the Serbs’ through the use of language. Two clearly
identifiable groups of people are constituted and created as subjects in this
move.20 Bizarrely, the victims of Serb atrocities were often identified as
‘Kosovo Albanians,’ combining the Serb term for the territory with the
notion that those being named are essentially Albanians.21 If ‘the Albanians’
have identifiable common ideas about their political future, they should be
referred to as Kosova Albanians.
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As the debate about Kosov@, and the explicit justifications of the usage
of Kosovo, show, it was sometimes acknowledged that naming was a polit-
ical act, as it implied taking a position. However, the issue seems to me to be
more fundamental. Following Saussure, naming is not a simple act of link-
ing a name to an existing object, which might be called one or other thing.
Rather it is a productive practice.22 Judith Butler, referring to Louis Althusser,
points out that being called a name is ‘one of the conditions by which a
subject is constituted in language’.23 According to Althusser, hailing, or
‘interpellation’, is the process whereby individuals are recruited into subjects
by an ideology as they realise that it is they who are being hailed.24 This
draws attention to naming as a twofold political process of making subjects
and positioning them at the same time. Firstly, our name is not merely a
label attached to us as a priori existing individuals. It establishes us in our
relationship to the social world, i.e. in our subjectivity, while at the same
time serving as an act of objectification. Prosecution, for instance, must first
identify the victim as an object through its name.
Secondly, although names are arbitrary in their sound pattern, they are
not random in the linguistic and political context. If being called by a name
turns us into subjects (and indeed objects) within an ideology, then naming
is related to the assigning of power positions. For example, ‘Albanians’ in
‘Kosovo’ are unlikely to be as powerful as they are in ‘Kosova’ because the
names already imply that the best they can hope for is autonomy, rather
than independence. Tim Judah argues that there has been a transition from
‘Kosovo’ to ‘Kosova’, leading to a situation where the ‘Albanian Kosovars’
have taken over, thus excluding the Serbs and other minorities.25
The assertion that naming is part of subjectification draws attention to
the issue of how we conceptualise reality and our relationship to it. Saussure’s
critique of the idea that linguistic concepts are reflections of independently
existing objects opens up the opportunity to question representations of
reality. It does not, however, offer any views on the status of representation
and of reality as such, or on that of the power relations involved. This view
is open to the reply that the atrocities and bloodshed on the ground in
Kosovo (or Kosova) are more real than their representation; and that it is
that situation ‘on the ground’, rather than the secondary issue of how it
should be properly called, which deserves our attention. This valuing of the
supposedly real over representation, based on the possibility of differentiat-
ing between the two, is problematical. Engaging with Jacques Derrida’s
thought enables us to explore why.
Derrida: reality as representation
If language is not merely a reflection of an independent reality, the relation
between representation and reality is in question. Derrida’s critique of what he
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calls logocentrism, ‘the determination of the being of the entity as presence’,26
revolves around the claim that Western thought is based on the value of
presence. In logocentric thought representation and reality are not merely
divorced, but valued differently. Representation is always inferior to that
which is supposedly present and therefore seen as ‘real’.
Taking presence as a secure foundation for our thought assumes presence
to be given, pure and absolute. However, according to Derrida, presence is
an effect of differences, and the mutual exclusiveness of presence and absence
is impossible. Referring to Saussure’s claim that ‘arbitrary’ and ‘differential’
are correlated characteristics,27 Derrida introduces the notion of différance.
On the one hand, it refers to something being not identical, discernible. On
the other hand, it refers to a ‘temporal or temporizing mediation or a detour
that suspends the accomplishment or fulfilment of “desire” or “will,” and
equally effects this suspension in a mode that annuls or tempers its owns
effect’.28 Derrida suggests that différance
is a structure and a movement no longer conceivable on the basis of the
opposition presence/absence. Différance is the systematic play of differences,
of the traces of differences, of the spacing by means of which elements are
related to each other. This spacing is the simultaneously active and passive
. . . production of the intervals without which the ‘full’ terms would not signify,
would not function.29
This claim implies that when we cannot show the thing itself, ‘we go through
the detour of the sign’.30 Hence, the sign is deferred presence: ‘[S]ignified
presence is always reconstituted by deferral, nachträglich, belatedly, sup-
plementarily’.31 The sign, as supplement, is always dangerous because it
necessarily contains two contradictory dimensions. On the one hand, the
supplement adds itself, enriches another plenitude and thus functions as a
surplus.32 ‘But the supplement supplements. It adds only to replace. It inter-
venes or insinuates itself in-the-place-of; if it fills, it is as if one fills a void.’33
Thus, while the supplement enriches the presence, at the same time the sign
endangers presence by replacing it. As the ‘sign is always the supplement of
the thing itself ’,34 it ‘takes its place’ in both meanings of the term: it stands
for it in its absence but at the same time already replaces it.
If the sign is not a stand-in for pure presence, there is nothing beyond
signification. In other words, there ‘is nothing outside of the text’.35 This
claim has created much indignation in those who understand it to imply
that the ‘real world’ does not exist. What Derrida is driving at is that ‘all
reality has the structure of a differential trace, and that one cannot refer to
this “real” except in an interpretive experience’.36 Derrida explains his point
using the logic of supplementarity in relation to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s
Confessions:
There is nothing outside of the text [there is no outside-text; il n’y a pas de hors-
texte] . . . What we have tried to show by following the guiding line of the
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‘dangerous supplement,’ is that what one calls the real life of these existences
‘of flesh and bone,’ beyond and behind what one believes can be circumscribed
as Rousseau’s text, there has never been anything but writing; there have
never been anything but supplements, substitutive significations which could
only come forth in a chain of differential references, the ‘real’ supervening,
and being added only while taking on meaning from a trace and from an
invocation of the supplement, etc.37
This is particularly important in view of what is at issue here. The claim that
‘there is nothing outside of the text’, as the imprecise translation puts it,38 is
likely to arouse emotions insofar as it can easily be construed as questioning
the reality of the bloodshed and the suffering of ‘real people in real places’.
Discussing the status of reality in relation to Rousseau’s Confessions, as
Derrida does, is one thing; doing so in relation to massacre and rape in
Kosovo is quite another. It could be seen to ignore, if not ridicule, the
suffering of the victims. However, Derrida’s thought does not imply that the
real world with its bloodshed does not exist. Rather, because we conceive
what we think of as life on the model of a text, the seemingly clear distinc-
tion between inside and outside is blurred. ‘One wishes to go back from the
supplement to the source: one must recognise that there is a supplement at the
source.’39 Hence, that which we call ‘real life’ turns out to be ‘constituted
by the logic of supplementarity’.40 As a consequence, the positive value
attached to the real as opposed to the represented, the signified, the sup-
plement, is not natural, but is indeed political. Derrida’s arguments lead us
to radically reconsider the notion of representation. It is not merely that
several, and as Saussure might point out, arbitrary, representations of real-
ity are possible. What we call ‘reality’ is itself a representation, and what
comes to be represented as ‘reality’ is political.
The reality of Kosovo
Serb atrocities against the ‘Kosovo Albanians’ were identified as the salient
feature of the reality which for NATO made it imperative to act. It was
estimated that about 1,500 Kosovo Albanians had been killed in the Serb
offensive in the summer of 1998 and about 300,000 had fled their homes to
hide in the surrounding area. Despite negotiations and a partial withdrawal
of Serb security forces, the situation continued to deteriorate. The UN High
Commissioner for Refugees estimated that on 23 March 1999, when it had
to suspend its operation in Kosovo, about 360,000 people had become
refugees, either within the region or beyond.41 After the OSCE observers
had left Kosovo, reports of the Kosovar refugees had now become the only
source of information.42 As they were considered to have a stake in exagger-
ating the Serb atrocities to which NATO’s actions were claimed to be a
reaction, verification was both difficult and vital. One of the verification
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mechanisms relied on corroboration of reports by several groups of refugees.
The refugees’ reports detailed mass expulsion, rapes and killings.43
As Chancellor Schröder explained, the ‘Alliance was forced into this step,
in order to stop further grave and systematic violations of human rights in
Kosovo and to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe there’.44 NATO Sec-
retary General Javier Solana and the German Army Inspector Helmut
Willmann also used the description ‘humanitarian catastrophe’.45 The German
Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping argued that no further time was to be
lost in the face of the misery of the refugees.46 For US President Bill Clinton
it was a case of the civilised world fighting against ethnic violence and bru-
tal crimes.47 According to one commentator, NATO was forced to act in
order not to become complicit in the death of thousands.48 Thus two salient
features of reality were identified: firstly, the human rights’ violations and
the resulting human suffering in Kosovo; and, secondly, the necessity of
NATO military action as an immediate consequence of this suffering.
This representation of reality is hard to escape. To argue that what
we call reality is itself a representation seems simply an act of disrespect
towards the victims of physical violence, if only from a position which sees
itself as able to separate the real and the represented. While one may be
quite prepared to accept that, as Derrida claims, we cannot refer to the real
except in an interpretive experience,49 the real is typically considered to
provide some form of limitation to this insight. In this view, whether torture
is good or bad is a matter of fact, not of opinion or interpretation.50
The emotive power of human suffering had been important in German
debates about military involvement abroad prior to the Kosovo operation.
It is interesting to explore these earlier discussions in order to contextualise
the German reaction to the Kosovo war. The problem the FRG was experi-
encing with post-Cold War international military operations, starting with
the 1991 Gulf War, is often portrayed as a tension between commitment
both to anti-fascism and to pacifism.51 This debate concerned the Greens in
particular, if by no means exclusively, because they had portrayed them-
selves as a pacifistic party. The ‘heirs of the peace movement’ had been
overwhelmingly opposed to Bundeswehr participation in the Gulf War.52
Yet Bosnia, and subsequently Kosovo, posed a completely different prob-
lem. Because of the atrocities committed, and the Holocaust imagery related
to them, Bosnia came to be seen as a fundamental challenge to a pacifistic
position.
In the summer of 1995, Joschka Fischer, then a leading politician of
Alliance 90/German Greens, and from October 1998 Foreign Minister,
argued that accepting a policy of war and murder in Bosnia would have far-
reaching consequences for Europe. The key question he posed to his own
party was: ‘Can pacifists, can especially a position of non-violence accept
the victory of brute, naked violence in Bosnia?’53 He likened the position of
the West in the 1990s to the appeasement in the 1930s and expressed his
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worry that the German Left would lose its moral soul if it ducked the issue
of standing up to the new violent politics with ‘whatever argumentative
escape it may be’.54 His rhetorical question was whether the Greens could
‘put principles higher than human lives’.55
Fischer backed the idea of a military intervention in Bosnia, even though
he stopped short of explicitly saying so. He thereby questioned a funda-
mental tenet of Green politics, the principle of non-violence, and predict-
ably generated outrage and debate among his party colleagues.56 What is of
interest here are the reasons why Fischer apparently felt compelled to do so.
He claimed it was the terrifying reality of the cruelty and barbarity that had
led him to rethink the principle of non-violence. In the face of real violence
the unavoidable interpretative experience comes to be seen as somehow
unnecessary, an ‘argumentative escape’, a luxury enjoyed by those safe at
home in their living rooms, merely watching the bloodshed on television.
Less than four years later, Fischer had become Germany’s foreign minis-
ter, and his government authorised, with parliamentary consent, the Bundes-
wehr’s participation in Operation Allied Force. An ashen-faced Fischer
insisted that he had done everything humanly possible for a diplomatic
solution. He admitted that he simply could not figure out what else to do.57
The German weekly Der Spiegel commented that the German leadership, all
good pacifists or at least card-carrying ‘civilians’ in the past, looked hon-
estly distressed at the prospect of going to war.58 When, for ‘the first time,
the western defensive alliance started out of area into a war of aggression
against a sovereign country, and that on a questionable basis in terms of
international law without a UN mandate’,59 when ‘German fighter planes
were flying bomb raids on another state for the first time since the end of the
Second World War’,60 those in charge in the FRG were not exactly the usual
suspects. They had grown up as participants in sit-ins at NATO’s missile
bases, in human chains and at ‘peace workshops’,61 and looked distinctly
uncomfortable in their current role of commanding the military in a real
war. The irony of their position was not lost on them. At one point Fischer
publicly admitted that he sometimes thought he had lost his way.62
While human chains may, to their way of thinking, have been a credible
response to the threat of nuclear weapons, which is construed as potential
rather than fully real, such non-violent protest rings hollow in the face of
the atrocities in Kosovo.63 Defence Minister Scharping used a particular
vocabulary to describe them: genocide, slaughterhouse, ethnic cleansing,
selection, concentration camps.64 These terms suggested that what was at
stake was not the crude materiality of what was going on, but its position in
a wider interpretative context, within which the West, and the FRG in
particular, were conceptualised. However, this point could be seen as unim-
portant because of the arguably indisputable reality of death. Derrida ques-
tions the underlying assumption of such talk about death which ‘takes the
form of an “it is self-explanatory”: everybody knows what one is talking
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about when one names death’.65 While Derrida recognises death as a limit, it
is not a self-evident, natural limit. Rather, as Drucilla Cornell explains, it is
the ‘limit of any system of meaning [that] is, for Derrida, graphically repre-
sented to us in death’.66
The deaths of the Kosovars certainly were interpreted and related to
systems of meaning. They mattered greatly in their symbolism with respect
to the history of the Holocaust. They mattered quite clearly in relation to
the lives of the Serb civilians. As Gordana Milanovic, a Serb woman living
in FRG, put it: ‘Now Herr Fischer should explain to me how he wants to
protect thousands in Kosovo by bombing millions’.67 Yet they mattered
rather less in another context. The German commander for the Kosovo
operation, General Helmut Harff, supported the deployment of ground
troops, a move rejected by the government. He asked whether the argument
against this course of action was supposed to mean that the ‘life of a raped,
massacred woman is worth less than that of a soldier who is trained to
defend himself ’.68 Harff ’s question about the refusal to commit ground troops
suggests that death and its significance were a matter of interpretation.
Thus, it seems that the ‘reality’ of a situation, even if it is one involving
death, depends on how it is contextualised. One could therefore assert
that there is nothing beyond the text of our representations of reality
which could tell us how exactly bloodshed matters or whose life should be
protected.
The different valuation of lives, which is apparent in the refusal to
commit ground troops, also exposed a tension in the position of the German
government. Harff ’s contextualisation implied that the failure to commit
ground troops to the operation contradicted the government’s stated object-
ive of helping the Kosovars.69 It is interesting to note in this context that
the massacres in Kosovo were seen to legitimise the FRG’s war operation
but not asylum for the Kosovar refugees in the FRG.70
In fact, the German government seemed very eager to confirm its willing-
ness to participate in NATO’s operation. As early as June 1998, then
Defence Minister Volker Rühe had already stated that the Bundeswehr would
participate in a NATO operation.71 In the period of transition to a new
government in the autumn of the same year the continued willingness to do
so was carefully established and articulated.72 Rühe’s successor, Scharping,
confirmed on the eve of the first air raid that German soldiers would be part
of the operation from the start.73 After the bombing had started, a SAT-1
television reporter rather proudly claimed that Bundeswehr Tornados were
flying ‘in pole position’.74 When the Russian Prime Minister Yevgeni
Primakov visited Bonn to mediate between the West and Belgrade, the FRG
leadership was reportedly concerned, above all, to avoid a ‘second Rapallo’
which would undermine the West’s trust in Germany.75 It had to be clear
that, as Fischer had declared like so many others before him, there would be
‘no German Sonderweg’, no German special path.76 According to Fischer,
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Germany stood ‘on the right side for the first time this century’.77 Kosovo,
despite all the agonising about the death of pacifism, provided a welcome
opportunity to demonstrate the end of German abnormality.78
The supplement: identity, credibility, cohesion
The end of German abnormality was articulated within a Western identity,
which was thought to be enacted in Operation Allied Force. According to
Chancellor Schröder, the Kosovo operation demonstrated that NATO is an
alliance based on common values, especially human rights.79 The Kosovo
operation had enabled the Alliance to show that it is a community of values
above and beyond being a defensive alliance.80 The Operation thus provided
an opportunity to endorse NATO’s proclaimed new post-Cold War identity.
In tune with NATO’s human rights’ identity, the air raids were meant to
limit the Serbs’ ability to inflict harm on the KLA and the civilian population
in Kosovo.81
However, NATO’s credibility was an issue throughout.82 At times this
issue seemed more central than the goal of protecting the Kosovars. When
President Clinton outlined the three aims of the operation, he mentioned
demonstrating the strength and resolve of the Western Alliance ahead of
preventing Yugoslavia’s President Milosevic from further use of violence
and restricting his military capabilities.83 NATO Secretary-General Solana
stressed ‘NATO solidarity, unity and resolve’ with respect to the opera-
tion.84 And Chancellor Schröder simply said: ‘If only for the sake of its
credibility as a community of values NATO was forced to act against mass
expulsion and mass murder in Kosovo.’85 Considering the argument that
Operation Allied Force was all about protecting the lives of innocent Kosovar
civilians, and the idea of human rights more broadly, this focus on NATO’s
credibility seems inappropriate.86 Indeed, the very name of the operation
seems to indicate NATO’s conception of self.
The point is not that NATO was more interested in its own unity than it
was in the declared aims of Operation Allied Force, as if these were unre-
lated issues. One could argue that the maintenance of the NATO coalition
was necessary to carry out the military operation that was to protect both
the Kosovar civilians and the ideal of human rights. Hence, maintaining the
consensus among the NATO states, as well as the credibility of the Alliance,
might not have been the aim as such, but they were necessary to the overall
goal. Strengthening NATO’s credibility and its post-Cold War cohesiveness
are, then, welcome side-effects of the operation as well as its preconditions.
This brings us back to Derrida’s argument, as one could say that NATO’s
unity was only a supplement to the defence of human rights in Kosovo. The
cohesiveness of the Alliance was not supposed to be the primary goal of
the West, but was something added, a surplus. However, as Derrida warns,
The politics of representation 117
‘the supplement supplements. It enriches only to replace.’87 While NATO’s
solidarity may have been intended to help and protect the Kosovars,
such solidarity, following Derrida’s argument, at the same time endangered
this objective by replacing it.
The debate over the sending of ground troops to Kosovo offers another
illustration of this mechanism. Although the deployment option was seen to
have been almost unavoidable in terms of military logic, it was rejected by
all key powers except the United Kingdom.88 The fear of large-scale casual-
ties, and the expected loss of domestic support in NATO countries as a
result, were seen to be the reasons.89 In contrast, an air war with smart
weapons was attractive because the threat to the lives of NATO soldiers and
civilians was considered low.90 ‘Real’ war, involving ground troops and thus
probably a higher level of casualties, was to be avoided in order to prevent
a break-up of NATO’s unity. This option was thus evaluated not primarily
in terms of what was supposed to be the main goal of the operation, the
protection of the Kosovars, but in terms of the supplementary consideration
of NATO’s solidarity.
The point, however, is not a simple overturning of the means–end rela-
tionship.91 Whether NATO ‘really’ wanted to protect the Kosovars, or to
reinvent itself and sustain its new identity, is in many ways the wrong
question to ask. Operation Allied Force can be construed both as protecting
the Kosovars and as contributing to their expulsion and slaughter.92 More
pertinently, it can be seen as a practice, one which produced the Kosovo
Albanians as subjects in a particular political context. The NATO operation,
however much intended to help and however much it did achieve what were
presented as its aims, could not but reproduce the identity of ‘Kosovo
Albanians’ as victims of the present state system in which they cannot practise
self-determination. Therefore, it also produced them as a danger to the ‘text’
of which NATO is a part.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that what we hold to be reality is itself a representa-
tion. We produce reality and its subjects whenever we represent them, and
representing them is an inherent part of our political practices. Portrayals
of the Kosovo conflict have tended to suppress the productive effect of
Western practices. The crisis was conceptualised as a ‘no-choice’ situation.
Typically, when we have no choice, we are thought not to be responsible for
our actions, for example when someone holds a gun to our head or when we
cut off a fellow climber from the rope below us in order to save ourselves.
While moral philosophers might have protracted debates about what
exactly is happening in such situations, the idea that we are not responsible
when the only alternative is death holds some persuasive power.93
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Germany’s Chancellor Schröder argued that there had been no choice for
the West in relation to the Kosovo operation.94 As a result, the responsibil-
ity for the air raids rested exclusively with Milosevic.95 Western governments
emphasised, time and again, that it was in Milosevic’s power to immediately
end NATO’s operation by acceding to the Alliance’s demands.96 As Defence
Minister Scharping explained: ‘Everyone in the government had scruples. In
order to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo, we had, however,
no other choice. The responsibility for the air raids rests exclusively with
President Slobodan Milosevic, who leads a war against his own people
in Kosovo with incredible brutality.’97 The West was forced to act in the
way it did both by Milosevic and by the reality of which Milosevic was a
part. Therefore, Milosevic and that reality were to blame for any adverse
consequences of NATO action.
The claim that something is demanded by reality is problematical because
it conceptualises ‘reality’ as outside language. Jenny Edkins and Véronique
Pin-Fat claim that we ‘seek to convince ourselves of the existence of
“reality” by trying to trace the outline of objects over and over again.
As Wittgenstein points out, this is a trick of language.’98 Derrida similarly
argues that ‘the truth is precisely limited, finite, and confined within its
borders’,99 but that we fail to recognise the limit for what it is. The problem
is that if we understand the boundary, which we believe we experience, as
the necessary interference of an independent materiality rather than a limit
to our conceptualisations, we consider our choices limited by a mysterious
outside power that we cannot ever directly experience. As a result, because
we have no choice, and because this is the way things are, we limit our
responsibility. This conceptualisation is deeply political. In other words, the
assertion of the existence of an independent reality, which in itself cannot be
proved and seems to demand no proof, works to support particular political
positions and to exclude others from consideration.
Facing up to the reality of not being able to do anything other than use
armed force in order to protect innocent civilians from physical violence
was portrayed as the responsible thing to do in the Kosovo crisis. Clearly,
the assertion that reality is a certain way, rather than another, limits the
range of options that one might reasonably contemplate. In this context, the
idea of refusing the choice between ‘Kosovo’ and ‘Kosova’ can be seen not
as a silly move, as some political commentators regarded it, but as an effort
to disturb an established field of signification by refusing to be committed to
either side of the dichotomy. In this sense, writing about Kosov@ constitutes
a political intervention, an act of resistance. For the point is not to face up
to a tough reality but to engage the ‘limits declared to be insurmountable’,100
and to explore ways of thinking beyond the limits which are thought to be
those of reality.
No one failed to be touched by the human suffering to which NATO’s air
campaign was a response, nor by the misery that followed in its wake and
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which was, to some extent, a consequence of it. Equally, no one is likely to
be satisfied with that response, nor would they have been had the operation
not happened. Clearly, it was not only the response that was unsatisfactory,
but the way in which the issue was approached, discussed and conceptual-
ised. What is interesting is not so much that the West’s response fell short of
what one might have hoped for. Rather it is that something seemed amiss in
the ethical discourse surrounding ‘Kosovo’. The way we are accustomed to
speak about such crises revolves around the issues of human rights, sover-
eignty and war; and that way of speaking (re)produces the exclusion it seeks
to remedy.
NATO and Western governments claimed to be acting out of responsibil-
ity for fellow humans. However, their conceptualisation of the events in
Kosov@ and their practices produced those for whom they were claiming to
take responsibility as ‘other’, as neatly identifiable ‘Kosovo Albanians’, as
outside the accepted state system, and consequently as a danger to it. Hav-
ing conceptually excluded this ‘other’ in the representation of reality, and
having then recognised its humanness, the question was how to bring the
‘other’ back in. Military intervention, which at the same time reproduced
the exclusion (for instance, by making even more Kosovars refugees), was
the answer. This is a peculiar way of accepting one’s responsibility for the
‘other’, based as it is on thinking which starts from exclusion and therefore
reproduces exclusion even as it aims to overcome it. Our inability to address
the Kosov@ crisis in a satisfactory manner points to our failure to investi-
gate the role of language in producing subjects, and with them what we call
reality. The question, then, is how to think differently, and that seems to
require thinking beyond the limits we consider to be those of reality.
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‘vvv.nato.int.’: virtuousness, virtuality
and virtuosity in NATO’s representation
of the Kosovo campaign
Resist the probability of any image or information whatever.
Be more virtual than events themselves, do not seek to re-establish the truth,
we do not have the means, but do not be duped,
and to that end re-immerse the war and all information
in the virtuality from whence they come.
Turn deterrence back against itself.
Be meteorologically sensitive to stupidity.1
Introduction: reading preferences . . .
The Kosovo war did not take place. Jean Baudrillard’s diagnosis of the Gulf
War also applies to this latest expression of organised violence in contem-
porary politics.2 This is not to deny that death and destruction defined the
reality in Kosovo and Serbia in the first half of 1999. After all, NATO
planes delivered large amounts of ordnance upon targets in this area,
destroying both military and civilian infrastructure; killing civilians as well
as soldiers. And on the ground, Serb forces engaged in the mass expulsion
and murder of the Albanian population in the province. To deny that a war
took place therefore does not mean to deny the exercise of violence and the
reality of human suffering in Kosovo. Nor, for that matter, did Baudrillard
deny the suffering that was caused by the UN campaign against Iraq. His
provocation that ‘the Gulf War did not take place’ needs, instead, to be
understood as the articulation of two distinct, yet related, observations about
the nature of organised violence in the new world order. Or, as this term
is by now consigned to the dustbin of history, the post-Cold War order
( perhaps best abbreviated as PoCoWO). Both observations are relevant for
the critical engagement with ‘war’ beyond the case of the Gulf War. As I
demonstrate in this essay, the Kosovo campaign lends further evidence to
the suspicion that war as such no longer ‘takes place’, but that it has trans-
mogrified into a different game with a different logic. There are two central
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aspects of this strange state of non-war that Baudrillard captures in his own
critical reflection.
First, the argument about the Gulf War not taking place expresses the
insight that what happened during Operation Desert Storm was not a war
in the traditional sense of a duel between two more or less equal antagon-
ists, proceeding ‘from a political will to dominate or from a vital impulsion
or an antagonistic violence’.3 For Clausewitz, war was the continuation of
(national) politics by other means, a way in which to settle disputes between
states. The Gulf War and NATO’s Operation Allied Force in the skies over
Serbia and Kosovo, have changed this logic. Replacing the anarchical logic
of war in which no side can claim to fight for more than its own interests,
the ‘non-wars’ of the PoCoWO introduce a hierarchical rationale for the
exercise of organised violence. Non-war ‘operates today on a global level
which is conceived as an immense democracy governed by a homogenous
order which has as its emblem the UN and the Rights of Man’.4 The Gulf
War and, now, Operation Allied Force thus take on the nature of enforce-
ment actions or police operations against (so-called) ‘rogue states’ violating
the universal consensus which purportedly unites the ‘international com-
munity’ against such perpetrators. Moreover, Baudrillard argues that the
hierarchical nature of the exercise of violence is reflected in the way these
campaigns are actually conducted. Denying the other side the dignity of the
‘enemy’ by casting him as a rogue or criminal, ‘the Americans inflict a
particular insult by not making war on the other but simply eliminating
him’.5 Guided by the principles of precision or ‘surgical’ strikes, the air
campaigns against both Iraq and Serbia do not engage the ‘other’ as an
enemy on a common (battle)ground. Rather, the adversary is turned into
the passive object of a methodical administration of violence. As Baudril-
lard adds: ‘We have seen what an ultra-modern process of electrocution is
like, a process of paralysis or lobotomy of an experimental enemy away
from the field of battle with no possibility of reaction. But this is not a war,
any more than 10,000 tonnes of bombs per day is sufficient to make it a
war.’6
The second observation, expressed in the contention that the Gulf War
did not take place, concerns the ‘virtualised’ nature of the conflict, its rep-
resentation in a virtual system of signifiers.7 Unable to fix and localise the
Gulf War, we are left with floating, intersecting, contradictory or mutually
reinforcing bits and bytes of information ‘about’ an event, the reality of
which itself can no longer be pinpointed and localised. As Paul Patton
argues in his Introduction to Baudrillard’s The Gulf War, virtual war – the
war over truth rather than territory – is by now an integral part of modern
warfare: ‘state-of-the-art military power is now virtual in the sense that it is
deployed in an abstract, electronic and informational space, and in the sense
that its primary mechanism is no longer the use of force. Virtual war is
therefore not simply the image of imaginary representation of real war, but
a qualitatively different kind of war.’8
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Whatever real life ‘mudmoving’ took place in Iraq and in Serbia /Kosovo
is only a part, and perhaps not the most important part, of a wider
campaign in which the crucial battleground is the delocalised world of
information networks, TV screens, newspaper articles and internet sites. It
is on these grounds that the battles over the legitimacy, effectiveness and
consequences are fought. Admissions of manipulated videos of Allied
Force amount to defeats for NATO, while media reports about mass graves
in Kosovo ‘confirm’ the legitimacy of the Alliance campaign post facto.
Some harsh criticism has been launched against Baudrillard’s pathomor-
phology as a typical example of postmodern excess. Christopher Norris, for
instance, suggests that Baudrillard’s writings represent a kind of political
theory characterised by ‘cynical acquiescence, ill-equipped to mount any
kind of effective critical resistance’.9 To some extent, these criticisms can be
understood as a response to the rhetorical hyperbole in the text and the
polemical style in which Baudrillard tends to present his case. Yet this means
only that much of the criticism focuses on the means of delivery, rather than
the message itself, which, if we accept the above paraphrase, is far from
revolutionary. The emergence of a hierarchical and discriminatory concept
of war, as well as its inherent tendency to produce ‘total’ warfare, is an
insight offered as early as 1938 by Carl Schmitt.10 Certainly, Schmitt could
not possibly have anticipated the development of information technologies
that make up the material infrastructure for PoCoWO’s virtual war. But he
was acutely aware that such a discriminatory concept of war would project
the conflict away from the battlefields of armour towards the battlefields
of truth, on which the clash between ‘us’ and ‘them’, liberal democracy vs.
rogue state, would take place. Moreover, Schmitt’s discussion of the legal
and political consequences of discriminatory war makes it easier to place
such critical reflections on the nature of war within an intellectual tradition.
Above all, it becomes possible to place both the Gulf War and the Kosovo
campaign within the context of a broader, more historically informed,
discussion on the nature of liberalism and war. Most notably, Schmitt’s
critique of the League of Nations and the criminalisation of war suggests
that the most significant aspect of the Kosovo experience is not the extent to
which the virtualisation of war has by now developed. Rather, the existing
media and information technologies offer only a newer and more effective
means by which to conduct such an epistemic war. The new quality of
virtual war is but the latest phase in a centuries old tradition of conflict over
knowledge and truth inherent to the liberal discriminatory concept of war.
Obviously, this proposition deserves elaboration.
Loading plug-ins: liberal truth against systemic anarchy
To claim that the international system is anarchical is to give voice to a
truism – a truism, however, that easily begs the question of what is meant by
‘vvv.nato.int.’ 129
‘anarchy’. The usual definition refers to the absence of any superior authority
above and beyond the sovereign states that make up the international system.
For neo-realists, anarchy is the quasi-objective structural constraint that
forces states to maintain their independence and locks them into a perpetual
state of war. For constructivists, anarchy ‘is what states make of it’, i.e. an
intersubjective structure of mutually recognised state identities.11 Anarchy is
thus the condition of possibility for a variety of relational complexes between
states. In this definition, anarchy can be best understood as the absence of
an authoritative voice that preordains the nature of interstate relations.
The notion of anarchy used in this chapter builds on the constructivist
reading, and advances it. Constructivists ultimately cling to a realist episte-
mology within which they ground the proper, ‘scientific’ nature of their
research projects by establishing the identity of states within a presocial
atomistic realm. For the purpose of this essay, anarchy is understood as the
absence of the very possibility of settling the question of a state’s identity
beyond its sovereignty. More specifically, while constructivists emphatically
assert the prepolitical identity of democracies and authoritarian regimes, the
poststructuralist-informed approach, embraced in this essay, holds that the
decision about ‘democratic’ and ‘authoritarian’ identities are, in fact, polit-
ical decisions. In other words, they are contestable outcomes of knowledge/
power games.
Anarchy as the absence of ‘voice’ entails the impossibility of any final
depoliticised arbitration of claims to, and designation of, identities. The
nature of war and its just (or unjust) character cannot be preordained. In an
international system ruled by anarchy, wars are to be considered ‘just’ if
they are conducted by recognised entities, i.e. sovereign states. As for the
justness of the causes and purposes of war, the absence of ‘voice’ renders
such judgement impossible.
To be sure, the United Nations Charter constitutes a significant interven-
tion into this logic. Article 2.4 of the Charter postulates that states shall
refrain from the threat or use of force in their relations. War, in other
words, is a breach of international law, and the illegality of the cause and
the identity of the perpetrator are ascertained by the UN Security Council,
according to Chapter VII of the Charter. In its ultimate consequence, this
delegitimises the traditional notion of war as the sovereign prerogative of
states. Either war has become illegal as a breach of the UN Charter, or it
becomes, as authorised by the UN Security Council, an execution, sanction,
or enforcement of international law.12 War as a duel between states has been
replaced by a discriminatory concept in which the warring state becomes a
‘criminal’ or rogue state.
Although the UN Charter constitutes a major modification of the law
of war, the Western imagination goes much further: whereas the Charter
allows only the post facto identification of a ‘criminal’ state (namely, after
it has breached international law), institutionalised Western knowledge
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attempts to render judgement about the identity of states before they act. To
simplify and exaggerate the argument found in democratic peace theory and
NATO’s political discourse, as well as among strategic pundits on CNN
et al.: some states are evil by nature, regardless of their actual conduct; and
while those ‘rogue states’ cannot do right, the West, as the community that
carries the beacon of universally recognised (if not always realised) values,
cannot do wrong. The West’s intervention in Kosovo expresses this logic in
a dramatic fashion: for the first time, a Western security organisation has
taken military action against a sovereign country that has not attacked any
of that organisation’s members. Moral and humanitarian standards, rather
than national interest, were offered as the rationale for this campaign.
On one level, this has been discussed as a prima facie breach of interna-
tional law.13 More relevant for the purpose of this essay, however, is NATO’s
express claim to represent a superior ‘community of values’ which would
authorise it to conduct such military acts of violence against other, ‘lesser’,
states. NATO presents itself as an agent with a humanitarian purpose and
moral values, untainted by politics, power and persuasion, which notions
are now replaced by such concepts as morality, authority and force.
NATO has conducted an epistemic war to secure its privileged moral
status, fighting against the systemic anarchy of the international system, the
inherent ambivalence and undecidability that necessitates and demands the
political designation of identity (a demand which even the UN Charter is
unable to erase). The vehemence of the Alliance’s cyberwar, and its assertive
retaliation against any doubts about the virtuousness of Operation Allied
Force, should be understood in this context.14 Cyberwar (as the postmodern
expression of epistemic war) is waged in ‘an abstract, electronic and informa-
tional space’, and provides the perfect strategy for this purpose.15 For power
to remain virtuous and exemplary, it needs to be virtual. Virtuousness–
virtuality–virtuosity constitute the Holy Trinity of information warfare,
a war waged against the ambivalence and undecidability of the anarchical
international system. In order to impose order – its order – upon the hetero-
geneity of the international realm of politics, the Western imagination pursues
a doubletrack strategy in which ‘liberalism’ (or ‘liberal democracy’) is instated
as the site and sight of knowledge. Liberalism provides the cognitive
vantage-point from which to survey and map global politics, as well as the
geopolitical space in which supreme political, social and cultural values and
norms have been realised. Liberal theory (which focuses on democratic peace
theory) provides ammunition for the first track, supporting the political or
politicised representations of ‘the West’ in its claim to moral and political
superiority.
Yet, politics is messy; war is messy. The first victim in war, it is (too)
often said, is ‘truth’. But this insight should be deepened, since war also
demonstrates the very impossibility of truth in the international system as
that system defies the possibility of a totalising global regime of ultimate
‘vvv.nato.int.’ 131
knowledge. If truth is always indebted to power, then the boundaries
of sovereignty delineate its realm. It also implies that the universalising
impetus of the liberal project sustains a war against those forces that get in
the way of its success. Any outside involvement in the messy realities of war
has to be purified and made virtuous through virtualisation.
In the following section, I analyse NATO’s virtuoso campaign to virtualise
Operation Allied Force in order to represent itself as the virtuous actor in
the messy reality of war. This analytical strategy thus makes use of the
weakest link in the triad of virtuousness–virtuality–virtuosity by appre-
ciating and exploiting the obvious virtuosity of the campaign, its skilful
performance in daily press conferences, in the media and, above all, on the
internet.16 The focus of this investigation will be the site where the three V’s
come together in the most unadulterated fashion, namely NATO’s internet
site. The target of this investigation is, so to speak, the vvv.nato.int-site.
Access is granted, however, only via the alias of www.nato.int.
Looking up host: www.nato.int
On NATO’s homepage, under the heading ‘NATO’s role in Kosovo’ and a
colour map of the Balkan area with Kosovo designated by a red circle, we
find an overview of briefings and background information made avail-
able during the air campaign (25 March–10 June) as well as up-to-date
(11 June– ) information on the UN-mandated international peacekeeping
force (Kosovo Force, KFOR).
Host found; waiting for reply . . .
A click on the ‘air campaign’-link loads the main page http://www.nato.int/
kosovo/all-frce.htm. This page provides hypertext links to ‘operational
updates’, ‘morning briefings’, ‘press briefings’, and to ‘maps and aerial views’;
‘video material and high quality photos are available separately’. More
interesting than the listed dates of briefings, however, are the graphic illus-
trations that are scattered across the page. On top of the page, a banner
provides the context of this and connected sites: NATO’s emblem on the left
side is linked with an image of a stream of refugees on the right side.
Figure 1 NATO banner
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Linking ‘NATO’ and the Kosovar
refugees is a white arc against a blue
background, reminiscent of fighter-jet
trailers and hinting at the shape of a
rainbow. At one end we find the dis-
aster that took place in Kosovo, with
the agent that came to set things to
rights at the other. The imagery of the
pageheader therefore already provides
us with the general frame through
which Allied Force is represented: the
Kosovo crisis as a human disaster,
NATO as a distant and aloof organisation working for the good cause, and
air power as the means of intervention in the ‘Kosovo crisis’. Just below the
header, the means of intervention and its successes are proudly displayed:
an F-15 takes to the skies, pregnant with weaponry. Under the heading
‘Air Operations’ the challenge is described: ‘12 × SAMs Launched’; at the
bottom of the picture we find the statement of ultimate success: ‘All NATO
Aircraft Returned Safely.’
NATO is here represented by one of its finest pieces of weaponry and
identified through the apparent impunity with which it was able to execute
its strategy. (Although one should note that 12 surface-to-air missile launches
as against 37,465 NATO sorties hardly seems to amount to a convincing
challenge17). Further images depict the actors engaged in their ritualised
briefings: Jamie Shea, NATO spokesman; General Wesley K. Clark,
SACEUR; and Javier Solana, NATO secretary-general. On this page, NATO
puts on its civilised, open face, delivering information rather than explos-
ives, engaging the media audience, rather than its enemy. Its voice comes
alive when we click our way through the hypertext links.
First in the offering is a ‘historical overview’ aimed at setting out NATO’s
role in relation to the conflict in Kosovo.
Reading file . . .
Kosovo, NATO tells us, ‘lies in southern Serbia and has a mixed population
of which the majority are ethnic Albanians’. Until 1989, there had been
general peace in the area. However, ‘Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic
altered the status of the region, removing its autonomy and bringing it
under the direct control of Belgrade, the Serbian capital’. This action by
Milosevic, NATO suggests, was at the core of the conflict between the Serbs
and the Kosovar Albanians, as the latter ‘strenuously opposed the move’.
According to this text, the conflict became a matter of concern for the inter-
national community in 1998. The escalation of the conflict, its ‘humanitarian
Figure 2 F-15/SAMS
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consequences, and the risk of it spreading to other countries’, as well as
‘President Milosevic’s disregard for diplomatic efforts . . . and the destabilising
role of militant Kosovar Albanians’, forced the West to pay attention and,
ultimately, to become actively involved.
In light of these developments, in May 1998, NATO set ‘two major
objectives’, namely, to:
• ‘help to achieve a peaceful resolution of the crisis by contributing to the
response of the international community’; and
• ‘promote stability and security in neighbouring countries with particular
emphasis on Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’.
As the conflict parties were apparently unimpressed by NATO’s concern, on
13 October 1998, ‘following a deterioration of the situation, the NATO
Council authorised Activation Orders for air strikes’ in order to make the
‘Milosevic regime’ withdraw its forces from Kosovo. Under a heavy diplo-
matic barrage, Milosevic caved in and the ‘air strikes were called off ’.
The rest of the pre-air-strike narrative provides a tale of institutional
networking, with hypertext links to UN Security Council Resolutions 1199
and 1203, to the Contact Group, as well as to the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). NATO supported the OSCE by provid-
ing a military task force for use in a possible emergency evacuation of
members of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), and ‘supported and
reinforced the Contact Group efforts by agreeing on 30 January [1999] to
the use of air strikes if required’. These concerted efforts found their climax
in the Rambouillet negotiations in February–March 1999, near Paris. The
Kosovar Albanians signed the ‘proposed peace agreement, but the talks
broke up without a signature from the Serbian delegation’. The NATO
website argues that ‘[i]mmediately afterwards Serbian military and police
forces stepped up the intensity of their operations against the ethnic
Albanians in Kosovo, [and] tens of thousands of people began to flee their
homes’. As a result the OSCE’s KVM pulls out of Yugoslavia and NATO
aeroplanes take to the skies.
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with this rendition of the Kosovo
crisis. But every narrative presents its subject matter in one version rather
than another; every narrative is told from a particular perspective, empha-
sising certain features, while omitting others. In the context of political
language, such narratives become resources of power, as they outline the
context of political action, assign responsibility, designate identities and
legitimise (and, ipso facto, delegitimise) certain political strategies. However,
their effectiveness as power resources depends on the assumption that they
refer to, and properly reflect, a given ‘reality’. In order to problematise
this status and to highlight the power resources’ contingent character, it is
‘standard operational procedure’ in the critical approach to contrast so-
called ‘ruling discourses’ with alternative ones. One of the purposes of
this essay is to demonstrate that a particular narrative provides only one
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‘construction of reality’, which inevitably distributes power, responsibility
and agency within a single structure. This strategy is not without pitfalls,
since the temptation exists to compile about an event a portfolio of narrat-
ives which may produce a meta-narrative of a rather dubious epistemic
character.18 Alternatively, one might easily smuggle in assumptions about a
closer proximity to reality when presenting alternative discourses and dis-
missing the investigated narrative as ‘ideological’. To avoid such misunder-
standings, let me say here that I do not intend to contrast NATO’s narrative
about the Kosovo crisis with a ‘better’, or more ‘accurate’, one. The follow-
ing references to alternative texts should serve simply as the background
which may bring certain problematic aspects of NATO’s rendition of
‘Kosovo’ into stronger relief.
To begin with, there is the particular timeframe within which NATO’s
discourse places the events of ‘Kosovo’. To argue that the conflict became
a concern for the ‘international community’ in 1998, obviously omits the
developments in and around Kosovo before that year, a period in which the
‘international community’ was heavily involved. One possible way to
problematise this omission is to import a discussion of the effects of the
Dayton Agreement in our debate about ‘Kosovo’. Mark Danner, among
others, has argued that the United States government was since 1992 aware
of the impending crisis in Kosovo.19 In April 1993, Secretary of State
Warren Christopher stated:
We fear that if the Serbian influence extends into [Kosovo or Macedonia],
it will bring into the fray other countries in the region – Albania, Greece,
Turkey . . . So the stakes for the United States are to prevent the broadening
of that conflict to bring in our NATO allies, and to bring in vast sections of
Europe, and perhaps, as happened before, broadening into a world war.20
It appears that even before 1998, Kosovo had become a matter of serious
concern for the ‘international community’. Interestingly enough, the 1995
Dayton Agreement failed to address the issues which were so dramatically
identified by Christopher. In Dayton, ‘the Americans were in a hurry: they
needed a Bosnia agreement, only Milosevic could deliver it to them, and
he knew it; and he would brook no diplomatic meddling in what was
unquestionable “Serb land” ’.21 Dayton’s non-decision on Kosovo, and the
willingness of the ‘international community’ to reach an agreement with
Milosevic at the cost of ostracising Kosovo from the negotiation agenda,
proved to have severe consequences. As Noel Malcolm writes, the Kosovar
Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova had justified his insistence on a non-
violent strategy against Serbia’s oppression by ‘telling his people, in effect,
that they must be patient until the international community imposed a final
settlement on ex-Yugoslavia, in which their interests would also be respected.
But that settlement . . . left the Albanians of Kosovo exactly where they
were’.22
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Consequently, the failure to address the Kosovo issue during the Dayton
negotiations contributed to the instability of the area and the subsequent
escalation of violence, not least through the strengthening of the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA). From this perspective, the ‘international com-
munity’ was most certainly involved in the Kosovo crisis long before 1998 –
and in a less than helpful fashion.
But there is another aspect of the temporal frame within NATO’s historical
narrative which deserves critical attention. According to this text, the troubles
began in 1989 when Milosevic ‘altered the status of the region’, taking away
Kosovo’s autonomy and imposing direct rule from Belgrade. While one
need not downplay Milosevic’s role in the Kosovo drama, this particular
timeframe excludes the long history of friction between Serbs and Albanians
in the region, as well as the centuries of Great Power games that have
played a part in the region’s circumstances.23 By limiting the historical frame-
work of the conflict from 1989 to 1998, Milosevic’s role and responsibility
are blown out of proportion: Rather than being one actor in a longstanding
conflict with its own dynamic and mythology, he is now rendered as the
agent who directly brought about the Kosovo conflagration.
Apart from the temporal framing of the conflict, NATO’s institutional
networking deserves attention. Although NATO’s website wants to create
the impression that its air campaign was ‘linked’ to a United Nations Secur-
ity Council (UNSC) resolution and has received broad interorganisational
support, it should be remembered that a broad consensus exists among legal
experts that Allied Force was a prima facie breach of international law. To
be sure, the UN had identified the situation in Kosovo as a ‘threat to peace
and security in the region’ (UNSC Resolution 1199). Yet, it had also reaf-
firmed that ‘under the Charter of the United Nations, primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security is conferred on the
Security Council’ (UNSC Resolution 1203). NATO was authorised only to
conduct an ‘Air Verification Mission over Kosovo’ in accordance with
an agreement between Yugoslavia and the OSCE. However, even taken
together, these resolutions failed to add up to a solid legal basis for NATO’s
Operation Allied Force.
Finally, the sparse treatment of the Rambouillet negotiations hardly
does justice to the political and diplomatic processes that are now known to
have taken place there. NATO contrasts the Kosovar Albanians as cooper-
ative signatories to the agreement, with the Serbian delegation stubbornly
unwilling to come to an accord. We now know that this is offering a car-
toon of what happened in Rambouillet, since from the outset there was
very little room for genuine negotiation over the draft agreement presented
to the conflict parties. As the representative of the European Union (EU)
has declared: ‘80% of our ideas will be simply whipped through (durchge-
peitscht)’.24 Nor did the proceedings resemble the usual negotiation process
between sovereign states. The delegations from Kosovo and from Belgrade
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were ‘interned’, and contact with the media was prohibited; leaving without
signing was forbidden. The Serb resistance to the Rambouillet dictate
apparently centred on the military Annex B, which would have granted
NATO forces ‘unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the
FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters’.25 Bearing in mind
this peculiarity in the set-up of the Rambouillet ‘negotiations’, the Serbian
refusal to accept this agreement may be easier to understand. At a min-
imum, it raises questions about NATO’s own responsibility for the failure of
the negotiations – questions made impossible by the rendition which NATO
offers on its vvv-site.
So much for the prelude to Allied Force. The ‘historical overview’ goes
on to provide hyperlinks to a day-to-day account of the actual air cam-
paign, and a short summary of the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis. Here
the narrative once again enmeshes NATO actions within an authorising
network of international institutions in which the UN plays a privileged
role. A number of UNSC resolutions are available via hyperlink, as are the
‘general principles’ of the G8 – a group which also includes the Russian
Federation – and the ‘paper’ presented by the representatives of the EU and
the Russian Federation in Belgrade on 3 June 1999. Perhaps even more
interesting is the narrative’s efforts to frame Operation Joint Guardian (i.e.
the deployment of military forces following the end of the air campaign and
the re-establishment of order and security in Kosovo) as a ‘humanitarian
effort’. NATO’s account of its post-bombing operations focuses on the
efforts ‘to relieve the suffering of the many thousands of refugees forced to
flee Kosovo by the Serbian ethnic cleansing campaign’. Moreover, NATO
had ‘built refugee camps’, moved ‘hundreds of tons of humanitarian aid’,
and coordinated ‘humanitarian aid flights’. These ‘facts and figures’ that
conclude the ‘historical overview’ stand in sharp contrast with the atrocities
committed by Serb forces. But, it might be remarked, NATO’s current
efforts to alleviate the plight of the victims and refugees also stand in sharp
contrast to its own earlier bombing campaign.
Again, the point here cannot be to ‘prove’ NATO wrong, or to present a
‘more correct’ account of Operation Joint Guardian. But for the purpose of
this essay it is important to point out the way in which NATO is removing
itself from the ambiguity of the Kosovo reality. To turn the operation into a
straightforward humanitarian effort in effect depoliticises it: it bestows upon
it a legitimacy that is not immediately available to a military intervention; it
silences the political and diplomatic preconditions and consequences of the
deployment of NATO-led military forces in a sovereign state; it pacifies the
Kosovo population into passive recipients of international humanitarian
aid, thus depriving it of political agency. And, finally, it ostracises from the
plot the fact that some 500 civilians died in NATO’s air campaign, which
makes it arguably a somewhat less than humanitarian action.26
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Cache clean-up . . .
The hyperlink to ‘Operation Allied Force’ within this narrative takes the
reader to the transcripts of seventy-seven days of operational updates,
morning briefings and press briefings, as well as the accompanying ‘maps
and aerial views’. This page also offers access to NATO’s densely woven
strategic construction of the Kosovo reality. In other words, this page records
the daily battles on the frontline of NATO’s information warfare. To those
interested in strategic discourse as practised at the end of the twentieth
century, a plethora of rhetorical strategies, metaphors and analogies here
offer themselves for critical study. My purpose here is to identify the dis-
tribution of responsibility and the designation of ‘evil’ in NATO’s evolv-
ing discourse on the Kosovo campaign. Especially important are NATO’s
rhetorical gestures to extricate itself from responsibility for the death and
destruction in Serbia and Kosovo in an effort to preserve its claim to the
moral high ground offered to it by the liberal project. Only by maintaining
this high ground can NATO legitimise its actions as the enforcer of human-
itarian values that exceed the boundaries of political power and which there-
fore cannot be restricted or rejected by invoking the privilege of sovereignty.
Yet, as Operation Allied Force has demonstrated, enforcing these moral
standards by military force also kills innocent people and destroys civilian
targets. The reality of ‘moral combat’ is never as clean as its purpose. This
tension has to be resolved in order to avoid the former undermining and
debilitating the latter.
One prominent rhetorical strategy used in the press briefings by NATO
spokesperson Shea and the representatives of the military is to condense the
‘responsibility for evil’ within the person of Milosevic. This contraction of
responsibility has been a central mechanism by which NATO has sought to
morally justify its actions. Firstly, it has allowed the Alliance to blame
Milosevic for the death and destruction that NATO has brought to Serbia
and Kosovo. Secondly, it has sought to drive a wedge between the Serb
people and its leader, allowing NATO to claim that in fact the Serbs
themselves are victims of Milosevic. Finally, this individualisation of guilt
supports NATO’s claim that it did not conduct a ‘war’ against Yugoslavia:
‘NATO is not waging a war against the Yugoslav people, to the contrary’
(press briefing [PB], 25 March 1999).27 NATO’s aim is ‘to stop the war and
to guarantee that peace is a reality for a country that has been suffering
from war for many, many, years’ (PB, 25 March 1999). Free of the onus of
war, NATO’s action is the legitimate execution of the ‘logic of the UN
Security Council’. Given this non-adversarial purpose, ‘the great majority of
the Serbs would be only too happy to see NATO come in and provide
security, stability, stop the fighting, guarantee basic human rights’ (PB,
28 March 1999).
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NATO has sympathy for the people of Yugoslavia. Ten years ago, when the
Berlin Wall came down, any economist looking at the map of Europe would
have probably designated Yugoslavia as the country emerging in the post
communist period which was most likely to rapidly catch up with the West-
ern European mainstream. It was a wealthy country. People had private
bank accounts, they went skiing in Austria and Switzerland, it was a very
civilised country indeed and many people obviously went there on holiday
and enjoyed it.28
In this reading of events, Serbia’s fall from grace was at the making of
‘Milosevic’, who single-handedly turned Yugoslavia into a ‘pariah state’.
‘It’s Milosevic who has isolated a great people from the European mainstream
where it belongs and this is a tragedy of course for the whole region but first
and foremost for the people of Yugoslavia themselves’ (PB, 4 April 1999).
Thus, in fighting ‘Milosevic’, NATO is fighting for the Serbs too – even if
the current situation has led to a temporary ‘upsurge of nationalism in
Serbia itself ’. However, once back on the track of rationality, the Serbs
would come to realise that NATO will ‘help Yugoslavia emerge from this
status of a pariah state and take the place in Europe which the people’s
greatness and ingeniosity [sic] deserves, quite frankly’ (PB, 7 April 1999).
The price for this prospect of peace and prosperity is to endure the ‘strategic
bombing’ of civilian targets such as power plants and electricity supplies.
However, the ensuing ‘inconvenience’ of power cut-offs ‘is nothing compared
with the day-to-day misery of that kind of economic meltdown which we
have seen at the hands of Milosevic since he came to power’. After all,
between 1990 and 1998
Serbian industrial production shrank by 50 per cent . . . Unemployment, the
official figure is 27 per cent . . . and more realistically is probably double that.
We know that salaries and pensions are paid late . . . 72 per cent of the 1999
budget is planned for defence-related spending. By the way, these are World
Bank and IMF figures, I haven’t made them up.29
Shea could therefore argue that being bombed, day in, day out, was prefer-
able to living a peaceful life in the misery of ‘Milosevic’s’ Yugoslavia.
But the price was paid not only by enduring power cuts and blacked-out
TV screens. NATO killed civilians in its bombing campaign; or, in its own
terms, NATO was regrettably unable to avoid ‘collateral damage’. As NATO
explained from the outset, should civilian casualties occur,
the responsibility is on the shoulders of President Milosevic for having
manoeuvred, cornered – whatever you like to call it – the international com-
munity into a situation where it has had no alternative but to take action and
whatever the situation, let’s not lose sight of the general context, we are acting
because already there have been too many civilian casualties in Yugoslavia,
thousands of them dead, and infinitely larger numbers of people who have lost
their livelihoods, their incomes, their work, their families, through the violence
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that has happened and it’s in order to prevent this overall situation of a human-
itarian catastrophe within the borders, and outside the borders of Yugoslavia
because of the refugee overspill, that we are acting, so yes of course and
I again stress that we will do everything, everything we can to avoid civilian
casualties, but let us at least not lose sight of the overall context which has
made this necessary.30
The rambling presentation of this case already betrays the discomfort with
which this challenge to the basic canons of ethics is being delivered. But
NATO has continued to use this argument: the death and destruction caused
by NATO bombs were to be blamed on ‘Milosevic’. As a consequence,
NATO itself bears no responsibility for the death and destruction it has
brought to Serbia and Kosovo. Freed of any presumption of malevolence,
the ‘collateral damage’ produced by NATO pilots is represented as a victim
of circumstances created by ‘Milosevic’. Given the limits of this essay, a
discussion of a single case will have to do to demonstrate NATO’s strategies
of ‘ethical cleansing’.
On 14 April 1999, some 70 Albanian civilians were killed and some 100
wounded when NATO pilots bombed a convoy on a road near Djakovica.31
After initial denials of responsibility and suggestions that this was yet
another Serbian atrocity, NATO admitted one day later that one of its own
pilots had caused the disaster. Responsibility for the deaths, however, was
once again deflected. Firstly, the fact that the pilot was a NATO pilot
absolved him from any element of evil. It was argued that he ‘dropped his
bomb in good faith, as you would expect a trained pilot from a democratic
NATO country to do’ (PB, 15 April 1999). His identity as a representative
of the morally supreme institution obviously immunised him from any taint
of responsibility. Bombing the convoy was an honest mistake – a mistake
that, given the morally superior identity and purpose of NATO, had to be
excused. Secondly, this ‘mistake’ is represented as a contingency of war.
After all, ‘no conflict in human history has ever been accident free, or will
ever be’ (PB, 15 April 1999). Regrettable as they are, such accidents will
happen, they are part of any conflict. And, finally, culpability is established,
as the original source of the evil is once again conjured.
But I would also like to ask in this connection two questions. First, why was a
refugee convoy escorted by Serb military vehicles on the Prizren–Djakovica
road at 3.00 o’clock yesterday afternoon in the first place? Why weren’t the
people in their homes, at their jobs, going about their normal lives? Why were
they en route to the border? Because they had been forced from their homes
and because they were on their way to joining the 580,000 Kosovar Albanians
that have already been expelled from Kosovo. My second question: why was a
NATO pilot 15,000 feet up in the air yesterday afternoon over Kosovo?
Because along with about 1,000 other NATO pilots, he was risking his life
every day to stop human suffering in Kosovo and to allow these 580,000
refugees to be able to go back home.32
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Responsibility for the deaths of some seventy Kosovar civilians is located,
therefore, in the ‘force’ that drove them out into NATO’s bombsights, and
not within NATO itself.
The three rhetorical strategies found in this case – the assumption of essen-
tial moral superiority; the reference to the contingencies of war; and the
projection of culpability for NATO’s killings onto ‘Milosevic’ – represent
the structure for NATO’s designation of responsibility during Operation
Allied Force. Whenever ‘collateral damage’ threatened to taint the image of
NATO as the moral agent in a humanitarian effort, these strategies are used
to ethically cleanse the Alliance and to maintain the legitimacy of its actions.
After all, in the vast majority of the attacks, legitimate targets were effectively
destroyed. Or so the video images that appears hyperlinked in the seventy-
seven-day narrative suggests.
‘All video sequences are available in MPEG’
NATO’s internet site collects 112 of these video sequences. During the daily
Press Briefings, these videos were used to provide evidence of NATO’s
ability to strike at Yugoslav forces in Kosovo and to hamper their genocidal
campaign against the Kosovar Albanians.33 Taken out of this context
and accessed via the internet, these videoclips produce their own peculiar
narrative of what ‘really’ happened during the Kosovo war.
It comes as no surprise that the execution of military violence is cleansed
of the mishaps and disasters that in the end cost the lives of about 500
civilians. Reminiscent of videogame simulations, NATO’s imagery produces
the impression of hygienic effectiveness: only military targets are hit, and all
targets are destroyed: Jeder Schuß ein Treffer.
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As a matter of perspective, the videoclips show the exercise of a just
violence in the deliverance from evil. The spectator is in the position of the
pilot who is following the laser-guided missile to its target, its bright flash
indicating successful delivery. The actual consequences of the attack, the
destruction and death it wreaks, cannot be captured by this vantage-point.
What we see are blurred and shaky images of tanks, armoured personnel
carriers and planes, captured in the crosshairs of the bombsight. Seconds
later, these instruments of genocide and death are destroyed. No ‘collateral
damage’ taints the reiterated images of grey shades, crosshairs and the
ultimate explosion.34
The video images reinforce NATO’s claim to have conducted a moral
campaign in which ‘collateral damage’ is the regrettable, if unavoidable,
exception to the rule of a just and hygienic war. As the video footage is
supposed to prove, NATO aimed to destroy the tools of Milosevic’s
genocidal campaign, and in the end forced him to surrender. Or maybe not?
Perhaps what we see in many of these blurred images is the destruction of
rubber decoys and fake bridge constructions. Perhaps Serbian cunning added
another twist to NATO’s simulation of moral warfare, by also simulating
the required destruction of its war machine.
Conclusion: vvv.nato.int: host not found . . .
The Kosovo war did not take place. What did take place was the enforcement
of universally held humanitarian values by a morally privileged agent (known
as NATO), against a rogue leader (named ‘Milosevic’). In this campaign,
the lines were clear: liberalism confronted one of the last vestiges of autocracy
and dictatorship in Europe; humanitarian values confronted genocide; virtue
did battle with crime. And, in the end, morality triumphed over politics. No
national or institutional interests, no concern for the balance-of-power or
the supply of natural resources, drove NATO’s action. As the agent of a
community of liberal and democratic states that defines the epitome of civilisa-
tional standards, NATO faces no equals against which it can wage ‘war’ in
the traditional sense. Consequently, war is replaced by enforcement; diplo-
macy is replaced by ultimata; and politics is substituted by moral rectitude.
Yet, to maintain the virtuousness of NATO’s actions is only possible within
the realm of the virtual. Only when its verbal representation is controlled,
structured and disseminated by spin-doctors and clever spokespersons, only
when the visual ‘evidence’ is presented in the form of videogames, only
when we stay within the framework of this de-ontologised version of warfare,
can NATO’s claims be sustained. Outside of this framework, confronted
with the consequences of NATO’s inscription of universalist order upon
Yugoslavia, a different reality emerges.
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It was Friday, May 7, 1999, in the city of Nis, in southern Serbia, and Nato
had made a mistake. Instead of hitting a military building near the airport
about three miles away, the bombers had dropped their lethal load in a tangle
of back streets close to the city centre. At least 33 people were killed and
scores more suffered catastrophic injuries; hands, feet and arms shredded or
blown away altogether, abdomens and chests ripped open by shards of flying
metal. This had been no ‘ordinary’ shelling, if such a thing exists. The area
had been hit by cluster bombs, devices designed to cause a deadly spray of hot
metal fragments when they explode.35
It is this representation that NATO’s virtual simulation of virtuous warfare
is supposed to suppress in order to maintain the legitimacy of its purpose
and action. As Shea admitted: ‘This was the first media war: all journalists
were also soldiers. Part of my task was to provide them with ammunition in
order to demonstrate the sincerity of our motives and actions. After the
bomb misses and the death of civilians, this became more problematic.’36
Virtuous warfare does not accept any responsibility for evil on its own
part. Virtuous warfare is warfare against evil. Based on a totalising ideo-
logy that invokes universal values and norms as the justification for all its
actions, this kind of warfare tends to become total in its conduct. Neither
the death of innocent people nor the principles of international law can
stand in its way. In this sense, Baudrillard is certainly right: We should be
‘meteorologically sensitive’ to this development.
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Of models and monsters:
language games in the Kosovo war
Introduction: Kosovo as a sign
The oddity of ‘humanitarian bombing’; the demonic Slobodan Milosevic;
the violence of genocide; the darkness of Serb nationalism; the anguish of
uprooted Kosovars; the hatred of ethnic cleansing. What took place in
Kosovo fascinates us, both because of its many monsters and because of the
opportunity it has offered ‘the West’ to portray itself as a model of altruism
and morality. The war over Kosovo is now far enough in the past to view
Kosovo as a ‘sign’, an emblem for things to come. Much as was the case in
ancient Rome, where omens and portents were always odd and bizarre, this
Kosovo-sign has for us a curious air of ambiguity. For those observing it
from the outside, it is either a model or a monster, a sign either of a maturing
and perfecting European security framework or of a Europe the fragile
stability of which is still under serious threat.
Kosovo’s ambiguity is relevant since we now have to come to an appreci-
ation of what this war implies for international relations (IR) theory, inter-
national law, normative approaches to politics and the development of
European security in general. What makes these examinations both demand-
ing and interesting is that ‘Kosovo’ is located in a realm where exotic and
distant things seem to occur. This essay therefore examines the events of
Kosovo not only as a sign of the future, but as a place where ‘different’
things occurred in a realm beyond the classical local–foreign boundary.
A fascination with freaks of nature – or lusus naturae – has been part of
Western culture since the ancient accounts of the marginally believable
(paradoxography). Explorers like Marco Polo and Columbus, like today’s
legions of tourists, have helped to incorporate the wonders of our world
into the dichotomy of the local and the foreign, and, later, into the domestic–
international nexus. The realm of the ‘outside’ has been inhabited by
fascinating and often horrifying things which frequently seemed to test and
defy the moral order that could be found at home. At the known world’s
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periphery – a realm that is foreign to us because it is unfamiliar and
nameless – the domain of marvels and wonders seems to commence.1 During
peacetime, such foreign oddities are often turned into tourist attractions and
TV entertainment. However, war often amplifies the horror and terror of the
foreign. Whereas the outside realm displays outlandish customs or curious
physical features during normal circumstances, the outbreak of war allows
for further freedom of interpretation and freedom of action, going beyond
the ‘normal’ and the ‘natural’. It is this sort of freedom that explains seem-
ingly unrestrained behaviour at the borders of the ‘known’ or, as it is more
conventionally called, ‘the West’. When war breaks out, this interpretative
freedom may turn into a violence that may both breed new life and bring
death.2 From this perspective, we should start to ask how to conduct war
under such foreign/international conditions?
In this essay, I try to examine such interpretative freedom, the ‘magical’
and ‘fluid’ construction of the Kosovo phenomenon, in both Western and
Serbian discourses. In particular, I consider how power can be derived from
the art of repetition – i.e. how ‘security’ can be created and maintained by
sticking to a single message and spreading it as widely as possible. To the
average spectator, one of the most noticeable features of the Kosovo war
has been the non-stop repetition of certain key concepts by all parties to the
conflict. One might have expected that such a continual repetition would
have become not merely boring but ineffective, and even counterproductive.
I argue here that this is a quandary inherent to the nature of repetition. By
repetition, all actors risk losing agency. Under these foreign/international
conditions, in order to counter enemies – ‘monsters’ able to change appear-
ances and transform themselves – one has to avoid becoming a mere auto-
maton. So, the question becomes how one might create (or maintain) stable
and potent agency?
The answer is inherently problematic since it involves the dilemma of
repetition versus variation. In exploring this question, I start from the pre-
miss that reality – and international reality in particular – has a strongly
‘magical flavour’.3 The concept of ‘magic’ may be new and unsettling to
some students of IR, but I wish to argue that it offers a good template for
understanding contemporary global politics since it deals with the art of
producing and maintaining marvellous, striking and at times also shocking
phenomena by ritualistic/performative methods. From this perspective, the
rationale justifying ritualistic repetition has to do with the power of words
to create (in and of themselves) a new kind of ‘reality’. The term ‘magic’
suggests a strong sense of forcefulness behind explicit words. But this degree
of force is not associated only with military power, or with human sacrifice
in battlefield. Other sources of power have to be explored.
In doing so, I base my approach on a variety of philosophical traditions
ranging from Plato via Giordano Bruno to Wittgenstein. The latter’s ideas,
for example, are extremely relevant for our discussion since Wittgenstein’s
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notions of the power of language conjure up images of something ‘higher’,
something ‘profound’, which goes well beyond the actual words themselves.
This essay argues that this ability of mere words to suggest and stimulate
powerful images should be considered an important source of political power.
The Kosovo-sign is just one recent illustration of this mechanism, albeit an
extremely powerful one.
Repetition, variation and incantation
To begin this exploration of ‘Kosovo’, I start my philosophical journey with
Bruno’s thinking on the importance of the hidden qualities in the magic of
reality. Bruno believed in what is called the ‘magical theory of language’. A
key element of this ‘theory’ is that words can bring matters and events into
existence and hence create agency. The power of words to animate is not
only connected with existing things: Bruno assumed that uttering something
could itself actually change reality. This suggests that language is more than
a means of describing reality, that the link between language and reality is
deeper, more creative and at times even forceful.4
The metaphorical thinking of Bruno suggests that the essential features
of a thing or event could be changed, maintained or even created. For
example, the powerful use of words could give a ruler characteristics asso-
ciated with God, thereby reinforcing the state’s power. One of the central
elements of Bruno’s thought is his emphasis on the infinite variance of
reality, which, he argues, offers the raw material that can be shaped by the
power of words and the imagination. For Bruno, even ‘real things’ are
imaginary. For example, he argues that ‘even if there were no hell, the
thought and imagination of hell without a basis in truth would still really
produce a true hell, for fantasy has its own type of truth. It can truly act,
and can truly and most powerfully entangle in that which can be bound.’5
In his On Magic (c.1590), Bruno writes that ‘nothing is so incomplete,
defective or imperfect, or . . . so completely insignificant that it could not
become the source of great events’.6 This is both the promise and the prob-
lem of prosaic politics, which involves the necessity of variance and the
impossibility of controlling it. This theme also appeared in Aristotle’s writings,
for instance when he argues that in a written text repetition may soon lead
the reader to incredulity and rob the text of its dramatic effect.7 Repetition
is, however, an altogether different matter in speech, where the strings of
unconnected and constantly repeated words are at times to be recommended
for their dramatic effect. Aristotle does not recommend simple repetition,
but repetition with variance: ‘In this repetition there must be variety of tone,
paving the way, as it were, to dramatic effect.’8 A certain level of variation is
required in repetition, just to keep the listener’s attention. This theme is
continued and given explicitly political content in Bruno’s General Account
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of Bonding, where repetition and variance establish the basis for bonding,
influence and power.
This brings us to Plato, who had much to say about repetition as a means
of ‘producing’ certain effects, mainly by influencing existing patterns of
sympathy and antipathy among people. In his Laws (c.360 BC), Plato goes
as far as to argue that political incantations play a central role in the affairs
of the state.9 For Plato’s so-called ‘ideal state’, the cultivation and strengthen-
ing of the skills of calculation, reckoning and consideration – logismo –
are paramount. However, this logismo is considered weak in comparison to
the soul’s irrational and destructive impulses. Hence, for Plato, there is a
need to make these irrational features subservient to the faint voice of reason,
paving the way towards the good polis. Plato has a solution for that: the use
of incantations. He argues that it ‘is the duty of every man and child – free
and slave, female and male – and the whole State, to use these incantations
we have described upon themselves incessantly’.10 He further defines these
incantations as plays and chants which, if taken together, can influence the
beliefs and actions of those who are not persuaded by reason alone.11 In
Laws, Plato argues for chants and plays which enchant in such a way as to
implant harmony through encouraging desirable and ‘correct’ behaviour in
people. These incantations are to teach people what is to be considered
‘good’, and what is to be deemed ‘bad’. He argues that the proper incanta-
tions should bind together good and pleasurable things with the correct sort
of behaviour.
Before I continue this short journey into the uncharted territory of polit-
ical ‘magic’, a reference to Wittgenstein’s notion of language games is neces-
sary to clarify matters. Wittgenstein uses the term ‘family resemblances’
(Familienähnlichkeiten) to illustrate the often elusive and indeterminate
character of language.12 This elusiveness is due to the variance and indetermin-
acy which, together with family resemblances, comprise the kaleidoscopic
character of everyday experience. This kaleidoscopic character of reality
lacks a stable and consistent set of features that would once and for all
define any language game or offer a set of qualities common to whatever is
included in a language game. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein points out that
language games can ‘conjure up’ a sense of order that goes beyond family
resemblances, and which is inherent in the actual uses of these games. Using
language games often suggests a determinate design that proceeds according
to specific rules, and language itself can hint at the more coherent and
consistent sense of order that can not be reduced to any specific example of
actual usage of the language.
Used in a specific way, language games that ‘enchant’ may have political
implications. Political rhetoric often uses language to give an impression of
something higher, or ‘spellbound’, within the language game. That which is
‘spellbound’ assumes a quasi-independent existence from the language games
with which it is interwoven.13 Wittgenstein argues that these games can serve
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two functions: they can be a means of showing how things could be, but also
a way to indicate how things should be. In the former sense, language games
can be used to bind things together by invoking patterns of similarity and
dissimilarity. Wittgenstein maintains that ‘language games are rather set up
as objects of comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts of our
language not only by way of similarities, but also of dissimilarities’.14 Apart
from this enlightening character of language games, they may also have, as
in the latter sense, a more dogmatic use, binding and holding captive.15
Images invoked by a specific language game may hold the ‘user’ captive,
which prompts Wittgenstein to argue that in this way ‘we could not get
outside of a language game, for it [ lies] in our language and language [seems]
to repeat it to us inexorably’.16
We may therefore conclude that the ‘magical’ side of language games can
be used both to control the social frame of mind, as well as to do battle
against the ‘bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language’.17
Irrespective of whether correctness and legitimacy pre-exist on some
metaphysical level (as in Plato’s thought) or whether they are embedded in
the language game itself (as is implied by Wittgenstein), these incantations/
language games have certain ‘magical’ qualities. These ‘magical’ powers are
reified in the repetitive and incantatory rituals that bind things and people
together into persuasive wholes and render them meaningful – existent as a
collective or as a group – through persuasive analogies.
The phantasmal background of political ‘magic’
For present purposes, the important element of Wittgenstein’s and Plato’s
thinking is the idea that there seems to be something higher, ‘spellbound’, in
our language games that is essential to the creation of a legitimate political
order. In this process, an appreciation of the ‘art of memory’ is being formed
which attempts to arrange images into memorable – or repeatable – order(s).
In this way, a certain sense of memory establishes a connection between the
practical level of everyday life and behaviour and the ‘spellbound’ stratum
of imaginary constructs.
Throughout history, the place (locus) for the ordering of memory has usu-
ally been a well-known building such as a theatre, a church or a mausoleum.
With the help of such ‘mental places’, the act and art of memory implies the
reading of written signs. This means that finding oneself in a certain locus of
memory – a place where memorable things and ideas are situated – may
allow for their actual recollection. However, in itself, the orderly locus has
proved to be insufficient to sustain memory and to produce order. What is
usually also required are striking images that complete the ‘art of memory’
with unforgettable and sometimes bizarre details. Specific memories may be
contained in, and provoked by, images by using simulacra that offer general
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representations of specific things/ideas.18 Thomas Aquinas, for example (in
his commentary on Aristotle’s De Memoria et Reminiscencia), argues that ‘if
we wish to remember easily any intelligible reasons, [we must] bind them, as
it were, by certain other phantasma’. Phantasmata enable orderly memory,
since ‘things that have subtle and spiritual considerations can less be remem-
bered, whereas things are more memorable that are gross and sensible’.
Aquinas (whose thinking was admired and followed by Bruno) further claims
that intellectual constructs can therefore be better remembered if they are
connected with striking emotional phantasmata.19
It can be argued that over the centuries, ‘the art of memory’ and
phantasmata have been used by political elites as a template for the orderly
arrangement of political loci such as the state itself, as well as to achieve
certain political objectives. The state, as an ordered political entity, is used
as a memory aid and a locus where striking phantasmata can be placed to
produce recollection, repetition and order. If the state is to be considered a
locus which produces political order and sustains its organisations, the role
of striking and unforgettable details becomes of paramount importance.
But what qualifies as a striking image in the state locus? Looking at the
history of state formation in Europe, we see that most states have traced
their origins through a series of miracles, catastrophes, struggles for national
determination and recovery, a string of enemies, and, more often than not,
a succession of violence and war. It is these phantasmata, and the elite’s skill
in making political use of them, that allows for the ‘magical’ act of sustaining
the existing state order.
Here I wish to consider how the practice of political ‘magic’ in global
politics – based on repetition and the variance of language games – may
evoke phantasmata that may be capable of producing certain desirable effects.
Looking at the Kosovo-sign, it will be essential to identify central language
games that have been used; the ‘spellbound’ phantasmata that have been
evoked by the warring parties; and the incantations that have served as their
context.
Western phantasmata and Yugoslavian counter-‘magic’
Much like their ancient incantatory templates, contemporary Western polit-
ical language games are based on the recitation of ‘magical’ words. During
the Kosovo war, the spectrum of these ‘divine’ words (used by both parties)
included such concepts as ‘freedom’, ‘liberty’, ‘hope’, ‘peace’ and ‘unity’. By
repetition and variation, these concepts were sublimated and acquired a
powerful character reminiscent of the ‘spirits’ of medieval times. Given that
these incantatory language games are at the core of Western texts, one
could expect them to be repeated only in order to install desired beliefs,
values and the ‘correct’ spirit within the audience at large. These language
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games were essential in fighting what has been labelled a ‘legitimate war’
and a ‘humanitarian intervention’, and reinforcing the Western-dominated
locus that underlies a specific system of images and keeps this system alive
and vibrant.
Obviously, numerous phantasmata have helped to sustain this existing pol-
itical order through the Kosovo-sign, most notably the continual emphasis
on ‘prosperity’ (open markets, high standards of living, investment opportun-
ities and health); ‘peace’ (security, stability, justice and human rights);
‘freedom’ (human dignity, life and hope); and ‘unity’ (the ideas of nation,
family and democracy).20
Besides these legitimate phantasmata, there were powerful phantasmata
whose status was considered undecided or even negative, such as ‘global-
isation’ and ‘interdependence’.
Finally, illegitimate phantasmata included ‘hate’ (genocide and cynical
manipulation); ‘disorder’ (corruption, rogue states, terrorism and economic
destruction); ‘suffering’ (drugs, diseases and environmental decay); and
‘despair’ (most notably the loss of hope).
In Western rhetoric, peace was oftentimes opposed to suffering; freedom
put opposite to despair; and unity opposite to hate. Reading the Kosovo-
sign, it becomes clear that this image-pantheon helped to maintain a sense
of political order, thereby giving uncertain concepts such as globalisation
and interdependence (which were oftentimes used as metaphors and ana-
logies for ‘the West’), a more positive and even quasi-legitimate connotation.
Central to repetition and incantation is the factor of time. In the case of
Kosovo, the build-up of powerful phantasmata did not occur overnight. The
NATO-led military operation against Yugoslavia had to be based on broad
popular support, which required careful preparation. For one thing, the
existing gallery of Western political images had to be rearranged and even
transformed so as to avoid the need for a United Nations Security Council
mandate which would legitimise the military intervention and overcome the
barriers of sovereignty and other established political norms. The emphasis
was therefore not only (or even mainly) on the careful military planning and
build-up; the West had to prepare its own public to accept the new code of
conduct of the emerging New European Order.
Since Western incantations and charms were based on a semblance of con-
sistent and legitimate aims, Yugoslavia’s counter-‘magic’ had to point out the
inconsistencies in Western language games and images, while simultaneously
interrupting the West’s repetitions. In Brunoïan terms, these seemingly insig-
nificant things – the level of variation in the West’s repetition – could poss-
ibly be turned into a self-defeating force. Belgrade’s attempt to underline
the weakness of the Western Alliance as such was part of an overall
scheme to protect itself from Western phantasmata. But the most effect-
ive means of counter-‘magic’ was to highlight the offensive and therefore
illegitimate nature of Western actions. However, much of Yugoslavia’s
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counter-‘magic’ failed since these claims were not able to reach and influence
Western public opinion on a daily basis.
For example, Yugoslavia was keen to emphasise the ethnic diversity of
Kosovo, claiming that almost half of the Kosovo population was ethnically
non-Albanian, whereas much of the Western press reported that the vast
majority of Kosovo was of Albanian ethnic origin.21 The issue of Kosovo’s
ethnic make-up was important since it queried Western assumptions
and similes of ‘unity’ as opposed to images of ‘disintegration’ which were
already occupied by the Milosevic regime. If Kosovo was not inhabited
overwhelmingly by ethnic Albanians, the West could be seen as de facto
supporting the Albanianisation of Kosovo, which would undermine much
of its political legitimacy. The phantasmata of the West supporting attempts
by the Kosovars to reach ethnic purity – an image frequently evoked by the
Yugoslavian side – was potentially disruptive to Western policy.
There were numerous problems with the Yugoslavian system of
phantasmata. It lacked internal consistency and credibility, but, most import-
antly, the reactive nature of its counter-‘magic’ could not resist and com-
pete with Western efforts to capture the Kosovo-sign. The problem was not
so much that Yugoslavia did not have powerful images in its arsenal. The
main reason why Belgrade appeared so ineffective in its resistance to the
West’s production of order was that its counter-images could not be ‘read’
with sufficient ease: they were not produced and consumed with the required
regularity. The phantasmata evoked by the Yugoslavian leadership were
based on specific historical experiences which the Serbian people attach to
Kosovo, as well as their ideas of national unity, sovereignty and territorial
integrity.
What was needed was a more striking element in the Yugoslav language
game, and this was found in the notion of Kosovo as a ‘holy’ site for the
Serb nation. For example, President Milosevic compared Kosovo with the
human heart: ‘Kosovo is important for us emotionally. As a part of this
country, this is the heart of the country. We shall never give away
Kosovo . . . it is the worst possible spot in the world for any threats, because
of its sensitivity, Kosovo is a sensitive spot in the heart of any Serb.’22 By
using the image of the ‘heart’, the Kosovo-sign was given a spiritual dimension
which was intended to unite a country that may have otherwise fallen apart.23
The phantasma of Kosovo as the Serb ‘heart’ was kept alive by the continu-
ous references and public incantations in Yugoslavia’s official media. For
example, the website of Yugoslavia’s Foreign Ministry claims that ‘Kosovo
and Metohia [Kosmet] represented, in the medieval ages, the centre of the
Serbian state and of the spiritual and cultural life of the Serbian people.’24 It
further argued that ‘in Kosmet, over 250 immovable cultural–historical
monuments are protected by the state’.25 These claims were made to associate
Kosovo’s spiritual strength with the Serbian right-wing – or, until recently,
their actual power – to repel outside forces. One could even suggest that this
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claim to offer protection to Kosovar monuments may have given Yugoslavia
a certain ‘magical’ power over Kosovo.
By equating Kosovo with Serbia’s ‘heart’, a deliberate connection was
made with blood, life and death, and, therefore, with war itself.26 Since
Kosovo had been the site of the 1389 battle between Serb forces (in ‘reality’
these forces were ethnically mixed) and the army of the Ottoman Empire, it
evoked images of violent early death and horror. Although an event of the
distant past, the Field of Blackbirds at Kosovo Pole symbolised the cataclys-
mic defeat in which the flower of the medieval Serbian aristocracy had been
destroyed. For the Yugoslavian political leadership, linking Kosovo with
blood and violence offered an image which mixed private disaster (death on
the battlefield) with public defeat (the defeat of the state itself). In principle,
it appears to be impossible to separate private from public matters when
one is standing at the grave of a fallen soldier friend, or when the state is
constructing monuments and memorials for its war heroes. In these cases,
of which there are all too many in Kosovo and Serbia, the public sphere
penetrates ‘private’ emotions in an extremely powerful manner. In this way,
the war dead become mediators, connecting the private lives of current and
past generations with the public locus where their lives have taken place: the
state itself.27 The war dead function as a bizarre societal cement that gives
the state a sense of pride and vitality through collective mourning.
During the war over Kosovo, these phantasmata have served to emphasise
the actor’s roots and sense of belonging. In the West, for example, this was
highlighted by the continual use of the powerful images of ‘unity’ and ‘union’
(e.g. the name ‘Operation Allied Force’ for the NATO air campaign). On
the Yugoslavian side as well, it was repeated that the war was all about the
‘unity’ of the State, claiming that the unity of the Yugoslavian people would
be undermined by the actions of the Kosovo Albanians and the West. Unity
was therefore at stake for both sides in the conflict. The war over Kosovo
was fought not only for territory, but for the ‘higher’ goal of unity: the unity
of Yugoslavia as a state, and the unity of ‘the West’ and the NEO which it
sought to project on the continent as a whole. The Kosovo war was used to
produce and sustain political and moral unity; war could both strengthen
and alter this unity in a desired way.
Extending political order during the Kosovo war
Another element of the phantasmal nature of global politics is the tendency
to construct and support the state as a functional organisation. The idea
that the state has a spiritual dimension dates back to the medieval concept
of ‘heavenly fatherland’. E.H. Kantorowicz claims that the ‘community of
the blessed and saints was . . . the civic assembly of the celestial patria which
the soul desired to join’, adding that ‘Christian doctrine, by transferring the
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political notion polis to the other world and by expanding it at the same
time to a Regno coelorum, not only faithfully stored and preserved the
political ideas of the ancient world, as so often it did, but also prepared
new ideas for the time when the secular world began to recover its former
peculiar values’.28 In these cases, the celestial patria served as an image and
a model for the earthly fatherland.
The images of holy places, monasteries and churches repeatedly promul-
gated by the Serb authorities during the Kosovo war, should be understood
as part of this long-standing tradition of providing the state with a much-
needed spiritual extension. The Christian notion of the heavenly polis is part
of the tradition in which the saint dies for all of us, and becomes our
immortal ‘ambassador’ to the heavenly kingdom, thereby offering ordinary
people a connection between the state and heaven.29 As the power of these
venerable dead accumulated through the centuries, their tombs and relics
were turned into images providing a ‘higher’ sanction for the state as well
as for the people.30 Memorials and war cemeteries have been turned into
collective ‘embassies’ of those people who could mediate between the earthly
state and its divine and spiritual shape. Through this mechanism, the pres-
ence of Serb memorials in Kosovo could be turned into a potential source
of power substantiating Belgrade’s claim to political order. Yugoslavia there-
fore read the Kosovo-sign in a distinct Wittgensteinian manner, interpreting
monuments as something ‘higher’, something ‘spellbound’.
For a Yugoslavia which found itself on the brink of further disintegra-
tion, the spiritual extension of its statal power was considered crucial.
Even in the West, this invocation of Serbia’s ‘ancient dead’ did not go fully
unnoticed. However, in the West, Serbia’s claim to spiritual belonging was
not considered a legitimate power resource, but rather as yet another
illustration of its propensity to give in to ancient and illegitimate hatred. To
nullify their possible effect, Serbia’s claims were called ‘scars’, ‘dividers’ and
‘faultlines’. US Vice-President Al Gore argued in 1999 that the
tensions and hatreds in Kosovo run very deep. Kosovo sits directly atop some of
the deepest and most bitterly drawn ethnic, ideological, and religious fault lines
in human history. The border between Rome and Byzantium was drawn there.
Bitter battles between Muslims and Christians took place there. Turks and Serbs
killed each other there. Communism battled for the minds of the people there.
All these struggles have left scars, and each scar has fed a lust for vengeance.31
Such words were part of an overall Western strategy to question Belgrade’s
claim that Kosovo was part of the spiritual core of Serbia. Gore even quoted
W.B. Yeats in this context – suggesting that ‘too long a sacrifice can make a
stone of the heart’32 – thereby trying to neutralise the idea of Kosovo as
Serbia’s heartland. This strategy to defuse one of Serbia’s most important
power resources – its claim to the moral and historically rooted legitimacy
of its presence in Kosovo – may explain why the West emphasised the death
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and destruction inflicted by Serbia on ethnic Albanians, whereas the losses
of the Yugoslavian army were reported in terms of military equipment only.
Admitting that the Serbs were again sacrificing their lives in and over Kosovo
would have reinforced the historical link between private and official suffering,
and might thereby have strengthened Serbia’s claim to Kosovo. Western
rhetoric and the media were focusing mainly on the suffering of the Kosovar
people – and there was certainly a lot of that – thereby weakening Serbia’s
spiritual claim on Kosovo and suggesting that the ethnic Albanian population
could now lay their own spiritual claim to the region by spilling their blood
during the conflict.
The Western media therefore chose to emphasise the phantasma of hate,
both individual and collective. The suffering of the Albanian refugees who
were driven from their homes in Kosovo was turned into the most striking
image of hate and ethnic cleansing. President Bill Clinton argued that the
United States and its
eighteen NATO allies are in Kosovo today because we want to stop the slaugh-
ter and the ethnic cleansing; because we want to build a stable, united, pros-
perous Europe that includes the Balkans and its neighbours; and because we
don’t want the twenty-first century to be dominated by the dark marriage of
modern weapons and ancient ethnic, racial and religious hatred. We cannot
simply watch as hundreds of thousands of people are brutalised, murdered,
raped, forced from their homes, their family histories erased – all in the name
of ethnic pride and purity.33
In this way, the phantasma of Balkan-style hatred was created, which –
together with the notions of ‘suffering’ and ‘despair’ making the actual hate
visible – soon became the most obvious target of the Western bombing
campaign in Serbia and Kosovo.
However, in itself, hatred was not enough, since it had to be embedded
in a more coherent set of phantasmata that would encompass the complexity
of the daily events during war. One way to overcome this was for the
Western media to show on a daily basis the suffering of the ethnic Alba-
nians, using the most shocking and striking images. Both sides (i.e. NATO’s
air forces and the KLA, on the one side, and the Yugoslav army and its
militias, on the other) were using violence to achieve political goals. But
only Kosovar suffering made Western newspaper headlines and reached
Western TV screens, as was illustrated by President Clinton’s remarks in
May 1999:
In the last few days we have seen more disturbing evidence of the atrocities
committed against innocent Kosovars, including some of the first photographic
proof of massacres of unarmed people. In trying to divert attention from these
crimes Serbian forces are only committing more by placing civilians around
military targets. It’s like pushing someone in front of an on-coming train, and
then trying to blame the train for running them over.34
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By applying this language game, the West admitted that its bombing raids
could be inflicting minor human suffering, but that this should be considered
merely as an unfortunate error, and that the real source of all evil was the
Milosevic regime. These language games were meant to construct a phantasmal
demon which could be exorcised and ultimately defeated in a military campaign.
The massive Western bombing of Serbia to destroy ‘hate’ in the ‘heart of
Europe’ has historical parallels with the medieval period when demons were
exorcised through torture and fire in a ‘legitimate’ fight of good against evil.
Peter Brown argues that for the late Roman Empire, exorcism gave a more
‘palpable face to the unseen praesentia of the saint than did the heavy cries of
the possessed’.35 He suggests that these torturers of ‘evil’ were often considered
‘good’ by definition. In a similar fashion, the death cries of the witch burning
at the stake were reminding the onlookers of their own relative goodness. It
is only the demon that is crying and dying, but not the possessed human
being that one sees ‘really’ being burned at the stake. Also, when ‘evil’ is
being punished, it is only logical that it should be the ‘good’ that are doing
the punishing. The few images of Serb suffering that reached the Western
public therefore resulted not in empathy, but, quite to the contrary, helped
solidify the identities of the ‘good West’ versus the ‘evil Serbs’.
Thus, one of the most important goals of the West’s incantations was to
stress that it was ‘evil’ that suffered from the NATO bombardments. In
these language games, the phantasmata of hate and evil were made synonym-
ous to the Milosevic regime which was systematically dehumanised by the
media to the point of losing any human quality whatsoever. This was most
clearly illustrated by the fact that the destruction caused by Western bom-
bardments was counted only in the loss and damage of military hardware,
without any mention of human casualties.36 The reason for this omission
was evident, since mentioning the human suffering inflicted upon Serbia
itself might have humanised the face of evil. The phantasmata of evil and
hatred were therefore legitimately made to suffer by the phantasmata of
freedom and unity (i.e. ‘the West’). Punishing hatred and evil was a means
by which to drive out the Balkan demon exemplified by the Serbian people.
Causing pain and suffering was, in itself, not the goal; on the contrary, it
served to distinguish between the righteous ones and the evil ones, and to
identify those who had the legitimate right to punish. Pain and suffering,
and the striking images thereof, helped to re-establish a new hierarchy of
power in Europe which had become less obvious after the end of the Cold
War. The Kosovo-sign helped to reinstate this clarity.
Concluding remarks: security in search of agency
The central theme of this essay has been the power of linkages between
different political levels – day-to-day politics and its higher normative appeal.
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Such links can be viewed as either legitimate (the model military actions of
the West) or illegitimate (Milosevic’s image as ‘a monster’). The claims and
counterclaims have drawn attention to the legitimate and, thereby, forceful
nature of one’s own links and the illegitimate and, thereby, weak bonds of
the other side. From a theoretical perspective, Wittgenstein’s notion of some-
thing higher, ‘spellbound’, in our language games sheds light on the power
of these linkages.
For Wittgenstein, these two customary levels – the everyday (‘lower’) and
the more normative (‘higher’) – are combined in the same magical language.
Tapping into the magical resources of power gives the earthly body of the state
an air of eternity, but also reifies its more phantasmal level. The phantasmata
were made physical in many ways during the Kosovo war. For example, the
dead were represented through material structures, such as tombs. Meanwhile,
in a much more radical sublimation, the nameless dead were turned into
phantasmata engaged in the fight over Kosovo. Ideas such as honour, pride,
brotherhood, sacrifice and unity made no distinction between the dead and
the living. The spiritual was understood in material terms (as the ability to
destroy the enemy troops), and the material was understood in spiritual
terms (the ability to bomb was connected with spiritual superiority). Language
games referring to ‘love for one’s fatherland’, ‘honour of the war-dead’,
‘cruel massacres of innocent civilians’ and ‘genocide’, were at once mysteri-
ously intangible and forcefully concrete. These linkages materialised in the
power of weapons on both sides; weapons which, just by themselves and
detached from the phantasmal, would have been powerless.
All parties to the Kosovo war have aimed their (re)actions at securing
their own agency. Both the West and the Serbs wanted to maintain their
agency, and their political independence, unrestrained by the other side. It is
clear that the orthodox reading of the conflict in Kosovo, based on the
interconnectedness of multiple actors and their interests, fails to secure agency
either for the West or for Serbia. When the local Serb phantasmata are being
removed from the Kosovo-sign in the form of burnt churches and fleeing
people, and are replaced by the Western phantasmata of ballotboxes and
peacekeepers, the problem of ‘security’ (i.e. how to define peace and order in
Yugoslavia) remains. However, the West’s hegemonic desire for the monoton-
ous repetition of its own phantasmata is likely to prevent the necessary
variance, and therefore may lead ultimately to the loss of its own agency.
The West’s grasp for agency may well be futile, since what it has now seems
to be slipping out of its hands. In turn, this will lead to a performance of
ceremonies and rituals of European security – comprised of such happenings
as the war in Kosovo – to which the West will be increasingly dedicated and
without which it will not be able to exist.
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‘War is never civilised’: civilisation,
civil society and the Kosovo war
Introduction
‘War is never civilised’, British Prime Minister Tony Blair declared on
10 June 1999, ‘but war can be necessary to uphold civilisation.’1 On that day,
seventy-eight days of war were brought to an end by the assertion that they
had secured the principles on which the post-Cold War European order was
founded. For that reason the Kosovo war provides an opportunity to study
what the West believes to be the foundation of a new European order.2 This
opportunity should be used because the reflexive confusion which followed
the end of the Cold War finally seems to have settled into a new kind of
political order. To appreciate how the West is constructing this order should
be of concern to anyone who wants to understand what the twenty-first
century has to offer European politics.
In the context of the debate on the futures of European order, Blair’s
construction of the Kosovo war may be seen as an illustration of Samuel
Huntington’s scenario of some forthcoming ‘clash of civilisations’.3 Was
Blair not arguing that, while war has ceased to be a means of politics
in the relations between Western states, the West’s relations with other
civilisations do – at least occasionally – involve war? However, the con-
struction of the Kosovo war as a defence of civilisation does not seem
to vindicate such a reading of the emerging post-Cold War world. On the
contrary, Huntington’s conception of civilisation is merely the culmination
of a long tradition of conceiving government – as well as relations
between governments – in terms of civilisation. This tradition began with
the philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment (particularly Adam Ferguson),
and culminated in Immanuel Kant’s conception of the pacific federation of
liberal governments as the cosmopolitan purpose of history. The centre-
piece of this tradition is the construction of government in terms of civil
society. In order to understand how the West came to see the Kosovo war
as necessary for the upkeep of civilisation, both the concept of civilisation
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and the notion of international politics it constructs should be carefully
analysed.
Civilisation and civil society
Adam Ferguson coined the term ‘civil society’ in An Essay on the History of
Civil Society (first published in 1767). In today’s idiom, Ferguson described
how modern society, with its elaborate division of labour, shapes both
domestic and international order. The division of labour, he argued, was
a prerequisite to an organic society that allowed social institutions inde-
pendent of the state. In their turn, these institutions would produce a truly
free society, whose organic nature was believed to encourage creativity
and progress.4 Ferguson’s work, therefore, implied a clear link between the
notion of civil society and the concept of ‘civilisation’. Ferguson suggested
that civil society was the vehicle of civilisation, being the result of what
Norbert Elias was to term the ‘civilising process’.5 Civilisation is an under-
standing of society as history, an understanding which developed from the
same Enlightenment belief in progress and freedom through social organisa-
tion by which Ferguson defined civil society. Kant developed and sharpened
these ideas of the Scottish Enlightenment, and argued that the peaceful
nature of civil society could be preserved only if the liberal governments of
civil societies would join in what he labelled a ‘pacific federation’.6
In 1999, the West believed itself to have realised such a pacific federation,
and its bombing campaign was supposed to defend this cosmopolitan peace.
French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin could therefore wholeheartedly agree
with his British counterpart that intervening militarily in Kosovo was the
answer to a profound challenge to Europe’s identity:
For decades Europe, at any rate our Europe, has been being rebuilt on new
foundations of peace, respect for human rights. To accept the flouting of these
values on the European Union’s doorstep would have meant betraying our-
selves. What is at stake in today’s conflict is a certain conception of Europe.
Do we accept the return of barbarism on our continent or do we rise up
against it? For us, the choice is clear.7
This makes it obvious that ‘Europe’ is constructed as more than a matter of
geography. To Western leaders like Jospin and Blair, ‘their’ Europe repres-
ents a certain monopoly of civilisation. By challenging this Western claim,
the Milosevic regime not only came to represent ‘barbarism’ in the eyes of
the West, but was questioning the very mechanisms by which the West defined
‘Europe’. In other words, the conflict in Kosovo did not threaten the physical
borders of Europe, but it seriously challenged the West European notion of
‘Europe’.
But who were Jospin and Blair to define the nature of Europe? As
Huntington would be the first to point out, ‘European civilisation’, on behalf
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of which they were speaking, was only one voice in a cacophony of civil-
isational identities. Serbia ostensibly fought for the interests of the ‘Orthodox’
civilisation, and Russia half-heartedly supported its ‘Slav brothers’. From
this perspective, one might argue that the Kosovo war was not the triumph
of civilisation (as proclaimed by Blair), but the first, nasty glimpse of a
world in which political (and occasionally armed) conflict stems from
mutually exclusive identities. Huntington argues that the West cloaks its
particular civilisation interests in universalism, which makes Western polit-
ical leaders (including the likes of Jospin and Blair) blind to the fact that
their interests, values and norms are at odds with those of many other
Europeans – not to speak of peoples in other parts of the world. However,
there is no such thing as an objective or stable identity. If a community of
nations constructs its (collective) identity around the notion of ‘the West’,
defining it in universal terms, then this is certainly relevant and ‘true’ for
that community. Other states and peoples may construct other (and com-
peting) identities, but these do not make the construction of ‘the West’ less
relevant and ‘true’. What matters for our discussion here, is whether
Huntington’s assertion that any identity (including the Western one) is
inherently in conflict with other identities is correct. If Huntington is right,
then the fight against ‘barbarism’ inevitably follows from Western identity,
and the Kosovo war is the prelude to a new century of civilisational conflict.
However, if Huntington is wrong, the Kosovo war may show that Europe is
on its way to a cosmopolitan peace which may well rule out war as a means
of international politics.
This essay pursues these questions by adopting a constructivist concep-
tion of international relations (IR).8 Huntington meets the constructivist
argument half way, since he claims that politics is shaped by the cultural
identities of governments. He differs from constructivists by arguing that
the basis of these identities can be objectively defined in terms of the concept
of ‘civilisation’. Huntington’s argument works according to what James March
and Johan Olsen term ‘the logic of consequentiality’.9 For Huntington, the
purpose of IR theory is to establish categories (such as ‘civilisations’) that
are supposed to explain and even predict the future development of global
politics.10 Constructivism rejects the viability of this kind of universal theory,
arguing that agents do not follow a pre-programmed schedule but are
influenced by the events and rules of action which constitute social institu-
tions.11 Constructivist studies therefore survey what March and Olsen term
the ‘logics of appropriateness’.12
The study of IR is – primarily, but not exclusively – the study of govern-
mental actions.13 Constructivism asks by what rules states define ‘appropriate
action’. Huntington argues that different civilisations cherish different
notions of what is ‘appropriate’, explaining these differences by referring to
the impact of civilisation. As I argue below, that position is untenable, but
for now it is important to notice that Huntington’s assertion is basically of
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a constructivist nature. The question therefore remains whether there is
some other way to conceptualise political appropriateness. Michel Foucault’s
notion of ‘governmentality’ offers a solution. ‘Governmentality’ assumes
that the governmental system is constructed and that it is possible to study
this construction as a totality. Foucault rejects the notion that politics should
be segregated from other social institutions in order to gain insight into the
workings of government. On the contrary, he argues that government does
not only concern politics, but also the government of the self: the way a
nation is governed and the way individuals govern their own behaviour are
parts of the same construction. This observation springs from a study
Foucault conducted on the historical sociology of the state in which he
points out that the development of the modern sovereign state has gone
hand in hand with the separation of the public from the private sphere.14 By
conceiving ‘the West’ as a configuration of governmentality rather than as a
civilisation, we may better understand that the notion of civilisation is the
manifestation, rather than the explanation, of the West’s construction of
appropriate government in post-Cold War Europe.
This essay, first, describes the way Huntington constructs civilisation. It
then argues that this construction is the manifestation of the governmentality
of civil society; and it concludes that this governmentality can explain the
Western construction of the Kosovo war.
‘Who are you?’
Like other constitutive texts of the post-Cold War world (such as Francis
Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man15), Huntington suggests
that the end of the Cold War has been a moment of becoming. But whereas
Fukuyama argues that the collapse of communism has made states
essentially similar, Huntington claims that states are becoming essentially
dissimilar, mainly because they define their interests by virtue of collective
identities that are mutually exclusive. He argues that during the ideological
confrontations of the twentieth century, the identity of an agent (be it the
individual or the state) was defined by the answer given to the question
‘Which side are you on?’ In the post-Cold War world, that question has
been replaced by the much more complex and ambiguous question ‘Who
are you?’16
Working within the realist understanding of IR, Huntington suggests
that the sources of (armed) conflict remain basically unchanged, although
the construction of these conflicts is now increasingly driven by identity.
This is bad news, according to Huntington, because identity is constituted
by conflict: ‘Identity at any level – personal, tribal, racial, civilisational – can
only be defined in relation to an ‘other’, a different person, tribe, race, or civil-
ization.’17 Now that the history of ideological struggle has come to a close,
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the state and its political system are no longer able to dominate people’s
identity, opening up new possibilities for personal, ethnic, religious and
other, non-state-centred, processes of identity formation.18 For Huntington,
civilisation has become the defining level of identity. He defines civilisation
as follows: ‘The civilization to which he [the individual] belongs is the broadest
level of identification with which he strongly identifies. Civilizations are the
biggest ‘we’ within which we feel culturally at home as distinguished from
all the other ‘thems’ out there.’19
The Cold War provided the West with an ‘other’ through which it could
clearly define itself. But now that the Cold War has been ‘won’, Huntington
fears that the West will succumb to complacency because it believes that its
‘universal values’ will inevitably come to dominate global politics.20 The
West may no longer see itself as a subject of history, he argues, but many
other peoples are defining their identities in juxtaposition to ‘the West’.
Huntington lists the usual suspects: Islamic fundamentalism, Chinese reviv-
alism and Russian revanchism.21 Since these ‘civilisations’ can define them-
selves only in conflict with their Western ‘other’, the West itself will have to
overcome its complacency and re-engage itself in history. Otherwise, he
argues, the West will cease to be a subject of history and become an object
of the history of others.
Huntington therefore considers Western attempts to enlarge the geograph-
ical scope of European integration as at best futile, at worst a process that
may weaken Western civilisation. ‘Europe’, he claims, can not be (and there-
fore should not be) redefined by politics, since politics has to be based on
the ‘fact’ that Europe’s (geographical) west is part of a different civilisation
than Europe’s east. The enlargement of NATO and the EU may try to
redress this situation, but ‘Europe’ (as a civilisation) can never include
the Slavs: ‘Europe ends where Western Christianity ends and Islam and
Orthodoxy begins.’22 Huntington therefore suggests that EU membership
will be awarded to states within the Western Christian sphere, but that the
defining act of political organisation will be NATO enlargement: ‘NATO is
the security organisation of Western civilization. With the Cold War over,
NATO has one central and compelling purpose: to ensure that it remains
over by preventing the reimposition of Russian political and military
control in Central Europe.’23
Huntington’s thesis suggests that the conflict of identity between self and
other which defines civilisation almost inevitability leads to political and
armed conflict. This ‘logic’ has been strongly criticised. Stephen Walt, for
example, rightly complains that ‘Huntington never explains why conflict is
more likely to arise between civilisations than within them’.24 The explana-
tion, I would suggest, is that Huntington conceives of civilisation in terms of
peace. States within a civilisation may not feel the same need to resort to
war as to a ‘continuation of politics’ because they (are supposed to) act in a
conforming manner and do not present each other with an ‘other’ which
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needs to be resisted and contested. Following Huntington’s logic, this
suggests that within each civilisation there is a relatively good chance of
peace. This interpretation explains Huntington’s rather peculiar conjecture
that Africa is the only continent without a distinctive civilisation. With
sub-Saharan Africa riveted by war within and between states, the continent
hardly qualifies as a ‘realm of peace’. This point is underlined by the fact
that sub-Saharan Africa does not have a common religion which could hold
the region together.
Religion is an important element (though not the exclusive factor it is
sometimes claimed to be) of Huntington’s definition of civilisation. Hun-
tington constructs religion as a gospel of peace, as it preaches harmony and
reconciliation among its followers. If people share a religion, they are also
likely to share an understanding (or at least have compatible understandings)
of peace. Indeed, in the case of Christianity and Islam, the realm of the
faithful has traditionally been defined in terms of peace, whereas relations
with the infidels were defined in terms of war.25 To Huntington, civilisation
is thus a community of peace achieved through conflict with ‘others’. But
why does Huntington believe peace depends on collective values?
The civilisation of civil society
The reason why Huntington defines civilisation in terms of peace becomes
apparent when one turns to his definition of Western civilisation. He makes
a distinction between the material and pop-cultural elements of Western
civilisation and what he calls ‘core values’, those elements of civilisation that
make the West ‘the West’. ‘The essence of Western civilisation’, he holds, ‘is
the Magna Carta not the Magna Mac.’ Arguing along these lines, Huntington
places himself firmly within the German conception of Kultur (culture),
especially in the way it was presented by Oswald Spengler. Nevertheless, he
goes to great lengths to disassociate his concept of ‘civilisation’ from Kultur.
This contradiction in Huntington’s thought demonstrates his purpose for
the concept of civilisation and how it reflects a very Western concept of
political identity.
Huntington defines ‘the West’ in terms of social and political values:
• the classical legacy;
• Catholicism and Protestantism;
• the separation of spiritual and temporal authority;
• the rule of law;
• social pluralism;
• representative democratic bodies; and
• individuality.29
Huntington has been criticised for dismissing the state as an agent of inter-
national relations.30 Given his broad definition of Western civilisation, this
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is hardly fair.31 One could even argue that Huntington makes an effort to
define what makes Western states unique. This uniqueness is the product of
history, and his list of Western characteristics can therefore be read as a
timeline describing how the West starts off in antiquity, solidifies in Chris-
tendom, matures in the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, and culminates
in the democratic societies of NATO. Reasoning along these temporal lines,
Huntington reproduces what David Gress has identified as the grand narrative
of ‘the West’.32 The West, Gress tells us, is an ancient reference to the land
of promise in European culture. The West is not constructed as a subject of
history, but rather as an entity that can shape its own history by virtue of its
superior values. As such, the notion of the West defines what is best in the
civilisation Huntington terms ‘Western’.
Gress argues that it was through the First World War I that ‘the West’
acquired its current meaning, as a reference to the north Atlantic community
of democratic nations.33 After Russia had left the war and the United States
had joined it, it was possible to give the endless battles in Flanders meaning
by constructing them as a struggle of democratic nations against German
‘autocracy’. US President Woodrow Wilson, for example, argued that the
war had been brought about by a German governmentality in which the use
of force was considered a legitimate extension of politics. At the beginning
of the war, Wilson believed that the ultimate source of the conflict could be
found in the balance-of-power system and that the war could be stopped by
revising that system. However, when Germany rejected his peace proposals
and had stepped up its submarine warfare, Wilson came to believe that the
war was the result not so much of the workings of the balance of power as
of the very nature of German governance. Where the US and its allies came
to see ‘the Kaiser’ as the symbol of an aggressive society, ‘democracy’ was
deemed to be the culmination of an historical process. As such, it was not
the European order that had to be changed: it was Germany itself which
had to be forced to adopt democratic principles of government which had
progressively generated freer and more peaceful societies. The conclusion to
be drawn was that democracies were peaceful not because they were democra-
cies, but because democracy as a system of government was the culmination
of a long-term civilising process.
As mentioned earlier, this notion of a ‘civilising process’ has been de-
veloped by Elias, who described the same practice as does Foucault in his
concept of governmentality: the historical process whereby a public sphere
is created which sets new standards for how individuals are supposed to
govern their behaviour and how the state is supposed to govern its subjects.
One of the clearest examples of such a ( joint) process is how the state has
tried to monopolise the exercise of violence within society. In seventeenth-
century Europe, most men of standing were carrying side-arms and were
allowed to use them under certain circumstances. This practice showed
that violence was a right, and occasionally even a duty of private persons,
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mainly because the lack of public order, and state-organised violence –
ranging from standing armies to the actions of police forces – made it
necessary for individuals (as well as for society in general) to depend upon
private violence. In the course of the seventeenth century, this situation
changed as the state gradually assumed the monopoly of violence.34
The state assumed the responsibilities hitherto held by individuals, who were
now compelled not to use force against each other. This process is continu-
ing to this very day, as more and more acts of violence are delegitimised
in the private sphere. The right of the head of a household to punish servants,
as well as his wife and children, has disappeared to the point where some
governments have prohibited parents from physically disciplining their own
children.35
In 1767, Ferguson described the development of the monopoly of
violence as a constitutive part of the division of labour within the emerging
‘civil society’ of Britain.36 Through Hegel’s use of this term, civil society is
now widely regarded as the private elements of society (e.g., the economy or
social movements).37 But, as Ernest Gellner, John Hall and John Keane
have pointed out, Ferguson originally used the notion of civil society to
delineate the separation of public and private functions as the unique char-
acteristic of a new kind of society.38 Ferguson described a certain Western
governmentality based on an increasing division of labour which allowed
for the diversification of society’s resources, a process that would in turn
result in increased wealth.39 As a former military chaplain, he was interested
in the relationship between the norms of army and society, and considered it
crucial that each man was no longer required to defend himself and his
family, since this would allow him to specialise in other professions. The
state’s monopoly of violence therefore produced a civil nation in which
political and military power were separated. Such a civil society, Ferguson
argued, was characterised by ‘peace and regular policy’.40 Civil society was
peaceful because the monopoly of violence had made warfare the monopoly
of the state, thus allowing the domestic relations of citizens to be guided by
peace. As Elias would later point out, both the manners of people and the
manner in which individuals relate to each other were being transformed,
thus making society ever more civil. As the state was no longer dominated
by a violent struggle for power, domestic policy was stabilised, allowing for
cultural sophistication, commerce and progress, which all depended heavily
on law and order. Civil society was thus characterised by an evolution which
accumulated ever more civility. This notion of a society striving for perfectibil-
ity is the link between civil society and civilisation.
Ferguson was one of the first thinkers to use the English term ‘civilisa-
tion’.41 To him, civil society was the sociological manifestation of civilisa-
tion. Civil society was a description of the nature of a given society and the
dynamics by which that society developed. As civilisation, civil society rep-
resented ‘an ideal order of human society’, an order which was considered
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‘ideal’ because it was supposed to have history on its side.42 Kant described
the culmination of history as the realisation of a true civil society, and
argued that war could be abolished since the increasing civility of and among
states would guarantee the peaceful settlement of disputes.43 When civil
societies had created a ‘pacific federation’, Kant concluded, they would be
able to look back on history as if its very purpose had been to create a
‘cosmopolitan system of general political security’.44
To summarise: the West is not a civilisation. But it may define itself as
civilisation, and this definition constitutes a governmentality. After the First
World War, the West was defined in terms of civil society, which in turn
was defined in terms of civilisation. Gress shows how the West became
constructed as the culmination of civilisation: ‘the West’ was constructed as
the system of cosmopolitan security which Kant had argued would be the
culmination of human history. Therefore, the alliance of democracies that
came into being after the Second World War was regarded not only as an
alliance of states but as the culmination of Western civilisation.45 History,
Gress ironically points out, was constructed as a progression ‘from Plato to
NATO’.46 Therefore, when NATO acted as it did on the Kosovo issue, it
acted on the belief that its bombing campaign was enforcing Kant’s idea of
a ‘cosmopolitan system of general political security’.
The cosmopolitan soul of Europe
The West will have to realise, Huntington argues, that ‘its Europe’ is funda-
mentally different from ‘Orthodox Europe’, the Europe of Russia and,
indeed, of Serbia. Between these ‘two Europes’ there is either conflict (of all
sorts) or mutual recognition, but never the possibility of comprehensive and
peaceful integration. The war over Kosovo showed that the West did not
construct Europe that way. As I mentioned earlier, Prime Minister Jospin
constructs ‘Europe’ as a governmentality rather than as a geographical or
geo-political notion. To Jospin, Europe is the result of a civilising process
which started in the West after the Second World War and by 1999 had
resulted in a definition of Europe as a cosmopolitan political system.
The Kosovo war was therefore not a way of drawing the line between this
cosmo-political Europe and the ‘barbarians’ (the ‘other’). On the contrary,
the Kosovo war was undertaken to secure the civilising process in Central
and Eastern Europe. Robin Cook, Britain’s foreign secretary, argued in The
Guardian that there
are now two Europes competing for the soul of our continent. One still follows
the race ideology that blighted our continent under the fascists. The other
emerged fifty years ago out from behind the shadow of the Second World
War. The conflict between the international community and Yugoslavia is the
struggle between these two Europes.47
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Cook obviously agrees with Jospin that the West could not accept ‘barbarism’
in one part of Europe and have civilisation in another. There could be only
one Europe, and this Europe had to be civilised. But what did this manifes-
tation of ‘barbarism’ signify? Jospin as well as Cook defined ‘barbarism’ as
a lapse into the ‘Europe of the past’. In 1999, the West had become used to
the construct of the Second World War as the close of its past barbarity, a
barbarity now left behind by the civilising process.48 The Second World War
had brought out the evil of human society in the shape of fascism, and the
West had barely been able to defeat it. Fascism had been able to flourish
because of the ongoing confrontation between European states, and, in the
words of the former British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, ‘a Europe of
nation-states always signified a Europe of war’.49 Only by removing the state
as the sole source of government in Europe could a new governmentality be
introduced, one that did not automatically lead to war. This argument shows
a remarkable consistency in the way the process of European integration
has been conceived from the time of the Schuman plan to the 1990s. ‘The
European Common Market’, Christopher Coker remarks, was ‘a “civilising
process” that was intended to render Europe at peace with itself for the first
time.’50 In the late 1990s, this civilising process was believed to have pro-
duced a new European governmentality, a new ‘Europe’.
In 1999, Western governments believed that this civilising process had
delivered them from their past and had introduced a ‘cosmopolitan system
of general political security’. The end of the Cold War had ensured that the
civilised ways of the West were the only game by which European politics
could be played. However, the Serbian regime had shown otherwise, and by
doing so it denied entirely the claim that European politics had been truly
transformed. This would not have been the case had Serbia been constructed
as part of an antagonistic ‘Orthodox’ civilisation. In that case, Serb violence
against ‘Muslims’ within Kosovo would have proved that civilisations were
indeed in conflict, and that very conflict would have constructed ‘Orthodox’
Serbs and ‘Muslim’ Kosovar Albanians as the West’s ‘other’. However, as it
turned out, the West had no ‘other’ in Europe. There was no other Europe
for the West but the Europe of the past. The methods of the Serb army and
militias therefore constituted a more massive and serious provocation than
the atrocities in Rwanda (a few years earlier), or the conduct of the Russian
army in Chechnya (a few months later). The notion of Europe’s own
non-civilised past was so present in the Western construction of its own
European political project that, faced with the non-civilised ways of the
Serbian government, the West felt it had to act in order to secure its own
future.
There was no ‘other’ in the construction of European identity because that
identity was defined in terms of cosmopolitan integration. The West believed
itself to have moved beyond the Europe of the nation state, but what rules
of government (‘governmentality’) constituted this ‘modern Europe’? During
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the Kosovo war, Prime Minister Blair probably came closest to defining this
new governmentality when he spoke, in April 1999 in Chicago, about ‘a wider
context’ in which the events of Kosovo should be placed, a context he defined
as that of ‘globalisation’.51 The interdependence of the world’s economies,
Blair argued, was only the ‘most obvious’ manifestation of the new govern-
mentality since we ‘are all internationalists now’. The West could no longer
define itself only as a community of nation states as the very governmentality
of these Western states themselves had become cosmopolitan. Blair agreed
with his Foreign Secretary that cosmopolitanism had been created during
the Cold War, but that it was only at that time, during the Kosovo campaign,
that this historical civilising process had come into its own:
We are witnessing the beginnings of a new doctrine of international commun-
ity. By this I mean the explicit recognition that today more than ever before
we are mutually dependent, that national interest is to a significant extent
governed by international collaboration and that we need a clear and coherent
debate as to the direction this doctrine takes us in each field of international
endeavour. Just as within domestic politics, the notion of community – the
belief that partnership and co-operation are essential to advance self-interest –
is coming into its own; so it needs to find its own international echo.52
By arguing that in today’s Europe the national interests of states are defined
by ‘liberal’ cosmopolitan rules, Blair’s Chicago speech offers a fine descrip-
tion of what Alexander Wendt has termed a ‘Kantian culture’.53 Although
‘national interests’ are routinely invoked by Western leaders, the states to
which these interests attach are believed to have gone through a civilising
process. West European societies have transcended their past war-like nature
and have adopted a practice of ‘international collaboration’. International
action is no longer guided by the transhistorical notion of ‘national interests’,
but is instead dominated by the ‘international echo’ of domestic politics. In
a sense, the civilising process has created ‘a new Europe’.
Arguing along these lines in his Chicago Speech, Prime Minister Blair
thus invoked Ferguson’s notion that individual societies would gradually
transform into an international community. Western governmentality is now
constructed in cosmopolitan terms and the formulation of national interests
has become subject to the rules of a new cosmopolitan system. ‘If we can
establish and spread the values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and
an open society’, Blair argued, ‘then that is in our national interest too.’54
Taken together, the values he was referring to are constitutive of a true civil
society. But why should the West want to spread civil communality?
Because, Blair argued, ‘the spread of our values makes us safer’, since states
that share civil values will eventually integrate into a democratic community
and, following the logic of his new international community, will subscribe
to ‘the belief that partnership and co-operation are essential to advance self-
interest’. This system of cosmopolitan security would make armed conflict
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extremely unlikely because ‘the principle of international community applies
also to international security’.55
To Blair, globalisation allows the ‘domestic peace and regular policy’ of
civil society to become the constitutive elements of European politics.
Globalisation is thus constructed as a process of transcendence, a process
which replaces the old rules of power politics with the novel rules of a
cosmopolitan community.56 As such, globalisation is a late-modern concept
which invokes the Enlightenment belief in the possibility of integrating civil
societies into a cosmopolitan system. To the West, globalisation is proof
that history is coming to an end and that a cosmopolitan system is emerg-
ing. Since history has been defined by war, as Kant has argued, history
would end if civil societies would translate their ‘domestic peace and regular
policy’ into such a cosmopolitan system. In this context, the notion of
globalisation signifies that the West now seems to believe that this tran-
scendence of international anarchy is currently being constructed, and that
this cosmopolitan system in the making is both possible and desirable. When
Blair argued that the Kosovo war was fought to protect civilisation, he was
arguing that this was a war against the ‘Europe of the past’, a war to ensure
the continuation and completion of a post-historical Europe. The Kosovo
war was a key part of the civilising process securing the future for a ‘cosmo-
politan system’ of civil societies in Europe.
Concluding remarks
One might argue that the West constructed the Kosovo war in terms of
civilisation by default. As the bombing campaign had only the shakiest of
foundations in international law, the West realised that its legal arguments
were weak and that it was therefore time to use the heavy rhetoric of civil-
isation. This illustrates the political importance, rather than the emptiness,
of the concept of civilisation. If the notion of civilisation can justify illegal
military actions, then civilisation holds a very powerful position in the minds
of Western political leaders and apparently also in the minds of the peoples
they represent. And as war allegedly starts in the minds of men, civilisation
is a concept that should be given serious attention.
Huntington has, almost single-handedly, placed this question of civilisa-
tion on the agenda of IR. Most students of IR are likely to turn to Huntington
in order to explain Prime Minister Blair’s statement that ‘war can be neces-
sary to uphold civilisation’. According to Huntington, civilisations are basic-
ally identities of peace, but conflict (including armed conflict) with an ‘other’
is necessary for civilisations to define the values which render them at peace
among themselves. Following this argument, one is left to conclude that the
Kosovo war showed peace in Western Europe to exclude peace with states
in Eastern Europe and beyond. The West’s rejection of the universal values
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of international law thus shows that the time for the particular identities of
civilisation has come. It also suggests that this time will be one of war.
This line of argument has forced many students of IR to reply that the
very notion of civilisation is the problem. For those critics, the Kosovo war
proves that civilisation is a very dangerous concept because it excludes
political solutions that go beyond established categories of exclusion and
is obviously unable to include Western civilisation’s ‘other’. This, so these
critics argue, is a mechanism leading directly to war. This essay has argued
that while Huntington’s conception of civilisation is basically flawed, ‘civil-
isation’ nevertheless remains important for the way the West understands
international politics. One will therefore have to focus on civilisation on its
own terms in order to understand the emerging post-Cold War order.
This essay has argued that civilisation is a manifestation rather than an
explanation. Huntington essentially replaces the neorealist concept of ‘the
state’ as the unit of analysis with ‘civilisation’, in the belief that every inter-
national occurrence of importance can thereby be explained. This line of
argument only works if all international agents belong to a unit of civilisa-
tion. The fact is that they do not, mainly because civilisation is a uniquely
Western concept. It is a concept developed during the Enlightenment as a
way to express the belief that society could only be understood in terms of
history and progress. Western societies ‘had civilisation’ because they – or so
it was believed – had a hold on the future due to their progressive modern-
ity. Civilisation is the expression of a certain conception of society and can
be understood only in light of that conception. It is also a conception of
modern society as a civil society.
So when Tony Blair argued that ‘war is never civilised’, he was invoking
the conception of a civil society that is constituted by ‘peace and regular
policy’, internally and externally defined by cosmopolitan peace between
civil societies. Within this conception, war is not a civil mode of interaction.
On the contrary, war limits the possibility of a regular policy of peace on
which civil society depends, nationally as well as internationally. Blair feared
that if war or coercion were seen to be effective in Europe, it would come to
threaten the regularity by which European politics had developed through
integration since the end of the Second World War. That war has become a
symbol of the end of European history as defined by armed conflict; European
integration was constructed as a civilising process which was to establish a
‘cosmopolitan system of general political security’. The Milosevic regime,
Cook argued, was threatening the ‘peace and regular policy’ of that European
system and had thereby defined itself as ‘barbaric’. The Serb government
was deemed to be uncivilised because it did not engage in the political
discourse of civil society and was blatantly using violence and military force
as a means of politics. In doing so, it had placed itself beyond politics in the
mind of the West. War was the only possible answer to its actions, and there-
fore Blair could argue that ‘war is sometimes necessary for civilisation’.
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This leads me to conclude that the notion of civil society offers us the
best explanation for the Western response to ‘Kosovo’. It is not civilisation,
but civil society that should be the unit of analysis in an account of why the
West considered the Kosovo war necessary and inevitable. But how is one
to conceptualise a construction of politics as a unit? In this essay, I have
suggested that Foucault’s notion of governmentality may provide a concep-
tual framework for understanding a construction of politics as the basis of
collective action. As such, governmentality serves the same analytical pur-
pose as Huntington’s notion of civilisation. However, governmentality is
not based on a priori assertions of how collective identity is (supposed to be)
created. Because governmentality is an analytical category, it also rejects the
a priori notion that identity is necessarily conflictual. On the contrary, this
essay has tried to show that the West has not pursued ‘others’ in order to
remake its collective identity after the end of the Cold War. The post-Cold
War order is created on the basis of inclusion, rather than exclusion. To the
West, the Kosovo war was necessary to maintain the development of the
‘cosmopolitan system of general political security’ that European civil soci-
eties have constructed as the beginning of a new political order.
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Chechnya and Kosovo: reflections
in a distorting mirror
This is not a text about who was wrong and who was right; neither is it a
text which aims to establish the true figures of those killed and displaced by
Russian or NATO bombs. It is a tale of two conflicts that share some
remarkable similarities and which are to some extent archetypal for our
globalised post-Cold War world. It is, above all, an essay about two
conflicts which are, nolens volens, tied like twins, because they became the
focal point of three fundamental, at times competing, principles of how to
organise the world. These are: the claims, rights and capacities of the nation
state; the claims, rights and capacities of identity groups; and the claims,
rights and capacities of international regimes. It is in the discourse and debates
about these organisational principles that the outlines of a European (global?)
security landscape must be found or will be lost.
Prologue
1230 hours, 24 March 1999: NATO airfields in Italy and the United
Kingdom
Eight American B-52 bombers, each carrying twenty cruise missiles in its
bomb bay, leave their UK base in Fairford and head towards Serbia. From
NATO airfields Aviano and Istrano in Italy, allied aircraft leave at short
intervals. The British frigate HMS Splendid fires a salvo of cruise missiles.
These events are broadcast in real time by satellite links all over the globe.
These are the pictures that the public has been told to expect for weeks. It is
the beginning of NATO’s Operation Allied Force, the long-announced answer
of the international community to ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. From 24 March
until 3 June, the images of aircraft taking off from airfields in the UK and
Italy, and returning home after the completion of their missions become a
regular part of TV news programmes. They will gradually replace the images
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of Kosovar refugees trying to escape the Serbian assaults. Now the former
refugees are shown mainly as a cheerful crowd, applauding NATO’s decisive
actions. These bombs will pave the way for a safe return to their homeland.
Meanwhile, over the Atlantic . . .
The Russian Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov is on his way to Washington,
DC. His mission is to obtain a much-needed financial infusion for the
crumbling Russian economy. Russia is hoping for new credits from the
International Monetary Fund: its external debts need to be restructured and
Russian steel exporters need to increase their exports to the highly protected
American market. The Russian space industry needs American satellites to
be launched from its space centre in Baikonur. However, in a dramatic
gesture, upon learning of NATO’s attack on Serbia, Prime Minister Primakov
orders his plane to return to Moscow. He does not wish to be on the Potomac
at a time when American cruise missiles are hitting targets in Serbia, so he
tells the reporters waiting at Moscow’s Vnukovo Airport on his arrival.
Although this seems to be an expensive decision (according to the liberal
daily Kommersant, it cost the Russian economy up to US$15 billion1), it is
certainly a popular one: NATO’s attack on Serbia has led to an unpre-
cedented outburst of public emotion in Russia.
In Moscow and some other big cities, there are spontaneous anti-American
demonstrations. The façade of the American Embassy suffers slight damage;
a pub in Moscow, which is unfortunately named U Djadi Sema (Uncle Sam’s),
is less lucky and is partly demolished. The political entertainer Vladimir
Zhirinovski begins to enlist volunteers for the fight against NATO. NATO’s
Moscow office is shut down and its director expelled. START II and START
III are declared virtually dead.
The Russian public’s emotions are running high these days, as if the
NATO bombs are actually hitting Russia. After a few days, the public’s
mood cools down somewhat. But a deep conviction of the public and the
classe politique remains: NATO’s action in Kosovo is ultimately threatening
the very idea of state sovereignty.
One night of NATO bombing has achieved what ten years of nation
building had not: a remarkable consensus between the public and the classe
politique has emerged. Leaders and public have become close as never before,
united in the vociferous condemnation of NATO’s operation. They agree
that NATO (for the Russians, basically an instrument of US hegemonic
ambitions) has finally shown its arrogance and unchecked power aspirations.
The cruise missiles of the Alliance are not only hitting targets in Serbia: they
are destroying the pillars of a multipolar world. These missiles target the
very essence of the United Nations, the peaceful concert of equal nations.
They amount to an assault on the idea of state sovereignty. Ultimately, they
are hitting Russia.
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August 1999: the Caucasus Mountains, border between Chechnya
and Daghestan
Two long columns of bearded fighters cross the border between Chechnya
and Daghestan. They are on their way to carry the Islamic anti-Russian
rebellion from Chechnya into Daghestan. They are lightly armed, mainly
with AK-47s, some machine guns, a couple of mortars and a few RPG-
7s – Russian shoulder-held anti-tank grenade launchers. Shamil Basaev and
Emir Khattab, two of Chechnya’s most famous warlords, veterans of the
first Chechen war, lead the two columns.
For Russia, the first Chechen war in 1994–96 was meant to be a short
and victorious one, which would boost the badly damaged reputation of
President Yeltsin. Instead, it had turned into a bloody disaster, leaving more
that 10,000 Russian soldiers and over 50,000 civilians dead. The Chechens,
surprisingly enough, had won on the battlefield, but had made little political
progress since then. In the 1996 ‘peace agreement’ of Khasavyurt, which
was actually a ceasefire, the opposing sides agreed to postpone the murky
question of Chechnya’s status until 2000. During the following years,
neither side showed any inclination for compromise. In August 1999, Basaev
and Khattab decided to take the struggle for Chechnya’s independence into
Daghestan. They hoped to trigger an uprising of the Daghestani population
against the Russians, thus probably deciding the question of Chechnya’s
status. In their view, the final stage in the war for the liberation of the
Islamic population of the North Caucasus from the Russian yoke had just
begun.
Three years later . . .
The Russian army is still fighting a bloody and costly war against the Chechen
rebels. More than 100,000 Russian troops are engaged against the Chechen’s
small forces. After driving the units of Khattab and Basaev out of Daghestan,
the Russian army launched a full-scale war against the Chechen forces in
Chechnya. The capital, Grozny, has been completely destroyed; the rebels
have been driven into the mountains, where they continue to engage the
Russians in a guerrilla war that neither side can win. Almost 300,000
Chechens have become refugees and are internally displaced. For Moscow,
this war is a ‘policing operation’ on a huge scale. Its objective is to protect
Russia’s state sovereignty and territorial integrity from criminal and terror-
ist assaults.
The Europeans accuse the Russians of gross human rights’ violations in
Chechnya. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE)
has suspended Russia’s voting rights. Russia’s political elite, however, refuses
to discuss what it sees as an internal affair. Any reference by Western politi-
cians to international norms and regulations are dismissed as hypocrisy.
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After all, it was NATO that bombed Serbia in clear violation of interna-
tional norms and regulations – and now these same international norms are
invoked to prevent Russia from defending itself against a terrorist assault
on its territorial integrity.
In the Balkans, Kosovo has de facto become a protectorate, governed by
the EU and protected by KFOR.2 The official currency of Kosovo is the Euro,
and the UN is struggling hard to establish a working administration. KFOR
is struggling hard to protect its monopoly of violence, but the KLA, far
from being disarmed, continues to exercise considerable influence. Most of
the Kosovar refugees have returned home, and most of the Serbian popula-
tion have become refugees. They are not especially welcome in Serbia, which
has to rebuild almost its entire infrastructure. Slobodan Milosevic has been
defeated in the election and displaced through popular protests, but his
regime and repressive machine have stayed largely intact, and his popularly
elected successor Vojislav Kostunica does not seem to be too accommodat-
ing to the West’s policy on Kosovo.
The high-intensity military operations in Kosovo and Chechnya are over,
and the dust has settled. But there a war of interpretation is still going on.
At stake is the ‘correct’ interpretation of what happened in Kosovo and
Chechnya. Did NATO bombs protect and promote human rights, or did
they violate international norms and regulations, and the rights of a sovereign
state? Do Russian bombs defend Russian territorial integrity and sovereignty,
or do they violate human rights? What about the collective rights of the
Chechens and the Kosovars? What will become of Kosovo when KFOR
leaves? What will become of Chechnya when Russia wins?
NATO’s interpretation of the events in Kosovo has clearly won the day
in Europe. The notion of ‘humanitarian intervention’ has given a remarkably
high degree of legitimacy to the Alliance’s Kosovo policy during the war
and in its aftermath. European politicians and the public seem to agree that
there are situations where protecting human rights is more important than
respecting a state’s sovereignty, and that in such cases the use of force even
without a UN resolution is justified.
On the other hand, the ‘humanitarian intervention’ interpretation has
failed in Russia. Here, the dominant interpretation is that NATO’s action
will undermine the principles of state sovereignty and weaken international
regulations. This latter interpretation in turn has helped to legitimise the
Russian war in Chechnya – a war that Russia fights in order ultimately to
protect her sovereignty and territorial integrity. In Russia, the political elite
and the public seem to think that the state’s sovereignty must be defended
by all means, even if the price is an occasional violation of human rights.
The creation of a dominant interpretation has always been an important
part of politics. In the cases of Kosovo and Chechnya, interpretation is
politics. Chechnya and Kosovo are so closely tied together that any interpreta-
tion of one case ultimately affects the other. Both NATO and Russia went
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to war for the sake of principles, and both made their points with bombs.
Indeed, both went to war for principles that seem to be mutually exclusive.
At the core of each of these wars of interpretation is the crucial question
of how to reconcile the competing claims of the sovereign states and identity
groups concerned. Neither Russia nor NATO has offered a viable answer.
But they better had, because ‘Kosovo’ can happen elsewhere, in Kashmir, in
the Philippines, in East Timor, in Sri Lanka, in Punjab – and in many places
in the former Soviet Union, like Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, Tatarstan
or Chechnya, to name only the notoriously ‘hot’ spots.
This chapter proceeds by offering an anatomical comparison of the con-
flicts in Chechnya and Kosovo, emphasising the remarkable similarity
between the two. I then move on to the responses of Russia and NATO to the
respective Chechen and Kosovo problems, discussing which rationales and
motives can, in the absence of any convincing Realist interests, best explain
NATO’s and Russia’s decision to go to war. In the final section, I show how
Chechnya and Kosovo are linked, both by Realpolitik and, perhaps more
directly, by each being the focal point of an on-going war of interpretation.
The outcome of each of these wars of interpretation may influence the Euro-
pean security landscape more than the ‘hot war’ in Kosovo ever could.
Chechnya and Kosovo: the similarities
Both the Chechen and the Kosovo conflict are essentially a by-product of
the breakdown of the Soviet and Yugoslav ethno-federations. The Soviet
Union and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) were multi-
level federations, consisting of ethno-territorially defined units with different
status. On the first level were fifteen Soviet republics and six republics of the
SFRY. They had all the institutional prerequisites of statehood, that is, polit-
ical institutions, political symbols, constitutions and borders. Within those
units, there were units of the second level, the autonomous republics, which
also were ethno-territorially defined. While they enjoyed lesser privileges than
the first-level units, they nevertheless possessed similar institutional prerequi-
sites for statehood. Both Chechnya within Russia and Kosovo within Serbia
were autonomous republics within first-level subjects of the federation.
After the implosion of the Soviet Union and the SFRY, the first-order
subjects of the federations became independent. Thus, the fifteen Soviet
republics and five republics of the Yugoslav federation became sovereign
nation states, recognised by the international community. Second-level terri-
torial units, however, were denied independence, even in cases where they
actively sought it. The international community reacted pragmatically to the
problem of how to deal with crumbling empires: all first-level republics
were, according to the principle of the self-determination of nations, recog-
nised as sovereign states. The second-level units, i.e. the former autonomous
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republics, on the other hand, were not. Here, the principle of the inviolability
of borders was invoked.
After the dissolution of the federations, the borders of these second-level
units became the fault line for conflict: most hot spots in the former Soviet
Union and the former Yugoslavia have emerged over the question of the
status of these second-level units. Chechnya, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh,
South Ossetia and Abkhazia were all ethnically defined territorial units within
the Soviet or Yugoslav republics. All of them turned violent, when they
started seeking greater autonomy or even independence. Thus, the legacy of
the socialist ethno-federalism proved to be especially prone to conflict. When
the empire broke down, the Chechens reacted by declaring their independ-
ence, thus unilaterally seceding from the Russian Federation. After two years
of an incompetent and inconsistent Russian policy toward the breakaway
republic this move led to the first Chechen war.3
The situation was slightly different in the former Yugoslavia. Milosevic
used an aggressive Serb nationalism to build up and stabilise his power
within Serbia. Already, in 1989, he had accused the Kosovars of separatism
and anti-Serb politics, and removed Kosovo’s autonomous status. The social
system he installed proved to be the perfect breeding ground for inter-group
violence: Kosovars were under-represented in political and economic key
positions, and denied access to educational and business opportunities, while
the use of Kosovar cultural symbols was restricted in public spaces. The
amount of inter-group violence was much higher in Kosovo than it was in
Chechnya. The Kosovars and the Serbs have been engaged in a low-intensity
internal conflict ever since 1989. By March 1998, the conflict had escalated
into an open guerrilla war between the Serbian police and army units and
the KLA. By the autumn of 1998, ethnic cleansing on a massive scale was
going on, and NATO began to threaten Milosevic with air strikes.
In the cases of Chechnya and Kosovo, there were additional permissive
conditions that made conflict highly probable.4 The Chechens and the
Kosovars had, prior to the actual outbreak of violence, a highly developed
sense of otherness in relation to the dominant group of each state, that is,
respectively, the Russians and the Serbs. Russians–Chechens and Serbs–
Kosovars are separated by language and religion. Chechens–Russians and
Kosovars–Serbs have, furthermore, complex histories of grievance – the
Chechens remember well the Tsarist wars and Stalin’s deportation of the
entire Chechen nation to Kazakhstan; and the Kosovars have not forgotten
the continuous politics of Serbisation of their homeland by administrative
measures or violence, dating back to the beginning of the twentieth century.
Chechnya and Kosovo can thus be labelled post-socialist conflicts. These
conflicts were shaped by the institutional legacy of the socialist ethno-
federations, and triggered by the collapse of the Yugoslav federation and
the Soviet Union. However, these conflicts share another set of similarities,
one often overlooked. The type of violence that has emerged in Kosovo and
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in Chechnya resembles in many ways the violent conflicts in Africa or Latin
America of the last decade. They belong to a type of violence that Mary
Kaldor has labelled ‘new wars’, that is a type of organised violence that
blurs the distinction between war (defined as violence between states or
organised political groups), organised crime and the large-scale violation of
human rights.5 Such wars involve not only state actors and state armies, but
myriad other actors, like paramilitaries, the warlords, militias, international
aid or human rights organisations, mass media and international organisa-
tions. Therefore, such wars are by definition transnational, since most, if not
all, of these actors are embedded in transnational networks.
‘New wars’ may have been common in Africa; but Chechnya and Kosovo
became the first new wars that were fought and broadcast in Europe.
Chechnya and Kosovo are thus not only examples of post-socialist conflicts:
they may be the first manifestation of a new type of violence, one that is on
the rise globally and will not stop at the fuzzy borders of Europe, and which
calls for new responses.
Such new wars share at least four common features:
• they are conflicts between identity groups and the state;
• they take place in an environment where the state in question is at best
‘weak’ or at worst all but absent;
• they often lead to the emergence of a ‘market of violence’;6 and
• the conflicts, and the actors, are embedded in transnational networks of
images, resources and politics.
Violence between the state and organised identity groups has become a world-
wide phenomenon, and the number of violent conflicts of this type has been
growing since 1950.7 There are three broad sets of reasons for that growth.
The first has to do with the steadily increasing acceptance of, and concern
for, collective rights, which is part of the (Western) cultural evolution since
the 1960s. The second set has to do with cultural globalisation, which threat-
ens to replace indigenous cultures with the globally proliferating McCulture.
The greater the loss of specificity to a given culture, the more people tend to
stress or reinvent the remaining distinctiveness, building cultural communes
of resistance. As the information technology of today makes it cheap and
easy to disseminate cultural markers, group-building processes are becom-
ing faster and cheaper than ever. The third set relates to the processes of
de-colonisation after World War II and the collapse of empires after 1989,
which have triggered many conflicts of this type, among them the conflicts
in Chechnya and Kosovo.
Like most originally internal conflicts, both the Chechnya and Kosovo
conflicts have their roots in an environment that is characterised above all
by dramatic state weakness. I define state weakness here as little or no
capacity to provide collective goods, and little or no coercive power. State
weakness may have many sources, and the on-going discussion of the dimin-
ishing role and capabilities of the nation state in our current globalised
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era points at one. However, in the cases of the Russian Federation and
Serbia, there is no need to look at the process of globalisation in order to
explain their dramatic state weakness. Both the Russian Federation and
Serbia are the successor states of imploded socialist federations, and each is
trying to establish its statehood on the ruins of an empire. This task at times
clearly overloads these new states. The result is state weakness, and its most
dangerous symptom is loss of the monopoly of violence. After the collapse
of the socialist federations, the Balkans and the post-Soviet space saw a
proliferation of weapons of all kinds, from small firearms to tanks, aircraft
and artillery. Most of the hardware came from the stockpiles of the Red
Army and the Yugoslav Army. What was needed in addition was provided
by international arms dealers, to whom the numerous new and quite perme-
able international borders posed no serious hindrance.
State weakness also means that the state is no longer able to penetrate
the territory with its institutions, and part of the state’s territory becomes de
facto governed by alternative institutions, such as clans, criminal networks,
rebel governments or local potentates. In such ‘lost territories’, social security
is provided by family ties, education by grandparents and protection by
private ‘firms’. In short, state weakness fosters the creation of parallel or
alternative institutions, which tend to be more private and more criminal
than the crumbling state institutions. In the mid-1990s, both Kosovo and
Chechnya had become, from the perspective of the central state, such ‘lost
territories’. In Chechnya, between 1994 and 1999, the Russian state was all
but absent and the Chechens have, though with no success, tried to establish
their alternative state structures. In Kosovo, the Serbian state maintained its
presence, though only by means of violence and at a considerable cost. The
Kosovars reacted by establishing parallel ‘shadow’ institutions, and by 1998
they had had their shadow state fully in place.
In both cases, low-intensity conflicts were well under way since the early
1990s, and restricted but organised violence became part of daily life. Pro-
longed violence paves the way for the emergence of markets of violence. By
‘market of violence’ I mean a situation where violence is both politically and
economically profitable for a handful of successful entrepreneurs of violence.
The organisation of violence, however, is expensive, and sustained violence
needs continual investment: warlords have to buy weapons for their soldiers,
soldiers need vehicles and vehicles need fuel. Therefore, entrepreneurs of
violence engage in a sort of economy of war which characteristically blurs
the border between legal economic activities, organised crime and warfare.
This economy tends to be integrated in transnational networks of trade and
investment. Entrepreneurs of violence engage in drug or weapon trafficking,
kidnapping, extortion, or in the black economy. Profits are reinvested or
kept in offshore banks. More often than not, sustained markets of violence
consequently become trading routes for goods with a very high value per
weight, such as drugs, gold, diamonds or weapons. In addition, markets of
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violence often serve as a hub for duty-free importation–exportation. Other
sources of revenues include profits from kidnapping or, where it is available,
the squandering of humanitarian aid.8 Lastly, when local production and
logistics are destroyed, the black economy booms, controlled by those who
have the monopoly of violence.
Both Chechnya and Kosovo, together with places like Afghanistan, Kash-
mir, Somalia, the Philippines and numerous others, qualified at a certain
stage as markets of violence.9 The ‘core’ of these conflicts is still political;
but for the entrepreneurs of violence there is an important economic rationale
for prolonging the conflict. This rationale has to be addressed analytically
and practically before any sustainable end to violence can be negotiated
between, or forced upon, the actors involved. Thus, any political solution to
such conflicts must be preceded by a strategy of raising the costs for violence,
which can only be achieved by closing the borders for supply, denying the
entrepreneurs of violence access to financial markets and/or establishing a
monopoly of violence by external powers. All of these measures, however,
are usually costly, dangerous, time-consuming and very difficult to achieve:
drying up markets of violence is a difficult task. Nation states are often
incapable of handling it, and external intervention is often not a good instru-
ment with which to tackle it either.
New wars tend to be geographically restricted, but they are embedded in trans-
national networks which link these local wars with the globalising world. The
entrepreneurs of violence depend on the transnational ties of trade and invest-
ment; on the other hand, international organisations such as the UN, the Coun-
cil of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
are monitoring the conflicts, pointing at violations of international norms and
regulations, and occasionally making attempts at conflict regulation. Once the
violence has reached a certain level, all sorts of ‘internationals’ enter the scene.
International non-governmental organisations provide help, gather informa-
tion or sponsor developments they think desirable. They act locally, but they
use the resources of their international sponsors. Newsmakers and image
distributors bring the war, as soon as it becomes an ‘event’, to the attention
of audiences all over the world. And then journalists, international relief
organisations, human rights activists, press officers and supporters of iden-
tity groups in conflict all flock to the place, ready to provide their selection
of facts to an international audience. At times, this selection is so gruesome
and compelling that the international community is forced to respond.
Chechnya and Kosovo: the responses
War used to be the ultimate domain of high politics, and high politics used
to be ruled on the basis of Realist considerations. According to this body
of literature, states go to war if their survival is at stake (or when there
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is a dominant perception that this might be the case), or if they think that
relative gains vis-à-vis other states can be made. However, both Russia’s
Chechen campaign and NATO’s Kosovo campaign are characterised by a
distinct lack of Realist interest. Realism, the self-evident traditional inter-
pretative key to international relations, fails to explain these developments:
neither NATO nor the Russian Federation went to war because its survival
was actually threatened, or because of relative gains to be made. Rather,
one of the main objectives of these wars was to satisfy the expectations of
domestic audiences, on the one hand, and to ‘send the right message’ to the
‘villains’, on the other. Both NATO and Russia wanted to make a point
with bombs. Winning these wars not only meant to outgun the enemy – it
meant above all ‘selling’ the conflict to the consumer, i.e. having the monopoly
of interpretation.
If this reason seems unconvincing, one can take a brief look at alternative
Realist explanations. As for Russia’s war in Chechnya, there have been three
sets of Realist argument: the oil argument; the domino argument; and the
geopolitical argument. None of them seems compelling.
The oil-argument sees the main motive for the war over Chechnya in the
Chechen oil-wells. The oil argument is usually supported by reference to
Chechnya’s importance as a transit route for oil from the Caspian to the
Russian terminal in Novorossiysk. There are, however, problems with this
argument. To begin with, the quantity of Chechen oil is insignificant. It has
no strategic importance, and the profits to be made are too small to warrant
activating the state’s military machine. During the final decade of the Soviet
Union, Chechen oil accounted for approximately 2 per cent of the overall
Soviet production. Since then, oil production in Chechnya has dramatically
decreased. What is more, if the war were really about oil, then it would
make no sense for Russian bombs to destroy most of the infrastructure.
Finally, Chechnya is not important as a transit route for the Caspian oil,
since the main export route will anyway go through Georgia and Turkey to
the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.
The domino argument suggests that Chechnya is the first domino to fall,
causing a chain reaction all over the Caucasus and probably reaching the
ethnic republics in Siberia and the Volga regions. The international com-
munity and, certainly, states which themselves have fought a war against
‘falling dominoes’ tend to meet this argument with understanding. However,
this line of reasoning fails any empirical test. The first Chechen war, although
won by the Chechens, has not produced a growing quest for independence
from Russia within the ethnic republics. On the contrary, Chechnya’s frag-
mentation in the inter-war period has strengthened the inclination of ethnic
elites in the republics to stay within the Russian Federation, especially so
within Chechnya’s Islamic neighbour republics Ingushetia and Daghestan.
The geopolitical argument combines the oil argument and the domino
argument, and places both into the broader context of geopolitical rivalry
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between Russia, Turkey, Iran and the US, with the Caucasus as the battle-
field.10 There is no denying that geopolitics plays an important role in the
Caucasus, and it certainly does so in the minds of the political elites. How-
ever, during the last ten years Russia’s politics in the Caucasus has amounted
to nothing but a more or less orderly retreat. Russian influence in Georgia
and Azerbaijan is continually decreasing; Russia has maintained a significant
military presence only in Armenia, with the consent of the Armenians them-
selves. On the other hand, Iran and Turkey, both potential rivals to Russian
regional hegemony, have kept a relatively low profile towards the events
in Chechnya. Iran needs Russia as a supplier of weapons and nuclear tech-
nology, and also in order to balance the hegemonic aspirations of the US.
Thus, Iran’s official support for its Islamic brethren in Chechnya is moder-
ate. Turkey, on the other hand, has a deeper understanding of the ‘internal
affairs’ argument because of its own Kurdish problem. It is clearly unwilling
to take any political risks for the sake of the Chechens, although public
support in Turkey for the Chechen cause is high and prominent Chechen
politicians operate from Istanbul.
Realist explanations of Russia’s war in Chechnya are, therefore, less than
convincing. What about NATO’s motives and interests? Here, Realists
seem to face even more obstacles. In the Balkans, there are no significant
resources that would make a war worthwhile. There is no potential challenger
to NATO’s hegemony in the region, and Milosevic’s Serbia was definitely
no threat to NATO member states. There are, however, two Realist argu-
ments worth considering.
According to one argument, the aggressive nationalism of Serbia posed a
threat to the stability of the whole region, with possible effects for NATO’s
southern flank. The Serbian policy of repression and ethnic cleansing of the
Kosovars could have spread to Albania and Macedonia. Macedonia has a
significant Albanian minority, so that refugees from Kosovo could have
changed the ethnic balance there, leading to internal conflict. In another
scenario, the Albanians of Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania would have
revitalised the idea of a Greater Albania. Either way, the territorial integrity
of Macedonia would have been endangered. Were Macedonian statehood put
under question, Greek, Turkish and Serb interventions would have become
a real possibility, constituting a threat to NATO’s southern flank.
The second argument posits that the Serbian policy of repression and
ethnic cleansing created refugee flows which would, sooner rather than later,
reach EU countries. As is well known, accommodating refugees is expensive
and politically sensitive. In order to prevent this from happening, NATO
decided to force Serbia to halt its policy of aggression.
Both arguments have some credibility, but share one big flaw: a rational
actor chooses the cheapest and safest plan to achieve its objectives. A full-
scale air operation against Serbia was neither cheap nor without risk. In
order to contain Serbia, the cheapest and safest way would have been to
190 Christoph Zürcher
engage the Extraction Force, to keep the refugees in the neighbouring coun-
tries, and to negotiate their return in exchange for political concessions.
To sum up: neither Russia’s war in Chechnya nor NATO’s war against
Serbia can be explained by Realist interpretations and motives alone. Yet
both wars have taken place, so how do we explain them? If we follow the
official discourse of NATO, the reason for war was the protection of the
Kosovars against the criminal assaults of the Serbian state. Moscow’s official
line cited the defence of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation
and the restoration of law and order in the ‘lost territory’ of the breakaway
Chechen Republic as reasons for the ‘anti-terrorist operation’ in Chechnya.11
Both Russia and NATO had some good arguments: Milosevic’s Serbia was
without doubt guilty of gross violations of human rights; and breakaway
Chechnya had, especially after the first Chechen war, indeed become a place
where crime was rampant.
However, NATO had not gone to war in all cases of human rights’
violations in recent history, and Russia had seen too many challenges to its
state sovereignty from organised crime and obstinate regional elites without
going to war over any of those issues either.12 The official discourses grasp
only some of the reasons for war; these were merely necessary, but certainly
not sufficient, conditions.
I argue here that the decision to go to war had been shaped, apart from
the stated principles (‘protection of the human rights’ for NATO, and ‘protec-
tion of the territorial integrity and sovereign rights’ for Russia), by the
following reasons:
1 the need and opportunity to respond to the expectations of domestic
audiences;
2 the opportunity to ‘send a message’ to targeted audiences – whereas the
‘decision’ to go to war has been eased by –
3 a blurred chain of command and by an almost complete lack of democratic
control mechanisms in both cases.
I start with the third of my reasons. Russian policy is for structural reasons
incoherent: at best it is polyphonic, at worst cacophonous. Russia’s institu-
tions are still weak, political elites are engaged in endless power struggles,
and there is a strong tendency to use foreign and security policies mainly for
their symbolic value on the domestic front.13 The second Chechen war began
as a limited defence operation. The Russian army pushed the units of the
Chechen commanders out of Daghestan. This defence operation then gradu-
ally developed into a full-scale war against the Chechen guerrillas. There are
some credible assertions by former Prime Minster Sergei Stepashin that the
military plans for such operations had already been in place in early spring
1999, and that the army had just waited for an opportunity to strike. The
opportunity came when the limited defence operation against the Chechen
invasion in Daghestan proved to be successful, and hugely popular with the
public. However, there had never been a formal decision by the president;
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there had been no ultimatum to the Chechens, and there had been no parlia-
mentary debate. President Yeltsin took responsibility for the war only after
the war had become a huge public relations success for Prime Minister Putin.
The decision-making process during NATO’s war was similarly blurred,
and had a very questionable popular legitimacy. Here, decision making and
democratic legitimisation got all but lost in a thicket of delegated decisions
and pre-emptive legitimisation acts, and in evoking the spirit, but not the
letter, of the UN Security Council’s resolutions. In the end, the NATO
Council took the decision alone. It did so in the spirit of the UNSC Resolu-
tions 1199 and 1203, in the spirit of the declaration of the Contact Group
prior to the Rambouillet talks, and in the spirit of the NATO Council’s
threat from October 1998. However, it had no explicit mandate from the
UNSC, since Russia and China would have vetoed it, and there had been no
prior debate in the national parliaments of member countries.
A second objective of both wars was to meet public expectations. It is
hard to say what comes first, images, public expectations, political action or
active image manipulation. At the start there was probably an image, e.g. a
picture of a refugee who had barely escaped from ethnic cleansing, with a
burning house in the background. This image created public expectations:
‘Somebody must do something about it!’ Public expectations prompted polit-
ical action, and, in order to sustain the public mood, creative management of
the information flow was generating more images. The image, the expectation,
the action and information management formed a self-sustaining process.
Once the circle begins to spin, each component reinforces the others.
The images of Kosovar refugees fuelled public indignation. Ethnic cleans-
ing in Europe? Never again!14 The indignation was rising, and with it the
legitimisation and acceptance of war, fought by European nations in Europe
against another European state, without a UN mandate. Preparations for
war, and the war itself, were accompanied by a media campaign, skilfully
orchestrated by NATO spokesman Jamie Shea and his colleagues. Its main
actors were the Kosovar refugees, and NATO’s clean and smart high-tech
weapons. Both images contributed to the legitimisation of war – the refugees
were standing evidence that someone had to do something, and a display of
weapons certified that NATO could do the job, with high efficiency and
minimal collateral damage.15
Things were somewhat different in the case of Chechnya: Russia had lost
not only the first Chechen war on the battlefield, but the information war
itself. Images of a demoralised army, of senseless destruction and the van-
dalised corpses of Russian soldiers had forced a sharp anti-war turn in the
Russian public opinion, finally leading to the cease-fire of Khasavyurt in
1996.
In the first war, the Russian army had made the same mistake as the
Serbs during their war against the Kosovars: they had treated journalists as
enemies and tried to keep them out. Journalists sneaked into Chechnya and
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Kosovo anyway with the help of the locals. Consequently, they reported
from the Chechen and the Kosovar side, and media coverage often reflected
only Chechen and Kosovar views.
By August 1999, the Russians had learned their lesson: during the second
Chechen war, journalists were guests of the Russian army, witnessing its
‘police operation’, while the Chechen victims’ perspective was hardly notice-
able in the Russian papers and TV screens. Instead, it was the images of
tortured and executed hostages of the Chechen criminal gangs that were
widely disseminated and presented to the European politicians.16
These manipulated images conveyed the impression of a highly motiv-
ated and technically up-to-date Russian army successfully conducting a
police operation against the Chechen bandits. These images catered to the
principal demand of the Russian population, as was revealed by numerous
polls: a quest for poryadok, order. It also played into the hands of Vladimir
Putin, the previously unknown KGB apparatchik chosen by Boris Yeltsin
and his entourage to become Russia’s next President. When Putin became
Prime Minister in August 1999, only a few Russians knew him, and even
fewer liked him. However, skyrocketing approval ratings soon rewarded his
decisive and tough stance on Chechnya. On 1 January 2000, he became
acting-president, and on 26 March 2000 he easily won the presidential elec-
tions in the first round. Without the war in Chechnya – which gave Putin
ample opportunity to demonstrate his determination, decisiveness and
toughness – there probably would have never been a President Putin.
Images of the second Chechen war easily captured the minds and hearts
of the electorate. They proved to be a powerful message, saying Putin =
poryadok. By the same token, images of NATO aircraft taking off and
landing, and images of refugees gradually turning into cheerful crowds,
applauding NATO’s war efforts, sent the message to domestic audiences in
Europe and the US: ‘NATO is doing something about it, and it is fair.’ Ten
years after the end of the Cold War and the virtual loss of its principal
raison d’être, the Alliance had finally found a new mission: the Europeans
had found a sort of common identity in a common war, and the ‘West’ had
finally showed to the ‘rest’ that it would stand up and fight for its principles.
While domestic audiences in both cases were important recipients, they
were not the only ones. Images of war are polysemantic: on the one hand,
Russian bombs in Chechnya
To self: Putin = order
To other: No breakaway
Nato bombs in Serbia
To self: We protect human rights
To other: Do not mess with NATO
Figure 5 Polysemantics of war images
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they must target domestic audiences in order to synchronise domestic moods
with the political actions taken by the elite; on the other hand, they must
deliver a message to the ‘other’. Thus, NATO aircraft were delivering a
message to Milosevic, and also to potential Milosevics. The message read:
‘Those who do not respect the basic principle of human rights face a deter-
mined response from NATO.’ Operation Allied Force just drove that point
home, restoring NATO’s ‘credibility’ after months of empty threats. The
same is true of the Russian bombs: they were meant to bomb into submis-
sion the Chechen guerrillas and/or to prove Putin’s toughness; but they also
carried a message to other potential ‘breakaway’ republics.
The problem, however, is that messages can be unwittingly or deliber-
ately misinterpreted, and read by others than the intended recipients. Thus,
NATO’s message, originally meant for Milosevic and intended for domestic
consumption, was received by and deciphered in Russia. To Russia, it said:
‘NATO is willing to violate the principle of sovereignty, without consent of
the United Nations.’ On the other hand, the message Russia sent to domes-
tic consumers and would-be separatists said to NATO countries: ‘Russia is
willing to violate human rights on a large scale for the sake of her imperial
ambitions.’ The result was an on-going war of interpretation, a cooling down
of East–West relations and the fallout in ‘real’ Russian politics.
Epilogue: reflections in a distorting mirror
The conflicts in Chechnya and Kosovo are in many ways closely linked. There
is a remarkable similarity between the two cases. Both are post-socialist and
post-imperial conflicts, and both share the characteristics of ‘new wars’. The
responses of Russia and NATO were also in many ways similar: both have
been largely influenced by domestic considerations and by the need and the
opportunity to ‘send messages’. Another similarity lies in the fact that pure
Realist approaches are not well suited to explain these wars.
Chechnya and Kosovo are also linked because these twin conflicts serve
as an interface between Russia and the West. It is not that Russia has any
Realist interests in Kosovo, or that ‘the West’ has any similar interest in
Chechnya. Nor, for that matter, is it that ‘the West’ has any significant
influence on the events in Chechnya, or Russia any significant influence on
the events in Kosovo.17 However, it is over Chechnya and Kosovo that
Russia and the West engage in debates: it is here that both test the actual
market value of their principles and measure their actual weight in Realpolitik.
It is primarily over Chechnya–Kosovo that Russia and the West are playing
the game of mutual integration/insulation.
Prior to the Kosovo crisis there were numerous attempts at integrating
Russia into the West’s Balkan policy, for example as a member of the
Contact Group for Bosnia, as co-chair of the Dayton Conference, and as a
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participant of SFOR and KFOR. These attempts at integrating Russia in
the Western policy were, however, a facilitation for East–West relations
rather than a significant contribution to European policy on the Balkans. At
present Russia has neither the resources for nor any serious interests in
being a key player in the Balkans. Russia’s primary interest in the region is,
above all, in defining its position vis-à-vis the West. Before the outbreak of
the Kosovo crisis, Russia took a flexible and pragmatic stand on Western
policy on the Balkans: it was generally supportive, but in certain symbolic
matters ostentatiously kept its distance. For example, it wished, and obtained,
some sort of autonomy for the Russian units within SFOR.
The outbreak of the Kosovo crisis changed that situation. The more the
West (NATO and EU member states) sought Russian support for its policy
towards the Milosevic regime, the more reluctant Russia became. When
NATO aircraft demonstratively carried out manoeuvres over the former
Yugoslavia in June 1998, the Kremlin no less demonstratively received
Milosevic for talks in Moscow. Although Russia supported UNSC Resolu-
tion 1199, it tried to slow down the efforts of the Contact Group to imple-
ment decisive action on Serbian non-compliance, and made it clear that it
would under no circumstances support NATO air strikes.
Russia’s reluctance to support Western policy paralysed the UN. As a
result NATO emerged as the key player in the Kosovo drama, and signalled
that it would act without a UN mandate, if necessary. This, in turn, stiffened
Russian resistance to what, in the end, became unilateral NATO policy in
the Balkans. When NATO started Operation Allied Force, diplomatic and
public reactions in Moscow were extremely harsh, and Russian top politicians
gloomily spoke about a new Cold War, or even hinted at the possibility of a
third world war.18 The Kosovo crisis suddenly showed a deep rift between
Russia and the West, and it seemed that the policy of mutual integration
and accommodation had proved a failure. It had indeed been a pet idea of
Russian foreign policy to integrate and thus constrain NATO into interna-
tional regimes, such as the UN or the OSCE. Until 1997, one of Russia’s
favourite ideas was to put the OSCE in charge of NATO. Likewise, the
West had attempted to integrate and constrain Russia in Western institutions
and policies. The Kosovo crisis has demystified these mutual attempts at
integration for what they were – benevolent and useful simulations.
NATO air strikes were seen in Russia, and not without good reason, as
an arrogant demonstration of power, a violation of international norms and
regulations, and ultimately as a threat to Russian national security and to
international stability in general. Consequently, paragraph 3 of the new
Russian National Security Doctrine, adopted in April 2000, states:
[A] destabilizing impact on the military–political situation is exerted by attempts
to weaken the existing mechanism for safeguarding international security
(primarily, the United Nations and the Organisation for Security and Coop-
eration in Europe) . . . [and ] by the use of coercive military actions as a means
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of ‘humanitarian intervention’ without the sanction of the UN Security
Council, in circumvention of the generally accepted principles and norms of
international law.19
NATO air strikes ended in June 1999. A month later, the second Chechen
war began. When the West expressed disapproval and protest over the gross
violation of human rights by the Russian army, this criticism was widely
rejected in Russia as hypocrisy.
The high-intensity conflicts in Chechnya and Kosovo are over, but the
war of interpretation is still going on, and binds the two cases even closer
together. Russia claims that NATO’s action was a violation of the interna-
tional norms, especially of the UN Charter. NATO declares that its actions
were justified, because they were aimed at the protection of the human
rights of the Kosovars. On the other hand, Russia claims to be defending its
territorial integrity and sovereign rights in Chechnya, while the West main-
tains that Russia is violating the international norms, especially the human
rights of the Chechen civilians. The debates on what Kosovo was about,
and what its implications really are, are also crucial for an understanding
of what Chechnya is about, and vice versa. Kosovo and Chechnya have
become synonyms, two signs forced to share a single referent – while that
referent is actually contested. Chechnya is the reflection of Kosovo. But this
mirror is a distorting mirror.
NATO probably feels no urge to look into the mirror for the time being.
It has won the war, and while the UN is working hard to restore a civilian
administration in Kosovo, NATO is busy managing its impressive collec-
tion of pictures from the war: here a happy refugee, there a clean cockpit
video. For Russia, the distorting mirror will not go away any time soon,
and she feels dizzy. In order to find a hold, Russia gladly embraced a new
president. He has a black belt in Judo, and he is likely to abolish all
mirrors.
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